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Almost every introductory industrial organization book explains the classical 
theory of firms through an entrepreneur who burdens financial risk of bankruptcy 
in the hope for profits. In order to generate some output, workers are hired and 
their wage is determined on a spot market. Since the entrepreneur provides 
capital and also carries full responsibility, he or she has the whole decision-making 
power in the firm. In a perfectly competitive world, such organization of markets 
leads to a maximization of society’s welfare. In Reality, however, many ifs and 
buts prevent efficient allocations through market forces. In many cases 
dysfunctions are caused by market failures. Another reason for market 
inefficiency is a political intervention that prevents efficient yet socially undesired 
market equilibria. A political intervention into markets however has not to be 
harmful per se. It can also be used to increase market performance by avoiding 
market dysfunctions. Market failures and political interventions ensure that 
unregulated welfare maximizing markets are rather the exception than the rule.  
Labor markets belong to the strongest regulated markets in industrial countries 
and, especially in continental Europe, they are far away from unregulated spot 
markets. The analysis of effects of a very particular political intervention into the 
German labor market is the topic of this thesis. I analyze how mandatory 
codetermination affects different issues of company’s performance. In principle, 
mandatory codetermination means that the legislator constrains the firm owner’s 
decision rights by giving codetermination and veto rights regarding the owner’s 
decisions or even by shifting some decision power from the owner to the 
employees. 
The German system of codetermination consists of two pillars. On the one hand, 
employees are allowed to adopt works councils. A works councilor represents the 
interests of employees at establishment level. The source of these 
codetermination rights is the Works Constitution Act. It grants extensive 
information, consultation and codetermination rights with respect to social and 
work place-related aspects. On the other hand, the Codetermination Act enables 
codetermination in supervisory boards of large companies. It defines that in 
companies with at least 2000 employees, half of the seats of the supervisory 
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board has to be allocated to labor representatives. In the event that a vote results 
in a standoff, the chairman of the supervisory board has two votes. As the 
chairman is a representative of the capital side, this structure results in almost 
parity distribution of votes in the supervisory board1. Although the effects of 
codetermination by works councils in establishments and almost parity 
codetermination in supervisory boards are examined in this thesis, an emphasis is 
devoted to impacts of works councils.  
If the relevance of the German model of codetermination and its development in 
the last years are considered, a reduction of importance over several years 
followed by slightly recovery during the financial crisis can be observed. At the 
beginning of the present century, codetermination seemed to be a relic of the 
industrial society with no place in a modern information society. Michael 
Rogowski, the president of the Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie, for 
example, characterized in a STERN interview in 2004 codetermination as a 
mistake of history2. This image, however, changed in the financial crisis where the 
society seemed to rediscover the advantages of codetermination with respect to a 
rapid response capability in which employer and employee are pulling together. In 
a FAZ article in 2010, for instance, employers praise the role of German 
codetermination during the financial crisis and even highlight how fast a works 
council helped to find a way through the crisis that was, under the given 
circumstances, satisfactory for employees and employer3. Even the journal THE 
ECONOMIST highlighted the role of German works councils during the crisis in an 
article in 2010 called “Inside the Miracle”4.  
Regarding the development of codetermination in Germany in the last years, a 
decline in the number of almost parity codetermined supervisory boards and in 
the share of codetermined establishments is observed. The latter seems to 
                                                          
1 Beside almost parity codetermination, other forms of codetermination, namely one third 
codetermination and the Act on Codetermination in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industry, exist 
in German supervisory boards. With respect to codetermination in the supervisory board, 
these kinds of codetermination are not discussed in his thesis. 
2 See Anonymous (2004). 
3 See Paul and Rossbach (2010). 
4 See Anonymous (2010). 
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stabilize at a lower level. Figure 1.1 shows the development of the number of 
almost parity codetermined supervisory boards.  
 
Figure 1.1: Number of companies with almost parity codetermination 
 
Source: WSI-Datenkarte 2005 and WSI-Datenkarte 2010. 
 
After an increase between 2000 and 2002, the number of almost parity 
codetermined supervisory boards has continuously declined. This reduction 
however might be caused by the possibility to transform an almost parity 
codetermined company into a Societas Europaea (SE). Such SEs are not covered 
by the German Codetermination Act. The extent of codetermination in such 
companies is negotiated between employees and the management before 
transformation into a SE. Only if such negotiations fail, the German 
Codetermination Act applies as a subsidiary regulation.  
Regarding the development of establishment level codetermination, also a decline 
is observed. Figure 1.2 shows the development of the coverage of 
codetermination at establishment level in the private sector.  
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Figure 1.2: Development of establishment level codetermination 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IAB-Establishment Panel, waves 2000-2010. 
 
If the share of covered establishment is considered, a decline beginning at almost 
19 percent in 2000 to 13 percent in 2008 is observed. Since 2008 however this 
trend seems to be stopped and a slight increase is indicated. With respect to the 
share of covered employees, almost the same pattern can be observed. Since 
2002 the share of covered employees declined and even excessed the 50 percent 
boundary in 2007. Since 2008 after all a slightly increase can be observed.  
A better insight and an international comparison of establishment level 
codetermination between European countries provides the European Company 
survey 20095. This survey contains interviews of more than 27,000 HR managers 
and employee representatives from the EU-27 and 3 candidate countries. It shows 
that, compared to the other countries, the incidence of works councils in German 
                                                          
5 A descriptive evaluation of this survey contains Bechmann et al. (2010). 
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establishments is below average (21st place). Clearly, this does not allow assessing 
the work of work councilors. The survey also includes further qualitative 
information about German work councils. Overall, this survey contains a 
subjective assessment of the influence of German works councils by HR managers. 
They characterize works councils as a powerful institution that on the one side has 
a strong influence on decisions in establishments. Germany reaches the second 
place in a ranking regarding the influence of employee representatives on 
organizational policies. In the case of involvement of employee representatives in 
decisions concerning flexibility practices, Germany even reaches the first place. 
On the other side, codetermination seems to be very frowned upon by managers. 
Regarding management’s agreeing that employee representation is constructive 
in improving work place performance and management’s preference for direct 
consultation of employees, Germany realizes ranks in the bottom quarter of all 
examined countries. In a nutshell, the first impression arises that the incidence of 
institutional establishment level employee representation is less prevalent than in 
other European countries. These representatives are however deeply involved 
into operational decisions. Additionally, to put it more strongly, managers neither 
value nor desire such intuition compared to other European countries.  
From a theoretical perspective, different predictions of the effects of 
codetermination on firm performance exist. The neoclassical view predicts that 
mandatory codetermination is an inefficient market constraint that is only used to 
shift rents from the employer to the employee. Referring to this, Jensen and 
Meckling (1979) highlight that if codetermination increases efficiency, firms would 
introduce it voluntarily. By contrast, Levine and Tyson (1990) oppose that the lack 
of voluntary codetermination results from a welfare decreasing market failure 
that has to be eliminated by the government. Finally, Freeman and Lazear (1995) 
argue that codetermination indeed increases welfare. It is however only the 
employee who profits from participation so that the employer is not willing to 
adopt codetermination rights voluntarily. In consideration of these predictions, 
the aim of this thesis is to contribute new insights into the discussion of effects of 
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mandatory codetermination whereas the main issue is to derive which 
consequences on firms and their behavior arise.  
The structure of this thesis is as follows: in the next chapter I discuss how works 
councils affect overtime work. Beside the classical comparison of mean effects, 
this chapter contains an analysis of effects of works councils in different quantiles 
of the distribution of overtime hours and effects conditional on the agreed 
working hours. Works councils are encouraged by law to support the 
reconciliation of family and working life. Hence, in the third chapter, I examine 
how works councils affect working hours mismatches, i.e. mismatches between 
hours worked and the desired amount of working hours of employees, especially 
of parents. In Chapter 4, I consider how works councils affect the likelihood of 
overemployment and too high wage costs. In contrast to other studies, I use 
subjective assessments of managers if their establishments suffer from such 
problems and also control for heterogeneity of works councils. In the fifth 
chapter, I examine how the adoption of a works council affects employment 
growth in an establishment. Therefore, I control for potential heterogeneity 
between non-codetermined establishments and establishments that adopt a 
works council. Furthermore, I also identify the source of changes in employment 
growth. Chapter 6 analyzes productivity effects of almost parity codetermination 
in supervisory boards. In doing so, I especially analyze how ownership structures 
of companies interact with employee representatives. That is, I examine if the 
effect of codetermination depends on the existence of dominant owners and their 
role in the supervisory board. Chapter 7 contains final remarks. 
2 The effects of works councils on overtime 
hours - a censored quantile regression 
approach 
This chapter is based on the SFB 823 Discussion Paper  No. 45/12. It is co-
authored with Kornelius Kraft and Stanislav Volgushev. 
2 The effects of works councils on overtime hours - a censored quantile regression 
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2.1 Introduction 
In the last two decades the topic of overtime work has frequently been 
investigated, with a substantial number of studies analyzing how labor market 
institutions affect overtime work. In our approach, we investigate how 
codetermination at establishment level influences the extent of overtime hours. 
The German system of industrial relations is characterized by two pillars: unions 
generally bargain over wages at industry level. Workers are additionally entitled – 
but not obligated – to elect a works council as an institution of employee 
representation at establishment level which acts as the workers’ voice in 
negotiations with the management.  
Works councils have explicit codetermination and even veto rights regarding 
overtime. Workers and management preferences frequently differ widely, 
particularly with respect to the extent of overtime, and in such cases a works 
council with its legally prescribed codetermination rights might well have an 
influence on the number of overtime hours supplied. Although our study is 
restricted to the German system of codetermination, our results provide evidence 
of general interest in the question of how the amount of overtime worked is 
affected by the existence of a body of worker representatives, i.e. a 
representation of the preferences of the supply side, which possesses bargaining 
power concerning determination of working time. In this sense it is strongly 
related to the general discussion on the effects of unions on overtime hours6.  
Compared to previous studies, we analyze the determinants of the impact of 
works councils in a very detailed way. In our study, we identify the effects of 
works councils on overtime hours based on two factors that strongly influence the 
employee’s decision whether to work additional overtime or not. The first factor 
is the amount of standard working time. The effect of a works council might 
depend on the standard working hours if works councils intend to prevent 
                                                          
6 Previous studies of this topic mainly focus on the USA and UK. While in the US union 
coverage seems to reduce the likelihood and amount of overtime hours (Trejo 1993), in 
the UK Bell and Hart (1999) find positive effects of a collective bargaining agreement on 
the incidence of overtime. Kalwij and Gregory (2005) however conclude that unions are of 
minor importance with respect to overtime.  
2 The effects of works councils on overtime hours - a censored quantile regression 
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excessively long working days. The second factor is the extent of overtime hours 
itself. The decision of a works council to agree to or to oppose the scheduling of 
additional overtime hours might strongly depend on the number of overtime 
hours that are done already. Therefore, in addition to analyzing the effects of 
works council effects given different levels of standard working hours, we 
additionally use censored quantile regression in order to identify differences in 
the values of overtime work across the quantiles of its distribution7.  
With respect to German codetermination rights, only few studies on overtime 
work exist and these show conflicting results. Kölling (1997), Gold (2004) as well 
as Schank and Schnabel (2004) use the IAB Establishment Panel, a German panel 
that contains establishments from all industries, and find positive effects of work 
councils on the amount of overtime hours. However, in the last study, the results 
are not robust. Gold (2004) additionally uses the Hannover Panel and finds no 
effects of works councils. In contrast to the IAB data, this panel only contains data 
from manufacturing establishments. Hübler and Meyer (1997) also use the 
Hannover Panel and find similar results as Gold (2004). Jirjahn (2008) additionally 
controls for the attitude of the management towards employee involvement. 
Irrespective of the view of the management, he finds no effects of works councils 
on the incidence of overtime work. All the mentioned studies use establishment 
data. In contrast we use the German Socio-economic Panel, i.e. personal data8. 
The only study that analyzes the effects of works councils on overtime with 
personal data is Kraft and Lang (2008). Using a difference-in-differences approach, 
they investigate how the introduction of a works council affects overtime hours 
and find no adoption effects. The same study demonstrates that in cases where 
only the presence of a works council is considered (instead of introduction within 
a difference-in-differences framework) the amount of overtime work is reduced. 
                                                          
7 Although quantile regressions enables much more detailed inference on works councils’ 
effects, other studies mainly apply conditional mean estimators. To our knowledge only 
Wagner et al. (2006) and Addison, Teixeira and Zwick (2010) apply quantile regressions. 
The first study analyzes productivity effects and the latter one analyzes wage effects of 
works councils.   
8 Several studies use this data in order to analyze determinants of overtime work. See e.g. 
Hunt (1999), Bell et al. (2000), Bauer and Zimmermann (2000). None of these studies, 
however, control for the effects of a works council. 
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Using the waves 2001 and 2006 of the German Socio-economic Panel we find 
strong heterogeneity in the effects of works councils on overtime work: if 35 
hours per week are the standard working time, works councils increase the 
number of overtime hours. However, this effect decreases if higher quantiles are 
considered. If an employee has a 40 hours-per-week contract, works councils 
always significantly reduce the amount of overtime hours. This effect becomes 
even more pronounced if higher quantiles are analyzed.  
This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the legal 
background of German codetermination rights and some theoretical background 
that might explain different effects of works councils on overtime work. Section 
2.3 describes our data and contains a descriptive analysis of overtime hours. 
Section 2.4 contains a description of our econometric approach and a discussion 
of our results. Finally, we conclude in Section 2.5.  
 
2.2 Legal and Theoretical Background 
According to Golden (1998) as well as Clarkberg and Moen (2001) actual working 
time, i.e. the sum of standard working time and overtime work, is determined by 
the interaction of a) workers’ preferences b) employers’ demands and c) the 
institutional environment. In the standard labor supply theory where leisure is a 
normal good, employees dislike working and marginal disutility rises with the 
number of working hours so that, given a particular number of standard working 
hours, (too much) overtime work in particular generates high disutility. 
Standard working time varies in Germany between industries and companies9. 
This is relevant in the given context as, with a low number of standard working 
hours, overtime will pose less of a problem for workers. In contrast, employees 
will tend to dislike doing overtime in addition to a high number of standard 
working hours. In accordance with this theory, surveys show that the majority of 
                                                          
9 In Germany, standard working time is usually determined by collective bargaining 
agreements or, if such an agreement does not exist, individually between employee and 
employer. Works councils are not allowed to renegotiate parts of a collective agreement 
as long as such an agreement does not explicitly allow renegotiation with respect to 
particular topics. 
2 The effects of works councils on overtime hours - a censored quantile regression 
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workers would like to supply fewer hours (Constant and Otterbach 2011). 
Although no study exists on possible differences in working time preferences of 
full-time workers with different standard hours, Holst (2009) points to an 
asymmetry as part-time employees would like to work more while full-time 
employees would prefer to work fewer hours. 
As argued by Pencavel (1986), employers mostly offer a “take-it-or-leave-it” 
package concerning working hours that includes standard working hours and 
requirements concerning overtime working. From the perspective of the 
employer many factors make a specific number of hours optimal. Theories on the 
determination of hours focus on fixed (e.g. investment into firm-specific human 
capital) versus variable costs (overtime premiums) of the factor labor. Higher fixed 
costs make it optimal to increase the number of hours worked10. In some cases 
employers demand some regular overtime of their workers, or at least they 
expect a willingness to work overtime if this is necessary for operational reasons 
such as temporarily high demand for the produced goods.  
Beside employees’ preferences and employers’ demand, the institutional 
environment both restricts the range of possible working time agreements and 
also directly affects actual agreements. The institutional environment includes 
factors such as labor law and regulation, collective bargaining processes, 
normative practices and the macroeconomic climate. We consider the impact of a 
very powerful institution of the German labor market on overtime work, works 
councils. Their legal basis is the Works Constitution Act (WCA), which grants them 
considerable information, consultation and codetermination rights. Among other 
things working time arrangements are a major topic on the agenda of a works 
council. Section 87.1.3 of the WCA defines that works councils codetermine in the 
setting of temporal changes in agreed working hours. This naturally includes 
overtime work. The explicit agreement of the works council is required for the use 
of overtime in an establishment and the works council even has the right to veto 
                                                          
10 See, e.g. Hunt (1999) and Hart (2004) for a detailed discussion on the overtime decision 
from a labor supply and labor demand perspective. Additional arguments on hours 
determination and employees’ working hours preferences are provided by Lazear (1981) 
and Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996). 
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overtime work. Hauser-Ditz, Hertwig and Pries (2008) analyze a survey of 
establishments of the private sector. In this survey 81% of the managers of 1235 
codetermined establishments state that working time and overtime agreements 
are the most important agreements between management and works councils.  
Codetermination rights can be used to avoid unhealthy and irksome working 
conditions. In addition works councils are encouraged to pursue social goals such 
as the reconciliation of family and working life. Too many working hours strain the 
worker’s health as well as their social life and this may well induce works councils 
to oppose (too much) overtime work. This opposition will presumably become 
more pronounced with every additional working hour. In principle, this 
codetermination right also offers works councils the opportunity to persuade the 
management to hire additional employees instead of resorting to overtime.  
As mentioned in our introduction, works councils are not mandatory. This offers 
the opportunity to analyze possible differences in overtime work between 
employees of establishments with a works council and those without. The use of 
quantile regressions furthermore allows us to consider the effects of works 
councils for different quantiles of the overtime distribution and to test the 
hypothesis that works councils will exert some pressure on the management if 
overtime hours are considered excessive but will tolerate small amounts of 
overtime. 
In addition, the expected effect of the existence of a works council may depend 
on the number of standard working hours. If the number of standard working 
hours is low, additional disutility connected with overtime working will tend to be 
low and works councils will probably accept overtime work or might even 
encourage the use of it in order to increase total wage payments. In contrast, if 
the agreed standard working time already implies many hours, disutility from 
doing overtime will instead be high and the employees’ representative body may 
well oppose demands of the employers to increase working time.  
Contrary to our previous hypothesis that works councils tend to reduce overtime 
work, an opposite effect might also be conceivable. Besides having a direct 
influence on overtime, work councils are also able to influence the amount of 
2 The effects of works councils on overtime hours - a censored quantile regression 
approach 
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overtime work indirectly. As stated above, the most efficient number of 
employees and overtime hours results from minimizing the sum of fixed costs of 
employment and variable costs (overtime premiums) of the factor labor. Fixed 
costs include adjustment costs such as hiring and firing costs. Works councils have 
strong codetermination rights with respect to hires and dismissals. They are able 
to avoid hires and dismissals for particular reasons11. Furthermore, they bargain 
over redundancy payments if dismissals take place. This clearly influences hiring 
and dismissal costs and may well imply an indirect influence on overtime work if 
the cost relation between employment adjustment and overtime has been 
altered. In this case overtime work would be more frequently observed in 
codetermined establishments.   
 
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
For our empirical approach, we use waves 2001 and 2006 from the German Socio-
Economic Panel. Further information about this data is provided by Wagner, Frick 
and Schupp (2007)12. We construct a dataset that only contains employees from 
the private sector between the ages of 20 and 60. We also drop employees from 
establishments that employ less than 5 workers because these establishments are 
not allowed to adopt a works council. Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of 
our variables.  
Our dependent variable is overtime hours. This variable measures the mean 
number of overtime hours worked per week. In our sample an employee works on 
average 3.071 overtime hours. Table 2.1 also contains some further variables with 
respect to overtime that are not used in the estimation but provide additional 
information on this issue. The dummy overtime work shows that 75.5 % of all 
observations worked overtime. Thus, our dependent variable is left-censored. Of 
                                                          
11 See Gralla and Kraft (2011a) for a more detailed discussion on codetermination rights of 
works councils with respect to hires and dismissals. 
12 The data used in this study was extracted using the Add-On PanelWhiz for Stata®. 
PanelWhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew 
(john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2010) for details. The PanelWhiz 
generated do-file to retrieve the data used here is available from us upon request. Any 
data or computational errors in this study are our own.   
2 The effects of works councils on overtime hours - a censored quantile regression 
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those persons working overtime, the mean length of overtime work is 4.069 hours 
per week.   
Our main independent variable is the dummy works council. This dummy has unit 
value if the observed person works in an establishment in which a works council 
exists. In our sample 57.6 % of all employees work in codetermined 
establishments.  
Another covariate is the standard working time per week. There is a large number 
of studies discussing the effect of standard hours on overtime work in a work-
sharing context13. Both in theory and in empirical studies the effects of standard 
working time on overtime hours are ambiguous. As mentioned earlier, an 
attenuation of the effect of standard working hours could be expected in 
codetermined establishments: if the marginal disutility of work rises with 
increasing working time and the aim of the overtime policy is avoidance of 
irksome working conditions, works councils will more often oppose the 
introduction or increase of overtime hours if standard working time is already 
high compared to cases where standard working time is rather low. Therefore the 
effects of works councils on the amount of overtime hours might depend on the 
level of standard working time. In order to control for such possible differences 
we also add an interaction term of works council and standard working time to 
our model.  
We additionally control for person-specific characteristics. We control for the 
effects of education by adding two dummies, university degree and vocational 
training, into our model. These variables have unit value if the highest educational 
degree is a university degree or a completed apprenticeship. We also add the 
variable tenure in our model. This variable measures job tenure in years. In order 
to control for age effects, we add age and age2 into our model. Female measures 
the effect of gender on the amount of overtime work and this variable has unit 
value if the observed person is a woman. 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., Hunt (1999). Andrews, Schank and Simmons (2005) provide a short summary 
of previous studies on the effect of a change in standard working hours on actual working 
hours. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Overtime hours 3.071 3.873 
Overtime hours given that person works overtime 4.069 3.977 
Overtime work (dummy) 0.755 0.430 
Works council (dummy) 0.576 0.494 
Agreed working hours per week (x10) 362.461 63.595 
University degree (dummy) 0.175 0.380 
Vocational training (dummy) 0.700 0.458 
Tenure 10.261 9.040 
Age 40.788 9.754 
Female (dummy) 0.393 0.488 
Blue-collar worker (dummy) 0.429 0.495 
Firm size: 5-19 workers  (dummy) 0.193 0.394 
Firm size: 20-99 workers (dummy) 0.222 0.416 
Firm size: 100-199 workers (dummy) 0.112 0.315 
Firm size: 200-1999 workers (dummy) 0.238 0.426 
Firm size: 2000 workers and more (dummy) 0.235 0.424 
East Germany (dummy) 0.201 0.401 
Obs. 7395  
 
We control for occupation by adding the dummy blue-collar worker. This dummy 
has unit value if the observed person is a blue-collar worker. Differences between 
East and West Germany are measured by the dummy east. Finally, we add a year 
dummy, five establishment size dummies and nine industry dummies into our 
model in order to control for year, size and industry effects.  
Table 2.2 shows mean values and tests differences of selected variables between 
establishments with and without a works council. Based on the full sample, the 
upper part of the table shows the means of both groups and the differences 
between them. Both the unconditional mean level of overtime hours and the 
mean number of overtime hours, given that an employee works overtime, do not 
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differ between employees from establishments with and without a works council. 
Nor do the incidence of overtime work and agreed working hours. The differences 
are always positive but of small magnitude and none of the variables are 
significantly different from each other. In the next step we only consider full-time 
employees. If we compare the means given that a person works at least 35 hours 
per week, the sign of the differences changes but they are still insignificant.  
 
Table 2.2: Mean comparison tests of selected variables 
 Works council No works council Difference 
All    
Overtime hours 3.087 3.050 0.037 
Overtime hours given that 
person works overtime 4.070 4.066 0.004 
Overtime work (dummy) 0.758 0.750 0.008 
Number of observations 4262 3133  
Only persons with at least 35 agreed  
working hours per week    
Overtime hours 3.265 3.375 -0.109 
Overtime hours given that 
person works overtime 4.224 4.293 -0.069 
Overtime work (dummy) 0.773 0.786 -0.013 
Number of observations 3656 2510  
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2.4 Method and Results 
Our empirical study is based on two different estimation strategies. In general, we 
use two samples. The first sample contains all observations. The second sample is 
restricted to people who work at least 35 hours per week, which implies that this 
sample mainly contains full-time employees. Using each sample we estimate a 
model that identifies the effects of the existence of a works council on overtime 
hours (taking into account influences by other covariates). Based on the second 
sample we additionally estimate a model that controls for different effects of 
works councils given the particular level of contracted standard working time i.e. 
we add the interaction term works council x agreed working hours to our model14.  
First, we consider a Tobit model in order to provide results which can be 
compared with the findings of other studies. Note that this approach only 
estimates mean effects, i.e. it assumes that the effect of a works council does not 
differ in different quantiles of the overtime distribution. As heteroscedasticity 
leads to inconsistent regression results in a Tobit framework, we replace the 
variance 2σ  in the log-likelihood function by  2 2 2i i[exp(w ' )]σ = σ α . In this 
expression α  is a vector of estimated coefficients of the heteroscedasticity term 
and wi is a vector of several size and industry dummies15. We also perform Wald 
tests with the null hypothesis that the size and industry dummies have no 
influence on 2σ . In every estimated model we have to reject the null of 
homoscedasticity at 1%-level. Thus, the heteroscedastic Tobit model is the 
relevant one.  
The last two columns in table 2.3 show the average marginal effects of the works 
council dummy (models 1 & 2) and the average marginal effects of the works 
council dummy given a particular level of the contracted standard hours (model 
3). Standard errors are robust and clustered at individual level. We calculate two 
different types of average marginal effects: the column E(h|h>0) shows the 
                                                          
14 We also estimated this model using the full sample. Our results of the interaction term 
are mainly driven by full-time employees. Thus, we refrain from showing the estimated 
results of this model based on the larger sample and concentrate on the sample of full-
time employees.   
15 See, e.g., Greene (2008) for a discussion of heteroscedasticity in Tobit models.  
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average marginal effect of a works council on the level of overtime hours given 
that an employee works overtime, while the column Pr(h>0) contains the average 
marginal effect of work councils on the likelihood of overtime work16.  
In model 1 and model 2, we find no significant effects of works councils on the 
extent and the likelihood of overtime work. However, if we add the interaction 
term 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 ×  𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠  to our model and calculate 
average marginal effects given a particular amount of agreed working hours, we 
find heterogeneous results. Although our specification allows us to calculate the 
marginal effect at any particular contracted working time, we only show the 
effects at the levels of 35 and 40 hours. The unions frequently ask for a level of 35 
standard hours and, as a rule of thumb, usually 35 hours are regarded as a kind of 
minimum level of working time in the case of full-time employees. This number of 
standard working time is effective for 11 percent of our full-time observations. 40 
agreed working hours are the mode of standard working time. In our sample, 41 
percent of all observations state 40 hours as their contracted working time.  
Table 2.3 shows that for an employee who has a 35-hour employment contract, 
the likelihood of working overtime increases by 8.3 percentage points if a works 
council exists. Additionally, on average he or she also works 0.721 overtime hours 
more per week. In contrast, an employee with a standard working time of 40 
hours works on average 0.385 overtime hours less. The probability of working 
overtime also decreases by 4.0 percentage points.  
 
  
                                                          
16 The average marginal effects are calculated by the margins command of STATA. For a 
detailed discussion of marginal effects in Tobit models, see Greene (2008). A detailed 
explanation of the margins command is provided by Cameron and Trivedi (2010).  
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Table 2.3: Average marginal effects of heteroscedastic Tobit models 
 Effect of works 
councils at … agreed 
working hours 
E(h|h>0) Pr(h>0) 
Model 1 No differentiation -0.167  (0.110) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
Model 2 No differentiation -0.167 (0.126) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
Model 3 
35 
0.721*** 
(0.230) 
0.083*** 
(0.028) 
40 -0.385*** (0.138) 
-0.040*** 
(0.014) 
Notes: Model 1 is based on 7395 observations of part-time and full-time 
employees, Models 2 and 3 are based on 6166 observations of employees with at 
least 35 standard working hours. ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at 
individual level. Standard errors in Model 3 are calculated by the delta method. For 
full estimation results see Table 2.5 in the Appendix. 
 
As mentioned previously, Tobit models only estimate the mean effect of work 
councils on overtime work. Particularly with respect to overtime work the 
presence of a works council might exert a different influence among different 
quantiles of the distribution of overtime hours. This hypothesis can be motivated 
by increasing marginal disutility from working, inducing works councils to prohibit 
excessively long working days. In order to identify the effect of works councils on 
different parts of the distribution of overtime hours, we consider a linear quantile 
regression model17. To cope with the presence of censoring, we propose the use 
of the estimator of Peng and Huang (2008). See the description below for more 
details. In our approach, we focus on the upper part of the distribution that is on 
quantiles between the median and the 0.9 quantile because we expect an 
influence of a works council at the upper tail.  
Our reasons for choosing the method of Peng and Huang (2008) instead of the 
Powell (1986) estimator were twofold. First, for the present sample the approach 
                                                          
17 See, e.g, Koenker (2005). 
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of Powell (1986) presents considerable computational difficulties. Second, as 
discussed in Koenker (2008), the use of Peng and Huang (2008) methodology has 
advantages in terms of efficiency, i.e. the estimators typically have a smaller 
asymptotic variance. A detailed comparison of the two methodologies can be 
found in Koenker (2008) and Portnoy (2010).  
For a precise description of the Peng and Huang (2008) approach, denoted by  
𝑌�𝑖,𝑗 the overtime hours of person i = 1,…,N in year j = 1,…,ni, by  
𝑍𝑖,𝑗 the corresponding covariate and define 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐼�𝑌�𝑖,𝑗 > 0�  as censoring 
indicators. The observations corresponding to zero overtime hours are thus 
considered as left-censored. In order to transform left censoring into right 
censoring, we `reversed time´, that is we set  
𝜏 = 1 − ?̃? and 𝑌𝑖,𝑗 ≔ −𝑌�𝑖,𝑗. Define an equally spaced grid of quantile values as  
𝜏𝑘 = 𝑘100 , 𝑘 = 0, … ,50. Set 𝐼�𝑌𝑖,𝑗 ≥ ?̅?(0)𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑗� ≡ 1 and sequentially define the 
estimator ?̅?(𝜏𝑘) as approximate solution of the estimation equation  
 
��𝑍𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
�𝛿𝑖,𝑗𝐼�𝑌𝑖,𝑗 ≤ ?̅?(𝜏𝑘)𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑗� − � 𝐼�𝑌𝑖,𝑗 ≥  ?̅?(𝑢)𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑗�𝜏𝑘
0
𝑑𝑢1 − 𝑢� ≈ 0                 (2.1) 
 
with ?̅?(𝑢) ≔ ?̅?(𝜏𝑘−1) for 𝑢 ∈ [𝜏𝑘−1, 𝜏𝑘). The estimators of the coefficients in the 
left-censored model are now given by (?̂?(𝑢))𝑢∈[0.5,0.9] ≔ (−?̅?(1 − 𝑢))𝑢∈[0.5,0.9]. 
Standard errors are estimated by means of a clustered bootstrap method where 
for each i = 1,…,N the observations �𝑌𝑖,1,𝑍𝑖,1,𝛿𝑖,1�, … , (𝑌𝑖,𝑛𝑖 ,𝑍𝑖,𝑛𝑖 ,𝛿𝑖,𝑛𝑖) were 
considered as cluster. More precisely, we create N i.i.d. variables 𝜉1, … , 𝜉𝑁 that 
follow an exponential distribution with parameter one and consider estimating 
equations of the form 
 
�𝜉𝑖�𝑍𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
�𝛿𝑖,𝑗𝐼�𝑌𝑖,𝑗 ≤ ?̅?(𝜏𝑘)𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑗� − � 𝐼�𝑌𝑖,𝑗 ≥  ?̅?(𝑢)𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑗�𝜏𝑘
0
𝑑𝑢1 − 𝑢� ≈ 0.                (2.2) 
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Note that this approach is an extension of the bootstrap proposed by Peng and 
Huang (2008). The difference is that we account for possible dependencies within 
clusters. All results are based on 100 bootstrap replications. Computation was 
performed using Roger Koenker’s quantreg package for the software R. Table 2.4 
shows the results of this approach.  
In Model 1, we find that the effect of a works council strongly depends on the 
quantile under consideration. At q(0.5), i.e. the median, works councils have a 
negligible effect on overtime hours. In higher quantiles, however the impact of 
the works council increases: the value of the 0.6 quantile is approximately 15 
minutes lower for employees of codetermined establishments compared to 
employees from establishments without works councils. The difference increases 
to almost one hour per week at the 0.9 quantile. If we use the sample that only 
contains full-time employees, the results hardly change. The effect of the works 
council at the median triples, although it is still insignificant. The coefficients at 
the other quantiles are comparable to the results of Model 1, although the 
significance levels at q(0.6) and q(0.7) decrease.  
In Model 3, we find a strong heterogeneity in the effects of works councils. On the 
one hand, the impact of a works council strongly depends on standard working 
time. On the other hand, it also strongly depends on the regarded quantile of the 
distribution. Regarding the effects from q(0.5) to q(0.7), the values of the 
conditional quantiles are approximately 1 hour higher in codetermined 
establishments than in non-codetermined establishments if an employee regularly 
works 35 hours per week. This difference, however, decreases at higher quantiles 
and disappears at the 0.9 quantile.  
In contrast, employees with a 40-hours employment contract always work fewer 
overtime hours than employees from non-codetermined establishments. We find 
a significant reduction in overtime hours at the median, and the magnitude of this 
effect increases with higher quantiles. While at the median an employee of a 
codetermined establishment works approx. 20 minutes less than an employee 
from an establishment without a works council, this difference increases to 
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approximately one hour and 18 minutes if the 0.9 quantiles of both groups of 
employees are compared.  
 
Table 2.4: The effect of works councils on overtime hours (censored quantile 
regression) 
 Effect of 
works councils 
at … agreed 
working hours 
Quantiles 
q(0.5) q(0.6) q(0.7) q(0.8) q(0.9) 
Model 
1 
No 
differentiation 
-0.047 
(0.139) 
-0.245** 
(0.114) 
-0.361** 
(0.152) 
-0.587*** 
(0.167) 
-0.948*** 
(0.308) 
Model 
2 
No 
differentiation 
-0.132 
(0.160) 
-0.194 
(0.119) 
-0.321* 
(0.177) 
-0.523*** 
(0.201) 
-0.863*** 
(0.360) 
Model 
3 
35 
0.959*** 
(0.360) 
0.953*** 
(0.366) 
1.023** 
(0.406) 
0.762* 
(0.435) 
0.252 
(0.531) 
40 
-0.341** 
(0.163) 
-0.556*** 
(0.173) 
-0.641*** 
(0.232) 
-1.017*** 
(0.286) 
-1.295*** 
(0.444) 
Notes: Model 1 is based on 7395 observations of part-time and full-time employees, Models 2 
and 3 are based on 6166 observations of employees with at least 35 standard working hours. 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications and clustered at individual 
level. For full estimation results see Tables 2.6 – 2.8 in the Appendix. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Although works councils have extensive codetermination rights with respect to 
overtime work, only a few studies on this topic exist. In our study, we analyze how 
overtime working differs between establishments with works councils and 
establishments without works councils. On average works councils do not affect 
overtime hours. However, we find a strong heterogeneity in the effects of works 
councils, which depend on the one hand on the standard working time. On the 
other hand, the effect of a works council strongly differs among quantiles of the 
distribution of overtime hours. If the number of regular working hours is low, an 
employee of a codetermined establishment works more overtime than an 
employee of a non-codetermined establishment yet this effect decreases with 
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higher quantiles. In contrast, if standard working time is high, works councils 
reduce overtime working at the median. This prevention effect actually increases 
with higher quantiles.  
Thus the effects of a works council on overtime hours depend heavily on the 
specific circumstances. How are these somewhat surprising results explained? If 
works councils do what they are expected to do, namely represent the workers’ 
interests and preferences, the results could be interpreted in the following way: in 
the case of a working week of 35 hours disutility from working is lower than 
wages including overtime premiums, but with 40 hours the contrary is true. Work 
councils do not prevent overtime work in general. Our results provide evidence 
that they prevent an excessively long working week. 
Our approach illustrates the use of quantile regressions to investigate the 
different effects of an institution like the works council on various regions of the 
response variable. This demonstrates the potential for further application of this 
method in many other areas and should help to provide a much more detailed 
and realistic comprehension of the working of institutions.  
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2.6 Appendix 
Table 2.5: Heteroscedastic Tobit results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coeff. (Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works council -0.264 (0.174) 
-0.252 
(0.190) 
13.507*** 
(3.219) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10 0.010*** (0.001) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 
Works council x 10    
-0.035*** 
(0.008) 
University degree 2.409*** (0.298) 
2.617*** 
(0.329) 
2.633*** 
(0.328) 
Completed apprenticeship 1.176*** (0.238) 
1.312*** 
(0.265) 
1.310*** 
(0.263) 
Tenure -0.014 (0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
Age 0.252*** (0.051) 
0.263*** 
(0.055) 
0.263*** 
(0.055) 
Age2 -0.003*** (0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Female -1.979*** (0.168) 
-1.985*** 
(0.178) 
-1.977*** 
(0.178) 
Blue collar -1.772*** (0.177) 
-1.850*** 
(0.193) 
-1.875*** 
(0.194) 
Size 20-99 0.445** (0.201) 
0.393* 
(0.219) 
0.425* 
(0.219) 
Size 100-199 0.527** (0.256) 
0.506* 
(0.278) 
0.561** 
(0.278) 
Size 200-1999 0.560** (0.229) 
0.420* 
(0.251) 
0.425* 
(0.251) 
Size >1999 0.842*** (0.252) 
0.598** 
(0.275) 
0.577** 
(0.276) 
East 0.330* (0.169) 
0.203 
(0.185) 
0.212 
(0.185) 
Year2006 -0,953*** (0.114) 
-0.961*** 
(0.124) 
-0.946*** 
(0.124) 
No. of obs. 7395 6166 
Chi2-value (H0: Homosce.) 
(p-value) 
52.47 
(<0.001) 
45.24 
(<0.001) 
45.82 
(<0.001) 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Industry dummies included but not 
reported.   
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Table 2.6: Censored quantile regression results, full sample 
 Model 1 
 
q(0.5) q(0.6) q(0.7) q(0.8) q(0.9) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works council -0.047 (0.139) 
-0.245** 
(0.114) 
-0.361** 
(0.152) 
-0.587*** 
(0.169) 
-0.948** 
(0.308) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10 0.008*** (0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
University degree 2.627*** (0.429) 
1.900*** 
(0.241) 
1.877*** 
(0.258) 
2.301*** 
(0.270) 
2.165*** 
(0.402) 
Completed apprenticeship 1.690*** (0.350) 
1.050*** 
(0.186) 
0.695*** 
(0.187) 
0.549*** 
(0.188) 
0.556 
(0.298) 
Tenure -0.008 (0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
-0.033** 
(0.015) 
Age 0.193*** (0.047) 
0.178*** 
(0.055) 
0.226*** 
(0.037) 
0.268*** 
(0.047) 
0.031*** 
(0.088) 
Age2 -0.003*** (0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Female -1.490*** (0.104) 
-1.613*** 
(0.129) 
-1.741*** 
(0.173) 
-2.194*** 
(0.161) 
-2.746*** 
(2.180) 
Blue collar -1.360*** (0.137) 
-1.346*** 
(0.140) 
-1.184*** 
(0.158) 
-1.293*** 
(0.192) 
-1.624*** 
(0.252) 
Size 20-99 0.296** (0.134) 
0.390** 
(0.161) 
0.506*** 
(0.157) 
0.876*** 
(0.291) 
1.702*** 
(0.318) 
Size 100-199 0.223 (0.187) 
0.370 
(0.242) 
0.578* 
(0.305) 
0.944*** 
(0.342) 
1.278*** 
(0.468) 
Size 200-1999 0.241 (0.154) 
0.480** 
(0.204) 
0.593*** 
(0.220) 
0.835*** 
(0.264) 
1.393*** 
(0.378) 
Size >1999 0.553*** (0.144) 
0.881*** 
(0.202) 
1.229*** 
(0.260) 
1.602*** 
(0.282) 
2.390*** 
(0.509) 
East 0.269** (0.116) 
0.192** 
(0.097) 
0.216 
(0.155) 
0.332* 
(0.190) 
0.451** 
(0.207) 
Year2006 -0.750*** (0.094) 
-0.583*** 
(0.088) 
-0.563*** 
(0.128) 
-0.590*** 
(0.131) 
-0.609*** 
(0.183) 
No. of obs. 7395 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Clustered and bootstrapped 
standard errors in parentheses. Industry dummies included but not reported.  
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Table 2.7: Censored quantile regression results, full-time employees I 
 Model 2 
 
q(0.5) q(0.6) q(0.7) q(0.8) q(0.9) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works council -0.132 (0.160) 
-0.194 
(0.119) 
-0.321* 
(0.069) 
-0.523*** 
(0.201) 
-0.863** 
(0.017) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10 0.000 (0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.186) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
University degree 2.731*** (0.317) 
1.940*** 
(0.267) 
2.065*** 
(0.000) 
2.498*** 
(0.350) 
2.472*** 
(0.000) 
Completed apprenticeship 1.774*** (0.284) 
1.053*** 
(0.184) 
0.776*** 
(0.001) 
0.674*** 
(0.194) 
0.736* 
(0.055) 
Tenure -0.009 (0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.325) 
-0.028*** 
(0.011) 
-0.029 
(0.118) 
Age 0.185*** (0.048) 
0.170*** 
(0.040) 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
0.249*** 
(0.059) 
0.290*** 
(0.001) 
Age2 -0.002*** (0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.005) 
Female -1.512*** (0.110) 
-1.569*** 
(0.122) 
-1.784*** 
(0.000) 
-2.210*** 
(0.168) 
-2.737*** 
(0.000) 
Blue collar -1.417*** (0.135) 
-1.329*** 
(0.158) 
-1.244*** 
(0.000) 
-1.449*** 
(0.233) 
-1.878*** 
(0.000) 
Size 20-99 0.298** (0.152) 
0.318** 
(0.146) 
0.379** 
(0.032) 
0.619** 
(0.276) 
1.553*** 
(0.000) 
Size 100-199 0.258 (0.196) 
0.376* 
(0.215) 
0.459* 
(0.087) 
0.758** 
(0.338) 
1.287** 
(0.041) 
Size 200-1999 0.188 (0.164) 
0.305* 
(0.164) 
0.376 
(0.138) 
0.656** 
(0.301) 
1.361*** 
(0.000) 
Size >1999 0.337* (0.188) 
0.544*** 
(0.195) 
0.801*** 
(0.001) 
1.255*** 
(0.328) 
2.069*** 
(0.000) 
East 0.231** (0.105) 
0.093 
(0.137) 
0.205 
(0.281) 
0.028 
(0.176) 
0.112 
(0.667) 
Year2006 -0.707*** (0.113) 
-0.528*** 
(0.096) 
-0.586*** 
(0.000) 
-0.597*** 
(0.159) 
-0.838*** 
(0.000) 
No. of obs. 6166 
Notes: See Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.8: Censored quantile regression results, full-time employees II 
 Model 3 
 
q(0.5) q(0.6) q(0.7) q(0.8) q(0.9) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works council 10.061*** (3.157) 
11.511*** 
(2.976) 
12.707*** 
3.542 () 
13.218*** 
(4.527) 
11.076*** 
(4.200) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10 0.017** (0.007) 
0.022*** 
(0.007) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.042*** 
(0.007) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 
Works council x 10 
-0.026*** 
(0.008) 
-0.030*** 
(0.007) 
-0.033*** 
(0.009) 
-0.036*** 
(0.011) 
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
University degree 2.850*** (0.356) 
2.027*** 
(0.250) 
1.996*** 
(0.281) 
2.476*** 
(0.338) 
2.510*** 
(0.536) 
Completed apprenticeship 1.888*** (0.331) 
1.009*** 
(0.228) 
0.634** 
(0.256) 
0.700*** 
(0.214) 
0.755** 
(0.382) 
Tenure -0.013** (0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.027*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032** 
(0.013) 
Age 0.188*** (0.035) 
0.179*** 
(0.038) 
0.223*** 
(0.052) 
0.240*** 
(0.067) 
0.326*** 
(0.125) 
Age2 -0.002*** (0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Female -1.480*** (0.109) 
-1.599*** 
(0.150) 
-1.859*** 
(0.189) 
-2.212*** 
(0.220) 
-2.769*** 
(0.284) 
Blue collar -1.466*** (0.141) 
-1.344*** 
(0.128) 
-1.224*** 
(0.140) 
-1.521*** 
(0.253) 
-1.744*** 
(0.322) 
Size 20-99 0.291** (0.148) 
0.366*** 
(0.137) 
0.416*** 
(0.154) 
0.664*** 
(0.250) 
1.569*** 
(0.476) 
Size 100-199 0.318* (0.168) 
0.509** 
(0.233) 
0.521** 
(0.236) 
1.013*** 
(0.281) 
1.319*** 
(0.368) 
Size 200-1999 0.164 (0.188) 
0.345* 
(0.203) 
0.454* 
(0.245) 
0.747*** 
(0.287) 
1.335*** 
(0.468) 
Size >1999 0.304* (0.183) 
0.608*** 
(0.230) 
0.756** 
(0.298) 
1.298*** 
(0.305) 
2.168*** 
(0.623) 
East 0.234* (0.131) 
0.037 
(0.120) 
0.145 
(0.206) 
0.098 
(0.213) 
0.038 
(0.343) 
Year2006 -0.681*** (0.115) 
-0.485*** 
(0.109) 
-0.621*** 
(0.137) 
-0.570*** 
(0.139) 
-0.697*** 
(0.267) 
No. of obs. 6166 
Notes: See Table 2.6. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The standard neoclassical models of labor supply tell us that only time 
endowment restricts the employee’s working hours. Thus, working hours 
constraints, i.e. working hours that do not conform to the desired working hours 
of an employee, should not exist persistently. This prediction, however, has been 
challenged both by theoretical arguments and by empirical evidence in recent 
years. Using German data, for example, Holst (2009) as well as Constant and 
Otterbach (2011) show that there is a persistent gap between actual working time 
and desired working time, where fewer working hours are more frequently 
desired with income adjusted accordingly. Furthermore, less than fifty percent of 
all employees are satisfied with their current amount of working hours. The aim of 
our study is to analyze how works councils affect the likelihood of the existence of 
working hours constraints. Such works councils are a major institution within the 
German system of industrial relations and bargain over the organization of 
working time in an establishment18. They represent the interests of the 
employees at establishment level and have information, consultation and 
codetermination rights on a number of issues. Working time regulations in 
general and decisions on overtime are codetermined. Another emphasis of their 
activities is the recon-ciliation of work and family life. Thus, working hours 
constraints are clearly an issue that works councils may try to avoid.  
The question as to why binding working hours constraints exist has been analyzed 
in a substantial number of studies19. Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2002) as well 
as Otterbach (2010), for instance, use data from 21 countries and show that 
certain socio-economic characteristics explain the existence of a time mismatch. 
They identify income and agreed working time as major determinants of working 
hours constraints. Furthermore, family structures, especially the existence of 
children, influence the extent of desired hours and therefore a potential hours 
mismatch (Clarkberg and Moen 2001, Reynolds 2004, Tseng and Wooden 2005, 
                                                          
18 Since the 1980s a considerable number of studies on the effects of works councils have 
been published. Frege (2002), Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2004), and Jirjahn (2011) 
contain detailed surveys of this issue.  
19 See, for example, Otterbach (2010) for a survey of different studies on working hours 
constraints.  
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Holst 2007). Theoretical arguments provide no reliable explanation for working 
hours constraints. Different theoretical approaches such as principal-agent issues 
and firm-specific human capital (Kahn and Lang 1992) as well as implicit contracts 
(Kahn and Lang 1995) are at most weakly supported empirically. Job insecurity, in 
contrast, seems to have a positive influence on the likelihood of overemployment 
(Stewart and Swaffield 1997).  
Compared to the determinants of working hours constraints, the consequences of 
such time mismatches have been analyzed less frequently. Empirical evidence 
shows that working time mismatch increases the probability of an employee 
changing their job within the company and in the worst case a constrained worker 
may even quit his or her job20. At the very least, such a job change destroys the 
job-specific human capital if the employee still works for the same employer. If 
the employee actually leaves the firm, the entire firm-specific human capital is 
lost.  
Besides such welfare-decreasing effects of working hours constraints, additional 
negative effects on employee wellbeing with respect to job satisfaction and life 
satisfaction (Theodossiou and Zangelidis 2009, Wodden, Warren and Drago 2009, 
Grözinger, Matiaske and Tobsch 2008) as well as negative impact on health (Bell, 
Otterbach and Sousa-Poza 2011, Constant and Otterbach 2011, Grözinger, 
Matiaske and Tobsch 2008) have been identified. Wunder and Heineck (2012) find 
that not only an employee’s own wellbeing is negatively affected by a working 
time mismatch, but even life satisfaction of his or her partner. Finally, if the 
mismatch between preferred working time and that which the employer requires 
is large, labor supply will not take place at all and this clearly affects welfare. 
If working hours constraints are such a big issue, the question arises as to how 
works councils can help to reduce such constraints. Ellguth and Promberger 
(2007) provide evidence for a strong influence of works councils on working time. 
They find that codetermined establishments have significantly lower agreed 
                                                          
20 See e.g. Antonji and Paxson (1992), Bijwaard, van Dijk and de Koning (2008), Böheim 
and Taylor (2004), Euwals (2001).  
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weekly working hours and also strongly differ in the usage of working time 
instruments such as overtime work and working time accounts. Besides a general 
influence on working time, works councils also have the objective to support the 
reconciliation of work and family life of the employees. In principle, such 
reconciliation means, among other things, that family life should not be 
(excessively) restricted by working time. Or in other words: works councils should 
prevent working time mismatches that negatively influence family life. As already 
mentioned above, family structures indeed influence time preferences and time 
mismatch. In particular the existence of children accounts for a major part of 
one’s time endowment. Hence, a time mismatch of a working parent might 
strongly generate disutility from work because, besides insufficient leisure time, 
difficulties in childcare provision could emerge. For traditional reasons, time 
mismatch could influence women’s behavior more strongly, and even prevent 
women from labor market participation.  
Family-friendly practices are indeed more frequently used in codetermined 
establishments than in establishments without works councils. Heywood and 
Jirjahn (2009) show, for example, that the existence of a works council increases 
the likelihood of an establishment offering support with respect to childcare, 
keeping in touch with the employee during parental leave and also taking into 
account specific needs regarding working time and the job design of parents. 
Moreover, Beblo and Wolf (2004) find that codetermined establishments more 
frequently implement measures that facilitate the compatibility of work and 
family life. We therefore focus especially on the effect of works councils on 
working time constraints of parents.  
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we show that 
employees of establishments with works councils more often match their desired 
working hours, mostly due to a strong reduction of the probability of 
overemployment for parents, especially for mothers. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the legal 
background of German codetermination rights and, based on relevant working 
time mismatch theories, the potential impact of works councils on the outcome. 
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In Section 3.3, we describe our data, variables and our econometric models. 
Section 3.4 contains a discussion of our results. In Section 3.5 we discuss how a 
works council’s influence on overtime can affect working hours mismatches. 
Finally, we conclude in Section 3.6.   
 
3.2 Legal background and theoretical thoughts 
The legal basis of the power of works councils is the German Works Constitution 
Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, WCA). It defines that workers in establishments 
with at least five employees are allowed to adopt a works council. Works councils 
have extensive codetermination rights regarding social and workplace-related 
issues in an establishment. Although collective bargaining agreements might 
constrain the influence of works councils on the quantity of working hours per 
week, agreements regarding working time are the main topic area of works 
councils (Hauser-Ditz, Hertwig and Pries 2008). Above all Section 87.1.2 of the 
WCA has a fundamental influence on the quality of the working day, namely on 
beginning and ending, breaks and the distribution of working time over the week. 
Moreover, Section 87.1.3 of the WCA provides fundamental codetermination 
rights with respect to the use and amount of overtime work. Besides their 
influence on working time, works councils are also encouraged to facilitate 
reconciliation of work and family life (Section 80.1.2b of the WCA). On the one 
side works councils may contribute to a closer match of actual and preferred 
working time by agreements with the management on special arrangements 
regarding the working time of a parent. This takes into account the special 
requirements and duties of mothers and fathers. On the other side works councils 
may bargain over childcare services provided internally or externally by the 
establishment. Such employer-sponsored childcare facilities most likely affect the 
preferred working time of a parent and as such helps to alleviate a mismatch with 
actual working time in an establishment. Both options increase the likelihood of 
an improved working time match. However, not all establishments have a works 
council. In fact, only a minority do. This offers the opportunity to analyze possible 
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differences between establishments with and without a works council concerning 
hours match and mismatch.  
Besides an adjustment through codetermination rights, German employees are 
also able to alter their working time according to the provisions on part-time 
employment of the Act on Part-Time Work and Fixed-Term Employment (Teilzeit- 
und Befristungsgesetz). The aim of this act is to support the realization of part-
time work within an establishment. It allows every employee to reduce his or her 
working time as long as the change in working time does not unduly burden the 
employer. Although this act supports the possibility of an employee to reduce his 
or her working hours, a significant proportion of German employees are, as 
mentioned above, overemployed. Despite the fact that no direct link between this 
act and codetermination rights exists, works councils can still support the 
enforcement of the desired working time reduction of an employee. They could 
use their bargaining power and information rights in order to induce the 
management to comply with such a request that would otherwise not be 
accepted.  
The simplest theory on labor supply and hour determination assumes the absence 
of restrictions of any kind and therefore an optimal match according to the 
preference of the workers can be achieved. In practice employers frequently 
make a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer concerning working hours (Pencavel 1986, 41). 
Several theories exist as to why an employer determines a specific number of 
hours and is not willing to negotiate about this21. However, we only discuss 
theories which might explain the influence of works councils on working hours 
constraints.  
Golden (1998) as well as Clarkberg and Moen (2001) regard the determination of 
actual working time as the result of three forces: workers’ preferences, 
employers’ demands and the institutional environment in which hours decisions 
are mediated. In this connection, institutional environment is determined by legal 
constraints such as labor law and regulation, collective bargaining processes, 
                                                          
21 See, e.g., Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2002) for a discussion on the theoretical 
explanation of working hours constraints. 
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normative practices and the macroeconomic climate. The idea is that institutions 
are able to prevent exploitation of one side of the negotiators and direct the 
exchange towards a socially desired outcome. Works councils are explicitly 
involved in the process of working time determination. In addition works councils 
are encouraged to pursue social goals through their activities. This suggests that 
works councils try to reconcile the diverging preferences of employers and 
workers with regard to working hours. 
Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) argue that employees are prepared to work 
more than desired in order to signal low disutility from work and therefore being 
a candidate for better paid positions within a firm. In principle, such 
overemployment is the result of the dynamic optimization of an employee in 
which disutility from the current time mismatch has to be compensated by the 
discounted additional future earnings that an overemployed worker expects. 
Addison, Teixeira and Zwick (2010), however, highlight that works councils 
increase the wage level, but also compress the wage distribution in an 
establishment. Thus, gains from pro-motions are lower, reducing the willingness 
of employees to be currently overemployed.  
Another theoretical explanation for working time constraints is the job insecurity 
hypothesis. Steward and Sweffield (1997) argue that employers are able to 
increase working time without expecting quits if workers face a high risk of 
unemployment and the range of alternative jobs is scarce for macroeconomic 
reasons. Workers might accept overemployment rather than risk dismissal and 
unemployment. Works councils, however, have codetermination rights with 
respect to dismissals. Thus, they provide further protection from dismissal so that 
a working time mismatch caused by job insecurity should less frequently occur.  
Freeman and Medoff (1984) and many others assert that unions act as an efficient 
channel to express dissatisfaction with working conditions. With regard to 
German industrial relations the body representing workers at establishment or 
firm level are works councils (FitzRoy and Kraft 1984, 1987). In combination with 
the strong codetermination rights regarding working time regulation, they provide 
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excellent opportunities to express the preferences of the employees and 
simultaneously to exert bargaining power concerning hours determination. 
Finally, the effect of works councils on working hours constraints can also be 
rationalized by public choice theory. The decision as to who becomes a works 
councilor is the result of an election process, and these elections take place every 
4 years. Workers interested in alternative working time rules will vote for 
candidates who promise to exert an influence in this direction. Thus, the elected 
employees will represent the working time preferences of the majority of the 
voters. This, however, also means that some workers will probably be worse off, 
namely if their preferences strongly deviate from the working time preference of 
the majority.  
Similarly, the demand for family-friendly work policies probably reflects the 
preferences of the workforce and is of higher relevance if many parents work in 
an establishment. These parents then elect representatives who promise to 
commit to childcare.  
A match between preferred and actual working time and in particular the 
introduction of employer-sponsored childcare services will probably be positively 
valued by public opinion. They may be regarded by works councils as fringe 
benefits, and bargaining for them may be part of a rent-maximization strategy 
(Heywood and Jirjahn 2009). 
 
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
For the empirical analysis we use the waves 2001 to 2009 of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) and construct an unbalanced panel of full-time private 
sector workers between the age of 20 and 60 (for further information on the data 
see Wagner, Frick and Schupp 2007)22. As works councils can be elected in 
                                                          
22 We also used data that contained part-time employees. We were however unable to 
identify any significant effect of our independent variables on their working hours 
constraints. This might be explained by strong selectivity and heterogeneity in part-time 
work.  
3 Let’s call it a day – The effect of works councils on working hours constraints in 
German establishments 
 37 
establishments with at least five employees, we drop all observations of persons 
working in very small firms with four workers and less.23  
In the SOEP, information on the existence of a works council in an employee’s 
establishment is only available for the years 2001 and 2006. To increase sample 
size, we make the assumption that the works council status does not change in a 
firm over time24. For the period before/after 2001 and 2006 in which employees 
do not change their job, we carry backward/forward the information on the 
existence of works councils. If workers stay in the same firm during 2001 and 2006 
and report that they are represented by a works council in one year but not in the 
other year, we exclude observations for all years for which we do not exactly 
know whether the works council already/still existed (i.e. we drop the 
observations for all years except for 2001 and 2006). If workers switch jobs 
between 2001 and 2006, we use the works council information of the former 
employer up to the year of the job change and information of the new employer 
after the job change. If persons change job after 2006 or repeatedly between 
2001 and 2006, we drop all observations concerned.  
Our dependent variables are based on the difference between actual weekly 
working hours and preferred weekly working hours. The question about desired 
working hours in the questionnaire reads: “If you could choose your own number 
of working hours, taking into account that your income would change according 
to the number of hours: How many hours would you want to work?” Actual 
working hours are taken from the question “And how many hours do your actual 
working-hours consist of including possible over-time?“ If both numbers are the 
same, there is no working hours mismatch and workers do not face any binding 
constraints. If preferred hours are higher than actual hours, persons are under-
                                                          
23 The data used in this study was extracted using the Add-On PanelWhiz for Stata®. 
PanelWhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew 
(john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2010) for details. The PanelWhiz 
generated do-file to retrieve the data used here is available from us upon request. Any 
data or computational errors in this study are our own. 
24 Using the IAB-Establishment Panel, Addison, Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2006) show 
that approx. 2 % of all establishments dissolved or adopted a works council within 2 years. 
Thus, we think that the effect of a measurement error in the existence of a works council 
can be neglected.  
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employed. They are overemployed, in contrast, if they would like to work less 
than their actual working hours. 
After excluding all observations with missing information on the relevant 
variables, our sample consists of 4992 full-time employees and 16140 obser-
vations. Table 3.7 in the Appendix presents the mean values of the variables we 
use in our estimations. It shows that there are large discrepancies between 
preferred hours of work and actual hours of work. On average, people work 42.48 
hours a week, which exceeds their average contractually-agreed working hours of 
38.54. Average preferred weekly working hours would be 37.69 - in other words, 
preferred working hours would be even less than the agreed working hours. 
However, there are also people who would like to work more. 6.6% of all people 
in the sample are underemployed, but the majority of employees, 66.5%, are 
overemployed and would prefer to work less than they do. Only 26.9% of all 
workers meet their working hours preferences exactly.  
Regarding our main independent variable, namely a dummy for the existence of a 
works council, more than 60 per cent of all employees are represented by a works 
council in their establishment25. As we expect works councils to affect agreed and 
actual working hours (including potential overtime) in the interest of employees, 
we first descriptively analyze differences between firms with and without 
codetermination.  
The mean values of working hours and hours constraints in Table 3.1 show that 
there are significant differences between employees in firms with and without 
works councils.  
Agreed working hours are about one hour shorter in establishments with works 
councils, whilst actual working hours in firms without works councils exceed those 
in firms with works councils by as many as 1.309 hours. Thus, employees 
represented by works councils seem to work slightly less overtime. Works councils 
have strong decision rights with respect to overtime work and have to agree on its 
                                                          
25 Although the majority of all establishments have no works council, those which have 
one are on average much larger and this explains the high percentage of workers 
represented by a works council.  
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use or extension. We discuss the issue of overtime as a possible way of adjusting 
actual working hours to preferred working hours in Section 3.5. Also, preferred 
hours of work are lower in codetermined establishments but, at about only 24 
minutes, the difference is much smaller. The share of people without working 
hours constraints is 2.5 percentage points larger in firms with works councils. This 
is caused by a significantly lower percentage of overemployed workers of 4.7 
percentage points. With respect to underemployment, works councils do not 
seem to enable employees to extend their working hours if they wish to work 
more. Underemployment is even more frequently observed in establishments 
with works councils. If a person is strongly constrained because of family duties 
and domestic work, preferences concerning working time, but also the possibility 
to realize preferred hours of work may differ. This should mainly be a problem for 
women, especially for those with children. Table 3.1 additionally shows the 
comparison of working hours for workers with and without a works council 
separately for men and women. Male workers, who are represented by a works 
council, are more likely to meet their working hours preferences, but again this is 
only caused by a lower probability of being overemployed.  
With respect to underemployment, however, male employees in firms with works 
councils are even more often affected. For female employees the differences are 
less pronounced. All in all, women more often report facing working hours 
constraints. 25.1% of all female workers realize their preferred working hours 
compared to 27.8% of all male workers. Moreover, women are more frequently 
overemployed, whereas men are more often underemployed. 
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Table 3.1: Working hours for employees with and without works councils 
 
Works 
council 
No works 
council 
Difference 
All    
Agreed working hours (week) 38.111 39.226 -1.115*** 
Actual working hours (week) 41.985 43.294 -1.309*** 
Preferred working hours (week) 37.541 37.936 -0.394*** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual 
hours)  
0.279 0.254 0.025*** 
Overemployed 0.647 0.694 -0.047*** 
Underemployed 0.074 0.053 0.021*** 
Number of observations 6150 9990  
Women    
Agreed working hours (week) 37.983 38.789 -0.806*** 
Actual working hours (week) 41.221 41.853 -0.632*** 
Preferred working hours (week) 36.019 36.282 -0.263** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual 
hours)  
0.257 0.243 0.014 
Overemployed 0.692 0.716 -0.023* 
Underemployed 0.051 0.041 0.009 
Number of observations 2179 2769  
Men    
Agreed working hours (week) 38.160 39.466 -1.306*** 
Actual working hours (week) 42.278 44.085 -1.807*** 
Preferred working hours (week) 38.125 38.843 -0.718*** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual 
hours)  
0.288 0.260 0.028*** 
Overemployed 0.630 0.681 -0.052*** 
Underemployed 0.083 0.059 0.024*** 
Number of observations 7221 3971  
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
As mentioned above, children may also play an important role in the context of 
working hours constraints. Table 3.2 presents the differences in hours of work of 
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women and men with and without children. In our sample 19.1% of all full-time 
employed women and 40.7% of all male workers have children up to age 16. 
 
Table 3.2: Working hours for employees with and without children 
 Children No children Difference 
Women    
Agreed working hours (week) 37.996 38.419 -0.423*** 
Actual working hours (week) 40.749 41.677 -0.927*** 
Preferred working hours (week) 35.832 36.207 -0.375*** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours)  0.297 0.240 0.057*** 
Overemployed 0.649 0.715 -0.066*** 
Underemployed 0.054 0.045 0.009 
Number of observations 947 4001  
Men    
Agreed working hours (week) 38.574 38.657 -0.082** 
Actual working hours (week) 42.931 42.912 0.019 
Preferred working hours (week) 38.548 38.265 0.283*** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours)  0.276 0.279 -0.002 
Overemployed 0.647 0.648 -0.001 
Underemployed 0.076 0.073 0.003 
Number of observations 4550 6642  
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Full-time employed mothers work less than women without children and also 
prefer fewer hours. They are less often overemployed and less often affected by 
hours constraints. Thus, they seem to be frequently able to reconcile family and 
working life. It is possible that women with children are to a greater extent willing 
or more under pressure to advocate their working time preferences or employers 
are better prepared to adjust working hours to the needs of employee with family 
duties. However, mothers, who find it difficult to adjust their full-time working 
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hours to their demands, may not work at all or prefer part-time jobs, so this result 
may be driven by selectivity. In contrast to women, male employees with children 
have higher preferred working hours compared to men without children, maybe 
due to their role as breadwinner. As full-time working mothers on average seem 
to be more satisfied with their hours of work compared to women without 
children, the question arises as to whether works councils can especially help to 
assert working time preferences of employees with children against the employer. 
Table 3.3 reports the differences between full-time employed parents with and 
without works councils.  
 
Table 3.3: Working hours constraints for employees with children and 
with/without works councils 
 
Works 
council 
No works 
council 
Difference 
Women    
No hours constraint (preferred=actual 
hours)  
0.329 0.255 0.074*** 
Overemployed 0.607 0.704 -0.096*** 
Underemployed 0.064 0.041 0.022 
Number of observations 535 412  
Men    
No hours constraint (preferred=actual 
hours)  
0.292 0.244 0.048*** 
Overemployed 0.617 0.705 -0.087*** 
Underemployed 0.089 0.050 0.039*** 
Number of observations 3023 1527  
Notes:***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
For mothers works councils seem to have strong positive effects on their chances 
of obtaining optimal working hours. The likelihood of being overemployed is 9.6 
percentage points lower for mothers working in firms with works councils. For 
male employees with children the probability of working more than intended is 
also much lower in establishments with works councils, although they have a 
somewhat higher likelihood of being underemployed of 3.9 percentage points. 
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3.4 Econometric method and results 
In line with previous studies (see e.g. Reynolds 2004, Tseng and Wooden 2005), 
we do not take into account the absolute difference between preferred and 
actual hours but only analyze which factors determine the probability of 
overemployment or underemployment. Thus, our dependent variable has three 
unordered categories26. Workers have either no hours constraint, are under-
employed or are overemployed. First we estimate multinomial logit models with 
“no hours constraint” as base category. We use two different specifications. The 
first one includes a dummy for the existence of a works council whereas the 
second model additionally considers a works council’s effect on hours constraints 
for employees with children by an interaction variable. As in the case of the 
descriptive analysis we also estimate all models separately for men and women. 
We take into account a set of socio-demographic and job-specific control variables 
(see also full estimation results in Tables 3.8 to 3.10 in the Appendix). We control 
for gender, age and marital status by including age in years and its squared value 
as well as dummies for women, married persons and for having at least one child 
up to age 16.  Additionally, we add a dummy variable which equals one if a person 
lives in East Germany, two dummies for highest educational achievement 
(completed vocational training and holding a university degree) and a variable 
indicating monthly household income less own monthly wage (i.e. wage of the 
partner and other income if applicable). With regard to job and firm character-
istics we include tenure in years, agreed weekly working hours, hourly wage, firm 
size dummies, industry dummies and dummies for blue and white collar workers 
differentiated by qualification level.  
As mentioned before, persons with strong (expected) hours constraints might 
even choose to quit their job or to remain outside the labor market. If the samples 
of employed persons and persons not working are systematically different and 
factors affecting selection into the sample simultaneously affect the outcome of 
interest, our results could be biased. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no 
                                                          
26 Some studies treat this variable as being ordered. In our opinion it is not. Being, for 
example, underemployed is not a lower category than being overemployed. It is in fact a 
completely different labor market status that is a result of a bad match which is simply not 
comparable to another kind of bad match, namely being overemployed. 
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selection models with multinomial outcomes in the second stage exist. However, 
we can estimate binary probit models with sample selection. As a robustness test 
we therefore also consider sample selection, but this is only possible if we neglect 
the fact that employees can work more or less than they would prefer. We just 
differentiate between workers with and without hours constraints. As selection 
into the labor market is very different for women and men, we only estimate 
separate models and do not use the full sample27. In addition to the 11192 
observations of male and 4948 of female full-time employees we include 5330 
observations of men and 10289 of women who are unemployed or inactive28. 
Based on the two resulting larger subsamples of men and women we apply a 
probit sample selection model (Heckman probit model) introduced by Van de Ven 
and Van Pragg (1981). This model is a modification of the well-known Heckman 
sample selection model (1979) for continuous outcomes. The latent equation is 
 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢1𝑖                        (3.1) 
 
such that the binary outcome (which equals one if a person’s working hours 
exactly match her or his preferred hours of work)  
 
𝑦𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢1𝑖 > 0)                      (3.2) 
 
is observed.  
However, the dependent variable is not always observed but only if  
𝑦𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 = (𝑧𝑖𝛾 + 𝑢2𝑖 > 0)                      (3.3) 
 
with     
                                                          
27 For example, married women more often choose to stay at home, which is not the case 
for married men. The same is true for female and male workers with children. 
28 The share of persons participating in the labor market is quite low. However, note that 
we excluded all public sector employees. 
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𝑢1~𝑁(0,1) 
 
𝑢2~𝑁(0,1) 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢1,𝑢2) = 𝜌. 
    
The selection equation is identified by adding several variables excluded in the 
estimation of having no hours constraints. We mainly use household and partner 
information as a dummy for being married and weekly working hours of the 
spouse (and a set of interaction variables), as these variables are insignificant in 
the multinomial logit model and thus do not explain hours constraints and 
underemployment or overemployment.  
Although we are able to consider sample selection with this approach, the main 
disadvantage is that we lose some information as we cannot differentiate 
between overemployment and underemployment. The model only considers 
match and mismatch. Thus, we will concentrate on discussing the multinomial 
logit results and afterwards briefly present the Heckman probit results as a 
robustness check. 
Table 3.4 shows the marginal effects of works councils on the probability of being 
overemployed or underemployed. As mentioned above, we estimate two 
different models. In the second one and in contrast to the first one, we 
differentiate between the effects of works councils on employees with and 
without children.  
The results mainly confirm our findings based on the descriptive statistics. In the 
full sample employees whose interests are represented by a works council have a 
probability 2.3 percentage points higher of achieving their desired hours. This is 
due to the fact that they are less often overemployed. Works councils reduce the 
probability of working more hours than preferred by 3.2 percentage points. 
Model 2 differentiates between employees with and without children up to 16. 
The positive (reducing) effects of works councils on overemployment but also the 
negative effects on underemployment are more pronounced for people with 
children. Thus, they ensure that a larger share of workers meets their preferences, 
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but this is at the expense of those who would like to work more. However, the 
reduction of the share of overemployed workers in the presence of a works 
council is larger than the increased share of workers who cannot realize their 
preferences for more work. Overall, the probability of exactly meeting working 
time preferences for employees with children is 5.5 percentage points higher if 
they work in a firm with a works council. 
In the next step we estimate both models separately for women and men. The 
marginal effects of Model 1 show, in contrast to the descriptive results, that all 
works council effects (both the positive and negative ones) are more pronounced 
for women. Women working in a codetermined establishment are 3.6 percentage 
points more likely to face no hours constraints, however the effect is insignificant. 
Moreover, they are 6.0 percentage points less likely to be overemployed 
compared to female employees in firms without works councils, but they also 
have a 2.3 percentage points higher probability of working less than they would 
like to.  For men all effects are insignificant. 
When we differentiate between women and men with and without children, the 
effects of works councils for both without children up to 16 are weak and 
insignificant. For men and women with children marginal effects of works councils 
are mostly significant and quite strong, especially for mothers, and similar but 
weaker for fathers. Female employees with children have a higher probability of 
9.7 percentage points of exactly meeting their working time preferences 
compared to mothers working in firms without works councils. This is caused by a 
large reduction in the probability of being overemployed of 13.7 percentage 
points. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that works councils 
support or even initiate the introduction of family-friendly work practices or 
corporate childcare. Moreover, works councils could be an efficient institution to 
help to communicate workers’ preferences to the employer. However, the 
likelihood of underemployment is slightly higher for mothers working in 
establishments with works councils. Apparently establishments with works 
councils show a tendency towards “normal” working time.  
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Table 3.4: Marginal effects on working hours mismatch - multinomial logit models 
   Difference in predicted outcome 
  Effect of works 
councils at … Desired = Actual Desired < Actual Desired > Actual 
Fu
ll 
sa
m
pl
e 
N
=1
61
40
 Model 1 No differentiation 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
-0.032** 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.008* 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
Kids=1 0.055*** (0.018) 
-0.081*** 
(0.020) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
Fe
m
al
e 
N
=4
94
8 
Model 1 No differentiation 0.036 (0.022) 
-0.060** 
(0.025) 
0.023** 
(0.011) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.041 
(0.026) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
Kids=1 0.097** (0.041) 
-0.137*** 
(0.043) 
0.040** 
(0.018) 
M
al
e 
N
=1
11
92
 Model 1 No differentiation 
0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
Kids=1 0.040** (0.020) 
-0.058*** 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Included control variables see Tables 3.8 to 3.10 in the Appendix. 
 
As mentioned above, selection effects into employment could bias our results on 
working hours constraints. Thus, we additionally estimate Heckman probit models 
which allow us to control for selection effects. Selection into employment should 
be more pronounced for women, especially for those who are married and/or 
have children. As traditionally in Germany, they still tend to be responsible for 
housework and family duties, whereas in many families men are still the 
breadwinners. Hence, faced with the decision to work or to stay at home, wives 
and mothers, who decide to participate in the labor market, may have special 
characteristics which could also have an impact on their perception of optimal 
working hours. 
As some factors, for example being married, can have very different effects for 
men and women on their likelihood to work, and as selection into employment is 
a more important issue for women, we only run separate estimations for men and 
women and do not use the full sample. As mentioned above, we cannot 
3 Let’s call it a day – The effect of works councils on working hours constraints in 
German establishments 
 48 
differentiate between overemployment and underemployment. We only estimate 
the effect of works councils on the probability of facing no hours constraints in 
this selection model. Table 3.4 shows that works councils have two opposing 
effects on the probability of exactly matching working time preferences. On the 
one hand, they reduce the probability of overemployment, on the other hand 
they increase the likelihood of underemployment. However, the first effect is 
much more pronounced than the second and we also find an overall positive 
effect of works councils on the probability of working preferred hours. The 
estimated marginal effects of the probit models with selection are comparable to 
those for the first category (desired hours = actual hours) of the multinomial logit 
models.   
The complete estimation results of the selection equation and the second stage 
equation can be found in Table 3.11 in the Appendix. The results indicate that 
selection effects are only present for women. The marginal effects for works 
council existence of the second stage equation (with the binary dependent 
variable indicating a perfect match between actual and preferred hours) are 
reported in Table 3.5. Again, we estimate two models where we differentiate 
between men and women with and without children in Model 2. 
Selection does not seem to severely bias our results presented above, as the 
effects shown in Table 3.5 are similar to those obtained in the multinomial logit 
models without controlling for potential selection bias. As an additional 
robustness test we also estimated an IV probit model where we treated the wage 
as endogenous and, for this purpose, instrumented the wage through several 
industry dummies. A Wald test, however, always rejected correlation between the 
error term of the reduced equation and the structural equation. Hence, we could 
not reject the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity. Thus, we refrain from 
showing these results because they do not lead to contradicting estimates, in 
contrast to our previous results. Finally, we also changed the definition of our 
dependent variables as an additional robustness check. We changed the definition 
of being not constrained from a perfect working time match to a match that treats 
a deviation of up to 75 min per week (i.e. an average deviation of 15 min per day) 
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from the preferred working hours as still being not constrained. This wider 
definition does not change our results.  
 
Table 3.5: Marginal effects working hours mismatch- Heckman probit models 
  Effect of works 
councils at … 
Absolute change in prob. of 
desired hours = actual hours 
Fe
m
al
e 
N
=1
52
37
 
Model 1 No differentiation 0.040* (0.024) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.023 
(0.024) 
Kids=1 0.113** (0.044) 
M
al
e 
N
=1
65
22
 
Model 1 No differentiation 0.019 (0.015) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.002 
(0.018) 
Kids=1 0.044** (0.020) 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Included control variables and selection equation 
see Table 3.11 in the Appendix. 
 
3.5 The role of preferences and overtime  
Our previous results show that the likelihood of a perfect working time match 
increases if a works council exists in an establishment. This result is driven by a 
strong increase in the probability of observing a perfect match if people have 
children. In the following, we try to identify the source of the increase in this 
likelihood by analyzing the effect of works councils on preferred working hours 
and overtime. On the one hand, works councils may change preferred working 
hours. Works councils have to bargain about the beginning, breaks and the end of 
a work day. If they are able to enforce daily working time regulations that are 
more in line with the preferences of the employees, staff will presumably be 
prepared to work more hours per week. Thus, employees in codetermined 
establishments may desire to work more and then preferred working time would 
be closer to actual working time. In this case, the lower likelihood of 
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overemployment could be explained by an increase in the desired working time. 
Hence, we estimate the impact of works councils on preferred working time.  
On the other hand, works council-induced constraints on the use of overtime 
might increase the likelihood of a perfect working time match. As already 
mentioned, whilst overtime can be an important source of working time 
mismatch, it may be strongly influenced by works councils29. We estimate a probit 
model where the dependent variable has unit value if the employee works 
overtime. Again, we use two models, one without and one with differentiation 
between employees with and without children30. The upper part of Table 3.6 
shows the results of OLS estimates of the effects of the works council on 
preferred working time. The lower part contains the results of a probit model with 
a dummy for overtime working as dependent variable31.  
We find no effects of works councils on preferred working time, regardless of 
whether the observed person is a parent or not. Thus we expect that our results 
are rather driven by particular overtime effects of parents in codetermined 
establishments. The results for Model 2 in the probit equation indicate that 
parents in codetermined establishments work overtime significantly less often. 
The probability of not working overtime is 4.0 percentage points higher for 
parents represented by a works council. Hence, works councils reduce their actual 
working hours. For employees without children up to age 16 we find no significant 
reduction in the likelihood of overtime work. Hence, for this group works councils 
do not prevent overtime work. 
 
                                                          
29 Hübler and Meyer (1997), Kölling (1997), Schank and Schnabel (2004) as well as Jirjahn 
(2008c) analyze the impact of work councils on overtime and find no or at most negligible 
effects. In contrast to our study, they use establishment data. Kraft and Lang (2008) use 
the SOEP and also estimate the effects of works councils. They, however, concentrate on 
the effect of works councils on the magnitude of overtime work after a works council has 
been adopted. Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) use the SOEP and estimate a model that is 
quite similar to our approach. They, however, do not control for the existence of a works 
council.  
30 Note that we lose 6 observations due to missing values in the dependent variable 
“overtime”. 
31 Note that we do not separate our sample into male and female observations because 
our previous results show that both groups are similarly affected by works councils.    
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Table 3.6: Marginal effects of works councils on preferred working hours and on 
the incidence of overtime 
 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10% 
level. Standard errors in parentheses. Included control variables see 
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 in the Appendix. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Although a large proportion of workers face working hours constraints that can 
strongly affect job satisfaction and health, the effect of labor market institutions 
on such constraints has largely been neglected in the previous literature. We 
analyze how worker representation on the establishment level by works councils 
affect the likelihood of being underemployed, overemployed or employed 
according to one’s preferences. We find that works councils indeed increase the 
likelihood of matching employees’ working time preferences by mainly reducing 
the likelihood of overemployment. However, we also find a small increase in the 
likelihood of underemployment. Additionally, our results show that parents even 
more frequently match their preferred working time which can be explained by a 
fundamental task of works councils, namely the reconciliation of family and 
working life.  
Moreover, our results on overtime show that the somewhat reduced probability 
of the occurrence parents of working overtime can be a driving force for lower 
overemployment in codetermined establishments. 
Preferred working hours – Pooled OLS 
Model 1 
N=16140 No differentiation 
-0.013 
(0.127) 
Model 2 
N=16140 
Kids=0 
-0.130 
(0.144) 
Kids=1 0.227 (0.169) 
Incidence of overtime - Probit 
Model 1 
N=16134 No differentiation 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
Model 2 
N=16134 
Kids=0 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
Kids=1 -0.040** (0.019) 
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Hence, worker codetermination affects more areas than the more commonly 
investigated topics such as productivity, profits, wages, turnover and innovation. 
Employees will most likely very much appreciate cooperative solutions to 
problems connected with differences between their working time preferences 
and the expectations of the employers. In turn, labor supply may react to the 
employee-orientated determination of working conditions. Given the increasing 
contribution of married women to labor supply and the growing importance of 
reconciling family life and work against the background of demographic problems 
faced by most developed economies, our results are probably not insignificant.  
Our results imply some questions for future research. If works councils reduce the 
likelihood of constrained working hours, which consequences will arise for the 
employer? Does a greater flexibility of agreements on working time towards 
employees’ preferences in contrast restrict the power to determine working hours 
from the employer’s view? Does this increase production costs and therefore 
imply a redistribution from the employer to the workers? Or is the reduction of 
working hours constraints rather a result of a coordination process that enhances 
efficiency by simply reducing information asymmetries between employers’ and 
employees’ preferences? While in the first case clearly no Pareto improvement is 
realized, the latter indeed increases welfare. 
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3.7 Appendix 
 
Table 3.7: Mean values of used variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Agreed working hours (week) 38.536 2.054 
Actual working hours (week) 42.484 5.256 
Preferred working hours (week) 37.692 3.996 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours) (dummy) 0.269 0.444 
Overemployed (preferred<actual hours) (dummy) 0.665 0.472 
Underemployed (preferred>actual hours) (dummy) 0.066 0.248 
Hourly wage (€) 16.611 7.679 
Tenure 11.470 9.139 
Firm size: 5-19 workers  (dummy) 0.163 0.369 
Firm size: 20-99 workers (dummy) 0.218 0.413 
Firm size: 100-199 workers (dummy) 0.109 0.311 
Firm size: 200-1999 workers (dummy) 0.261 0.439 
Firm size: 2000 workers and more (dummy) 0.249 0.433 
Works council (dummy) 0.619 0.486 
Female (dummy) 0.307 0.461 
Age  41.219 9.621 
Highest educational degree: University degree 
(dummy) 0.193 0.394 
Highest educational degree: Vocational training 
(dummy) 0.697 0.459 
Children (dummy) 0.341 0.474 
East Germany (dummy) 0.239 0.426 
Married  (dummy) 0.618 0.486 
Net monthly household income minus own income (€) 1135.600 1005.472 
White collar low-skilled (dummy) 0.074 0.263 
White collar medium-skilled (dummy) 0.267 0.443 
White collar high-skilled (dummy) 0.208 0.406 
Blue collar low-skilled  (dummy) 0.161 0.367 
Blue collar medium-skilled or high-skilled (dummy) 0.289 0.453 
Obs 16140  
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Table 3.8: Mulitnomial Logit, full sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.148** (0.071) 
0.068 
(0.137) 
-0.046 
(0.081) 
0.017 
(0.152) 
Kids  -0.069 (0.074) 
0.024 
(0.127) 
0.129 
(0.102) 
-0.169 
(0.184) 
Works Council x Kids    -0.311*** (0.111) 
0.250 
(0.199) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10-1 1.077*** (0.137) 
-2.640*** 
(0.181) 
1.082*** 
(0.137) 
-2.652*** 
(0.180) 
female 0.426*** (0.080) 
-0.645*** 
(0.145) 
0.431*** 
(0.080) 
-0.653*** 
(0.146) 
Female x Kids  -0.221* (0.133) 
-0.312 
(0.250) 
-0.246* 
(0.133) 
-0.269 
(0.249) 
Married -0.032 (0.073) 
-0.154 
(0.129) 
-0.030 
(0.073) 
-0.152 
(0.129) 
University degree 0.523*** (0.177) 
0.353 
(0.306) 
0.526*** 
(0.177) 
0.359 
(0.306) 
Completed apprenticeship 0.268** (0.130) 
0.367* 
(0.215) 
0.271** 
(0.130) 
0.404* 
(0.216) 
Tenure x 10-2 -0.388 (0.821) 
1.953 
(1.313) 
-0.417 
(0.819) 
2.002 
(1.320) 
Uni. degree x tenure x 10-2 -2.631** (1.095) 
-0.953 
(1.857) 
-2.611** 
(1.093) 
-0.992 
(1.870) 
Compl. apprent. x tenure x 10-2 -0.517 (0.860) 
-1.994 
(1.369) 
-0.530 
(0.857) 
-2.035 
(1.380) 
Hourly wage 0.058*** (0.006) 
-0.043*** 
(0.010) 
0.058*** 
(0.006) 
-0.043* 
(0.010) 
Age 0.079*** (0.023) 
0.078** 
(0.038) 
0.080*** 
(0.023) 
0.077** 
(0.038) 
Age2 -0.001*** (0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
White collar (low) 0.339*** (0.112) 
0.149 
(0.194) 
0.337*** 
(0.112) 
0.152 
(0.194) 
White collar (middle) 0.574*** (0.092) 
0.361*** 
(0.149) 
0.569*** 
(0.092) 
0.400*** 
(0.150) 
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Table 3.8: Mulitnomial Logit, full sample (cont.) 
White collar (high) 0.851*** (0.115) 
0.119 
(0.208) 
0.849*** 
(0.115) 
0.120 
(0.209) 
Blue collar (middle, high) 0.465*** (0.079) 
0.220* 
(0.130) 
0.463*** 
(0.080) 
0.221 
(0.131) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) 0.019 (0.018) 
-0.044 
(0.034) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
-0.043 
(0.034) 
Household income minus own income 
x 10-1 
0.080*** 
(0.028) 
0.019 
(0.053) 
0.081*** 
(0.028) 
0.181 
(0.053) 
East 0.441*** (0.076) 
0.028 
(0.136) 
0.439*** 
(0.078) 
0.032 
(0.136) 
No. of obs 16140 
Pseudo-R2 0.084 0.085 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. Industry, time and establishment size dummies included. Reference group 
for professional position: Blue collar (low).  
 
 
Table 3.9: Mulitnomial Logit, women 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.264** (0.134) 
0.398 
(0.285) 
-0.174 
(0.141) 
0.330 
(0.294) 
Kids  -0.275** (0.122) 
-0.347 
(0.239) 
-0.026 
(0.170) 
-0.589 
(0.377) 
Works Council x Kids    -0.445** (0.227) 
0.373 
(0.443) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10-1 0.650*** (0.223) 
-2.661*** 
(0.277) 
0.689*** 
(0.223) 
-2.703*** 
(0.279) 
Married -0.098 (0.141) 
-0.261 
(0.291) 
-0.184 
(0.142) 
-0.248 
(0.289) 
University degree 0.250 (0.327) 
0.183 
(0.564) 
0.230 
(0.328) 
0.228 
(0.567) 
Completed apprenticeship 0.413 (0.253) 
0.557 
(0.357) 
0.410 
(0.255) 
0.596* 
(0.356) 
Tenure x 10-2 0.770 (1.724) 
3.186 
(2.294) 
0.749 
(1.743) 
3.305 
(2.289) 
Uni. degree x tenure x 10-2 -3.192 (2.171) 
-4.920 
(3.415) 
-3.022 
(2.189) 
-5.029 
(3.428) 
Compl. apprent. x tenure x 10-2 -2.726 (1.794) 
-7.138*** 
(2.497) 
-2.862 
(1.825) 
-7.259*** 
(2.512) 
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Table 3.9: Mulitnomial Logit, women (cont.) 
Hourly wage 0.066*** (0.012) 
-0.049** 
(0.023) 
0.066*** 
(0.012) 
-0.049** 
(0.023) 
Age 0.106*** (0.040) 
0.030 
(0.063) 
0.108*** 
(0.040) 
0.030 
(0.063) 
Age2 -0.001*** (0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
White collar (low) 0.574*** (0.175) 
0.256 
(0.329) 
0.573*** 
(0.175) 
0.262 
(0.328) 
White collar (middle) 0.867*** (0.189) 
0.640** 
(0.298) 
0.868*** 
(0.159) 
0.644** 
(0.298) 
White collar (high) 1.321*** (0.246) 
0.446 
(0.592) 
1.323*** 
(0.246) 
0.448 
(0.506) 
Blue collar (middle, high) 0.771*** (0.221) 
0.667 
(0.435) 
0.774*** 
(0.221) 
0.659 
(0.434) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 0.003 (0.032) 
-0.157** 
(0.065) 
0.000 
(0.032) 
-0.156** 
(0.065) 
Household income minus own 
income x 10-1  
0.112** 
(0.050) 
0.028 
(0.110) 
0.111** 
(0.050) 
0.032 
(0.110) 
East 0.322*** (0.139) 
0.425* 
(0.239) 
0.309** 
(0.138) 
0.426* 
(0.238) 
No. of obs 4948 
Pseudo-R2 0.099 0.100 
Notes: See Table 3.8.  
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Table 3.10: Mulitnomial Logit, men 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.098 (0.084) 
-0.043 
(0.156) 
0.009 
(0.099) 
-0.135 
(0.179) 
Kids  -0.061 (0.078) 
-0.024 
(0.130) 
0.114 
(0.113) 
-0.186 
(0.199) 
Works Council x Kids    -0.274** (0.130) 
0.243 
(0.224) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10-1 1.132*** (0.173) 
-2.785*** 
(0.259) 
1.318*** 
(0.173) 
-2.790*** 
(0.259) 
Married 0.011 (0.088) 
-0.087 
(0.149) 
0.010 
(0.088) 
-0.086 
(0.149) 
University degree 0.723*** (0.200) 
0.512 
(0.362) 
0.728*** 
(0.200) 
0.511 
(0.367) 
Completed apprenticeship 0.210 (0.146) 
0.365 
(0.262) 
0.215 
(0.145) 
0.365 
(0.263) 
Tenure x 10-2 -1.004 (0.889) 
1.742 
(1.576) 
-1.032 
(0.881) 
1.765 
(1.587) 
Uni. degree x tenure x 10-2 -2.387* (1.250) 
-0.176 
(2.138) 
-2.405* 
(1.244) 
-0.194 
(2.154) 
Compl. apprent. x tenure x 10-2 0.463 (0.936) 
-1.046 
(1.630) 
0.449 
(0.928) 
-1.051 
(1.644) 
Hourly wage 0.057*** (0.007) 
-0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.057*** 
(0.007) 
-0.046*** 
(0.012) 
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Table 3.10: Mulitnomial Logit, men (cont.) 
Age 0.063** (0.028) 
0.107** 
(0.049) 
0.065** 
(0.028) 
0.106** 
(0.049) 
Age2 -0.001** (0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
White collar (low) 0.271* (0.155) 
0.178 
(0.264) 
0.264* 
(0.155) 
0.181 
(0.265) 
White collar (middle) 0.434*** (0.116) 
0.275 
(0.177) 
0.426*** 
(0.116) 
0.283 
(0.178) 
White collar (high) 0.649*** (0.130) 
-0.030 
(0.232) 
0.645*** 
(0.130) 
-0.029 
(0.232) 
Blue collar (middle, high) 0.396*** (0.088) 
0.152 
(0.140) 
0.392*** 
(0.088) 
0.155 
(0.141) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 0.028 (0.022) 
0.001 
(0.041) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
0.002 
(0.041) 
Household income minus own 
income x 10-1 
0.053 
(0.035) 
0.050 
(0.061) 
0.054 
(0.035) 
0.050 
(0.061) 
East 0.518*** (0.092) 
-0.067 
(0.165) 
0.519*** 
(0.093) 
-0.064 
(0.165) 
No. of obs 11192 
Pseudo-R2 0.085 0.086 
Notes: See Table 3.8. 
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Table 3.11: Probit with sample selection 
 Women Men 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff. (Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council 0.125* (0.074) 
0.074 
(0.077) 
0.058 
(0.047) 
0.008 
(0.056) 
Kids  0.361*** (0.113) 
0.234** 
(0.126) 
0.022 
(0.039) 
-0.062 
(0.061) 
Works Council x Kids   0.245** (0.123)  
0.129* 
(0.073) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10-1 -0.170 (0.116) 
-0.189 
(0.115) 
-0.445*** 
(0.093) 
-0.443*** 
(0.093) 
University degree -0.316 (0.211) 
-0.316 
(0.210) 
-0.475*** 
(0.118) 
-0.478*** 
(0.118) 
Completed apprenticeship -0.373** (0.161) 
-0.377** 
(0.161) 
-0.195** 
(0.089) 
-0.197** 
(0.089) 
Tenure x 10-2 -0.593 (0.965) 
-0.581 
(0.962) 
0.288 
(0.504) 
0.302 
(0.501) 
Uni. degree x tenure x 10-2 1.924 (1.203) 
1.822 
(1.207) 
1.405** 
(0.685) 
1.407** 
(0.683) 
Compl. apprent. x tenure x 10-2 1.904* (1.000) 
1.932* 
(1.005) 
-0.021 
(0.530) 
-0.016 
(0.526) 
Hourly wage -0.034*** (0.007) 
-0.034*** 
(0.007) 
-0.028*** 
(0.004) 
-0.028*** 
(0.004) 
Age -0.086*** (0.026) 
-0.089*** 
(0.026) 
-0.046*** 
(0.017) 
-0.047*** 
(0.017) 
Age2 0.001*** (0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
White collar (low) -0.332*** (0.099) 
-0.329*** 
(0.099) 
-0.145 
(0.091) 
-0.141 
(0.091) 
White collar (middle) -0.506*** (0.090) 
-0.504*** 
(0.090) 
-0.234*** 
(0.065) 
-0.231*** 
(0.065) 
White collar (high) -0.737*** (0.133) 
-0.736*** 
(0.132) 
-0.349*** 
(0.073) 
-0.347*** 
(0.073) 
Blue collar (middle, high) -0.450*** (0.126) 
-0.448*** 
(0.126) 
-0.209*** 
(0.050) 
-0.208*** 
(0.050) 
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Table 3.11: Probit with sample selection (cont.) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 -0.014 (0.020) 
-0.015 
(0.020) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.028* 
(0.017) 
Household income minus own income 
x 10-1 
0.034 
(0.050) 
0.040 
(0.050) 
0.004 
(0.033) 
0.004 
(0.033) 
East -0.160** (0.080) 
-0.152* 
(0.079) 
-0.242*** 
(0.057) 
-0.241*** 
(0.057) 
Selection equation     
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 0.581*** (0.081) 
0.580*** 
(0.081) 
0.715*** 
(0.071) 
0.715*** 
(0.071) 
(Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 )2 -0.061*** (0.018) 
-0.061*** 
(0.018) 
-0.125*** 
(0.018) 
-0.125*** 
(0.018) 
Household income minus own income 
x 10-1 
-0.916*** 
(0.051) 
-0.961*** 
(0.051) 
-0.940*** 
(0.049) 
-0.939*** 
(0.049) 
(Household income minus own income 
x 10-1 )2 
0.118*** 
(0.007) 
0.118*** 
(0.007) 
0.126*** 
(0.008) 
0.126*** 
(0.008) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 
Household income x 10-3 
-0.044*** 
(0.013) 
-0.044*** 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
Married 0.853*** (0.155) 
0.853*** 
(0.155) 
1.536*** 
(0.133) 
1.536*** 
(0.133) 
University degree 1.152*** (0.119) 
1.152*** 
(0.119) 
1.427*** 
(0.119) 
1.427*** 
(0.119) 
Completed apprenticeship 1.007*** (0.092) 
1.007*** 
(0.092) 
1.112*** 
(0.083) 
1.112*** 
(0.083) 
Married  x University degree -0.121 (0.170) 
-0.123 
(0.170) 
-0.352** 
(0.170) 
-0.352** 
(0.170) 
Married x  
Completed apprenticeship 
-0.589*** 
(0.129) 
-0.589*** 
(0.129) 
-0.487*** 
(0.116) 
-0.487*** 
(0.116) 
Married x  
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 
-0.086*** 
(0.028) 
-0.086*** 
(0.028) 
-0.005 
(0.031) 
-0.005 
(0.031) 
Married x Household income minus 
own income x 10-3 
-0.185*** 
(0.050) 
-0.185*** 
(0.050) 
-0.395*** 
(0.050) 
-0.395*** 
(0.050) 
 
 
  
3 Let’s call it a day – The effect of works councils on working hours constraints in 
German establishments 
 61 
Table 3.11: Probit with sample selection (cont.) 
Age 0.205*** (0.018) 
0.205*** 
(0.018) 
0.110*** 
(0.018) 
0.110*** 
(0.018) 
Age2 -0.003*** (0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Kids  -1.134*** (0.094) 
-1.134*** 
(0.094) 
-0.040 
(0.092) 
-0.040 
(0.092) 
Married x Kids  -0.419*** (0.105) 
-0.418*** 
(0.105) 
-0.187* 
(0.111) 
-0.187* 
(0.111) 
East -0.440*** (0.072) 
-0.440*** 
(0.072) 
-0.580*** 
(0.065) 
-0.580*** 
(0.065) 
Kids x East 0.671*** (0.111) 
0.673*** 
(0.111) 
-0.032 
(0.099) 
-0.031 
(0.099) 
Number of obs           15237 15237 16522 16522 
Censored obs        10289 10289 5330 5330 
Uncensored obs      4948 4948 11192 11192 
Rho (Std.) -0.255** (0.119) 
-0.271** 
(0.117) 
-0.124 
(0.094) 
-0.127 
(0.093) 
Notes: See Table 3.8. 
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Table 3.12: Determinants of preferred working hours (pooled OLS) 
 
Model 1 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.013 (0.127) 
-0.130 
(0.144) 
Kids  0.091 (0.120) 
-0.139 
(0.162) 
Works Council x Kids  
0.357** 
(0.180) 
Female -1.402*** (0.169) 
-1.404*** 
(-0.169) 
Female x Kids -0.283 (0.262) 
-0.249 
(0.263) 
Agreed working hours (week)  0.407*** (0.024) 
0.407 
(0.024) 
Married 0.227 (0.142) 
0.227 
(0.142) 
Female x Married -0.803*** (0.234) 
-0.812*** 
(0.234) 
University degree -0.553* (0.285) 
-0.556* 
(0.285) 
Completed apprenticeship -0.164 (0.213) 
-0.166 
(0.213) 
Tenure -0.032** (0.015) 
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
Uni. degree x tenure  0.046** (0.020) 
0.046** 
(0.020) 
Completed apprenticeship x tenure  0.029* (0.016) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
Hourly wage 0.029*** (0.009) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
Age -0.112*** (0.039) 
-0.113*** 
(0.039) 
Age2 0.001** (0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
White collar (low) -0.467** (0.182) 
-0.462** 
(0.182) 
White collar (middle) -0.642*** (0.162) 
-0.635*** 
(0.162) 
White collar (high) -0.324 (0.201) 
-0.317 
(0.200) 
Blue collar (middle, high) -0.353*** (0.123) 
-0.349*** 
(0.123) 
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Table 3.12: Determinants of preferred working hours (pooled OLS) (cont.) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 -0.100*** (0.031) 
-0.098*** 
(0.031) 
Household income minus own income x 10-1 -0.248*** (0.050) 
-0.249*** 
(0.050) 
East 0.521*** (0.124) 
0.524*** 
(0.124) 
No. of obs 
R² 
16140 
0.143 
16140 
0.144 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. Industry, time and establishment size dummies included. 
Reference group for professional position: Blue collar (low).  
 
 
Table 3.13: Incidence of overtime (Probit) 
 
Model 1 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.126 (0.081) 
-0.059 
(0.094) 
Kids  1.545 (1.068) 
2.132* 
(1.137) 
Works Council x Kids  -0.196 (0.137) 
Female 0.023 (0.115) 
0.024 
(0.115) 
Female x Kids -0.191 (0.157) 
-0.213 
(0.158) 
Agreed working hours (week)  -0.024 (0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
Agreed working hours (week) x Kids -0.046* (0.027) 
-0.058** 
(0.029) 
Married 0.196** (0.099) 
0.193* 
(0.099) 
Female x Married -0.631*** (0.149) 
-0.625*** 
(0.149) 
University degree 0.412** (0.204) 
0.414** 
(0.204) 
Completed apprenticeship 0.333** (0.134) 
0.334** 
(0.135) 
Tenure -0.020** (0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
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Table 3.13: Incidence of overtime (Probit) (cont.) 
Uni. degree x tenure  0.023* (0.014) 
0.024* 
(0.014) 
Completed apprenticeship x tenure  0.013 (0.009) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
Age 0.103*** (0.026) 
0.104*** 
(0.026) 
Age2 -0.001** (0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
White collar (low) 0.188 (0.116) 
0.187 
(0.116) 
White collar (middle) 1.005*** (0.101) 
1.002*** 
(0.101) 
White collar (high) 1.964*** (0.136) 
1.962*** 
(0.136) 
Blue collar (middle, high) 0.662*** (0.086) 
0.660*** 
(0.086) 
East 0.601*** (0.096) 
0.637*** 
(0.096) 
No. of obs 
Pseudo R² 
16134 
0.106 
16134 
0.107 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. Industry, time and establishment size dummies included. 
Reference group for professional position: Blue collar (low).  
4 Higher wages, overstaffing or both? The 
employer’s assessment of problems 
regarding wage costs and staff level in 
codetermined establishments 
This chapter is based on the SFB 823 Discussion Paper  No. 18/12. It is co-
authored with Kornelius Kraft. 
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4.1 Introduction 
There has been a long-standing debate in the literature on the effects of 
employee involvement in the operational decision-making of a firm. In Germany, 
wide-ranging codetermination rights are granted by law to employees, especially 
in personnel decisions, if they adopt a works council in their establishment. Thus 
works councils are, alongside unions, a powerful institution within the German 
system of industrial relations. The influence of such works councils has been 
examined since the mid-1980s focusing on different topics such as productivity, 
R&D, profitability, wages and employment. Starting with FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 
1987, 1990) as well as Kraft (1986), subsequent studies controversially discuss the 
gains and costs of German codetermination rights32.  
Almost all studies examine how objectively measured variables differ between 
establishments with and without works councils. In the case of wages, for 
example, recent studies find a remarkable wage markup in codetermined 
establishments33. Intuitively, this markup, in association with lower profitability, 
might be used in support of the hypothesis that works councils shift rents from 
the employer to the employees. The problem connected with these approaches, 
however, is that no point of reference is identified. High wages may well be 
justified if they are compensated by their main reference point, namely 
productivity. Productivity, however, may systematically differ between 
codetermined and non-codetermined establishments for many reasons, and may 
also be affected by the existence of works councils themselves. Hence, comparing 
the wage level between establishments with and without works councils, 
especially as an indication and source of rent shifting, might be misleading if 
economic reasons justify a difference.  
The point of reference is even more complicated if employment is considered. In 
principle the intersection of the wage rate with the labor demand curve should be 
used and this would also be related to establishment-specific characteristics such 
                                                          
32 Frege (2002), Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2004), and Jirjahn (2011) present surveys 
on the effects of works councils. 
33 See, e.g., Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001), Hübler and Jirjahn (2003), Gerlach and 
Meyer (2007), as well as Addison, Teixeira and Zwick (2010). 
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as productivity but in a non-trivial way. The German codetermination rights 
acknowledge a profound influence on hires and dismissals. At a minimum this 
might lead to bureaucratization and delays in personnel decisions. A potentially 
inefficient employment level is empirically hard to identify because the absolute 
employment level has to be related to the establishment’s labor demand. 
In contrast to other studies our approach is based on subjective assessments of 
expected problems by the management, namely overemployment and 
overpayment. The advantage of our approach is that establishment-specific 
heterogeneity is expected to be taken up by the managers. The assessment of the 
existence of overpayment and overemployment implies too large a difference 
between the actual levels of wage and employment and, from the employer’s 
point of view, optimal levels of both variables rather than solely their absolute 
levels. As mentioned earlier, the crucial point with any statement on the 
appropriateness of a wage or employment level is the point of reference. In the 
case of wages, the relation to productivity matters and productivity will be the 
result of observable as well as unobservable qualification advantages or – as many 
argue – simply by the existence of a works council itself. Hence, in such situations 
a subjective evaluation of the wage level by the managers may turn out to be 
useful. Also, where overemployment exists, a subjective assessment by the 
management considers all establishment-specific background information that 
determines employment. This information is difficult for researchers from outside 
to take into account. Hence, in such circumstances, subjective appraisal by the 
management may be regarded as a more reliable measurement of the efficiency 
of an establishment’s recent employment level.  
In the first place, we consider the effect of the existence of a works council on 
both personnel issues. Subjective approaches to identify the influence of works 
councils on wages and employment are very rare. To our knowledge, only Gold 
(1999) uses a subjective measurement of overemployment as a dependent 
variable. Using the NIFA-Panel, he finds that managers of a codetermined 
establishment are more likely to report overemployment as well as excessive 
redundancy costs than managers of establishments without works councils. 
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In the next step, we additionally control for heterogeneous effects of different 
types of work councils. Heterogeneity in the economic consequences of works 
councils due to different kinds of works council’s behavior has rarely been 
analyzed. This is probably caused by the difficulty in producing reliable 
classifications for works councils. Information on this issue is obviously hard to 
come by. Studies on the effects of different works council types are performed by 
Dilger (2002, 2006) and Pfeifer (2011). Dilger (2002) examines how different types 
of works councils (own classification by Dilger) affect hires, dismissals, and 
turnover in the German mechanical engineering industry. He shows that works 
councils that intervene in day-to-day business significantly reduce all three 
dependent variables. Works councils that do not intervene, however, have no 
significant influence. In a further study (Dilger 2006) he takes up his approach 
from 2002 concerning the types of works councils and extends it by controlling for 
the relations between works councils and management. In addition to the results 
estimated in his earlier study, he now finds a reduction of subjectively measured 
profit levels but no effect on innovations in establishments with intervening works 
councils. Pfeifer (2011) shows that establishments with works councils have 
higher productivity, higher wages, and lower profitability. Using data which is 
fairly similar to ours, he also considers different types of works councils. He finds 
the strongest effects on productivity if works councils usually negotiate with the 
management and also agree to a compromise. The strongest effects on wages and 
profitability, however, are identified in establishment with works councils which 
negotiate with the management but do not usually come to a compromise. Works 
councils that are largely in line with the management have the weakest impact34.  
Using wave 2006 from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show in this paper that on 
average in establishments with works councils (of all types) managers are more 
likely to complain of too large a number of employees. However, this is not true in 
the case of overpayment. If we additionally control for different types of works 
councils, we find strong evidence for heterogeneity: managers of establishments 
                                                          
34 After the publication of this chapter as a discussion paper (Gralla and Kraft 2012), a 
similar study has been published by another author. Pfeifer (2012) analyzes the same 
research questions and also finds similar results. 
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with negotiating works councils are more likely to complain of overemployment 
but are not more likely to complain of overpayment. In establishments with works 
councils that are mostly in line with the management, however, we find no higher 
likelihood of overemployment and in fact a lower probability for the existence of 
overpayment.     
This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the legal 
background and theories regarding codetermination. In Section 4.3, we describe 
our data and variables. Section 4.4 contains an explanation of the econometric 
model that we use and a discussion of our results. Furthermore, Section 4.5 
contains inferences using an objective measured variable, namely labor costs. 
Finally, we conclude in Section 4.6.   
 
4.2  Legal and theoretical background 
The source of German codetermination rights is the Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). It allows the staff of every establishment with at 
least five employees to adopt a works council and provides, compared to other 
countries, extensive rights to information, consultation and codetermination. 
Codetermination rights mainly exist with respect to social and workplace-related 
aspects within an establishment. For example, works councils are able to prevent 
dismissals if these dismissals neglect social aspects such as age or family 
background. Another reason for intervention is if (in the view of the works 
council) further employment (possibly after retraining) is feasible. Furthermore, 
they can also veto with respect to a hiring if it is thought that the person to be 
hired will disturb the peace within the establishment (Betriebsfrieden) or the 
works council fears that the new employee will substitute permanent staff 
without an operational need for this reorganization. In the case of collective 
redundancies, works councils have to negotiate what is referred to as “social 
plans”. These plans determine redundancy payments and the periods of notice.  
The influence of works councils on wages is limited. Firstly, works councils are not 
allowed to participate directly in wage negotiations. Nor are they allowed to call 
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strikes, and therefore they are not able to initiate the strongest form of industrial 
action. Furthermore, they cannot change parts of a collective bargaining 
agreement as long as no “opening clause” (Öffnungsklausel) of the agreement 
explicitly allows such an interference. Nevertheless, works councils are able to 
influence wages indirectly. If, for example, an establishment makes use of profit 
sharing, the works council has to bargain the organization and extent of such 
payments. Furthermore, works councils can negotiate benefits that go beyond the 
scale of collective bargaining agreements. Finally, collective bargaining 
agreements only define wage groups. Works councils and employers, however, 
have to determine which wage group should be used for a particular vacancy. 
Therefore, works councils indirectly define the wage that a particular worker 
earns.   
The theory of codetermination is highly controversial. Jirjahn (2005) provides a 
detailed discussion about the possible effects of works councils from a theoretical 
point of view. On the one hand, in line with the property rights theory, it is argued 
that works councils negatively affect the economic performance of an 
establishment. They reduce its flexibility and adaptability to market conditions by 
reducing the room for maneuver of the management. Furthermore, they use their 
bargaining power resulting from codetermination rights to shift rents from the 
employer to employees. This will ultimately reduce profits, and obviously lower 
expected profits will also negatively affect the incentives to invest in such an 
establishment.  
As stated above, works councils are able to prevent or, at least, delay dismissals. 
One might therefore expect less flexibility where dismissals are inevitable for 
economic reasons. Based on this theory, it could be assumed that establishments 
with works councils will more often suffer from personnel problems and also 
realize a wage-employment relation which is off the profit-maximizing labor 
demand curve. This would be a contradiction to the popular Right-to-Manage 
approach and establishments with works councils would in this case more 
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frequently state that overemployment prevails if works councils exist35. 
Overemployment may be a short- or long-term phenomenon. Most people will 
interpret it as a temporary phenomenon as management will find ways to reduce 
employment to its optimal level over time. Additionally, if overemployment were 
actually a permanent phenomenon, the management would simultaneously state 
that they expect to have overpayment because overemployment stands for a 
solution to the right of the labor demand curve. Then the wage would be higher 
than productivity. A major exception to this argumentation would be the 
existence of efficient contracts where the wage-employment combination must 
be off the labor demand curve. In this case it would always be in the interest of 
the management to reduce employment (and to breach the efficient contract) 36.   
On the other hand, participation theory argues that codetermination can increase 
an establishment’s performance. Works councils improve communication 
between employees and management in such a way that efficiency gains occur. 
Another line of argument is that the information rights granted to works councils 
may lead to reduced information asymmetries within an establishment. This 
would enable agreements to be reached which otherwise would not have been 
possible.  
Freeman and Lazear (1995), for example, argue that the information rights of 
works councils can decrease the likelihood of bankruptcy for an establishment. 
The reason being as follows: information asymmetries prevent the 
implementation of some pareto-efficient agreements between managers and 
employees if an ex-post break of such an agreement increases manager’s but 
decreases employee’s pay-offs. If the employees are aware of the incentives to 
break an agreement they would refuse such offers right away. In an unfavorable 
economic situation, for example, employees could decrease their claims toward 
the establishment in order to save their jobs if they trust the senior management. 
If a works council does not exist in an establishment, such concessions are less 
                                                          
35 See Booth (1995) for a detailed discussion of different approaches to modeling labor 
market bargaining.  
36 Please note that in this case we implicitly assume that, in addition to wages, 
employment is part of the works council’s utility function. 
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likely because the employees would then expect manager to exaggerate the 
gravity of the economic situation. With respect to our study, if participation 
theory describes reality well, establishments with works councils would be less 
likely to report personnel problems. 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The aim of this study is to analyze how the existence of a works council influences 
the likelihood of an establishment suffering from overemployment and 
overpayment. As mentioned earlier, the innovative aspect of our study is the use 
of subjective evaluation by the senior management concerning perceived 
problems. Whilst subjective assessments are sometimes regarded as unreliable, 
the advantage of this approach in our view is that the management uses its 
perception of an optimal situation as a benchmark on which to base its 
assessment. This includes the location of the labor demand curve (from the view 
of the managers). Hence, this approach enables us to identify whether the 
relation between wage and labor is on or off the labor demand curve.  
This study uses the IAB Establishment Panel, Wave 2006. Access to the data was 
provided via remote access at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German 
Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB)37. This panel is an annual survey of more than 15,000 German 
establishments. For the purpose of our study, we are only able to use data from 
2006 because this is the only wave with information on the relations between 
works councils and management, which are subsequently used to differentiate 
between types of works councils. We restrict our sample to establishments with 
at least five employees because smaller establishments are not allowed to adopt a 
works council. Furthermore, we drop observations from agriculture, nonprofit 
organizations, and public administration. Finally, our sample contains 5940 
observations. Table 4.1 shows means and standard deviations of our variables.  
                                                          
37 For a detailed description of the IAB Establishment Panel, see Kölling (2000). 
4 Higher wages, overstaffing or both? The employer’s assessment of problems 
regarding wage costs and staff level in codetermined establishments 
 73 
We examine the influence of works councils on two dichotomous variables. The 
first variable, overemployment, has unit value if the management of the 
establishment states that they expect to have too many employees during the 
next two years. In our sample, 9.7 percent of the establishments surveyed report 
that they expect such a problem. The second dependent variable is overpayment. 
This variable takes unit value if an establishment foresees a high financial burden 
on wage costs during the next two years. 36.9 percent of all establishments state 
that they are confronted with this problem.  
In Section 4.5, we will also use an objective measure as dependent variable, i.e. 
wages, in order to draw additional inferences. The IAB Establishment Panel 
contains just one piece of information regarding labor costs: the establishments 
state the total amount of gross pay in the month of June 2006 excluding the 
employer's social security contribution. We divide this variable by the number of 
employees and use its logarithmic value as a proxy for mean monthly ln(wage).   
Our main independent variable is works council. This is a dummy variable that has 
unit value if a works council exists in an establishment. In our sample, 35.4 
percent of all establishments have a works council. This is a high share of 
codetermined establishments. Beckmann, Föhr and Kräckel (2010) use 
representative data and show that 13.7% of all German establishments with more 
than 5 employees had a works council in 2006. Our relatively high number of 
codetermined establishments results from the fact that the likelihood of the 
existence of a works council increases with establishment size and large 
establishments are overrepresented in the IAB Establishment Panel. In a second 
part of our study, we consider different types of works council. The types are 
defined according to the behavior of a works council towards the management. 
We test empirically whether the estimated effects depend on the type of works 
council or not.  
The industrial relations-oriented literature on works councils has been discussing 
for some time how the types of works councils can be distinguished. Kotthoff 
(1981, 1994) identifies 6 types of works councils, namely isolated, ignored, 
behaving as a part of the management, autonomous, respected, and cooperative 
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but exerting countervailing power. Nienhüser (2005) characterizes the first three 
types of works councils as weak works councils and the last three types as strong 
works councils.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std. dev. 
Overemployment 0.097 0.296 
Overpayment 0.369 0.482 
Works council 0.354 0.478 
Works council (type A) 0.277 0.448 
Works council (type B) 0.077 0.267 
Increasing Sales 0.322 0.467 
Decreasing Sales 0.139 0.345 
Saturday 0.670 0.470 
Temporary work 0.020 0.059 
Technology 0.703 0.457 
Collect. agreement (firm level) 0.090 0.286 
Collect. agreement (industry level) 0.442 0.497 
Outsource 0.037 0.188 
Insource 0.033 0.178 
Single establishment 0.709 0.454 
Share of low-educated workers 0.183 0.252 
Share of highly educated workers 0.087 0.157 
Share of part-time contracts 0.152 0.205 
Share of fixed term contracts 0.052 0.118 
Active owner 0.478 0.500 
Labor costs per employee 2102.862 971.766 
Employment 138.498 290.833 
No. of obs. 5940 
 
 Note: Due to missing values, Labor costs is only observed in 5281 establishments. 
 
The IAB Establishment Panel does not contain as much differentiated information 
about different types of works councils. Instead, for our purpose, we just use two 
different types of works councils based on evaluations by the management. 
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Originally the management was given the three following alternatives (only one 
statement is possible): 
 
 1 Business decisions usually have to be put through against the 
 works/staff council. 
 2 The works/staff council often diverges from the management’s opinion 
 when it comes to business decisions; nevertheless a consensual solution is 
  eventually found in most cases. 
 3 Most business decisions are mutually agreed upon by the works/staff 
 council   and the management. 
 
Alternative 1 has only been selected by about 1% of all observations. As this low 
number implies too few observations for a useful empirical test, we merge option 
1 and 2 to what we call works council type A. The second kind of works council is 
of a more cooperative type and we call them works council type B. While the 
management in 27.7 percent of all establishments reports having a works council 
of the first type, the second type only exists in 7.7 percent of all observations. 
Hence, put differently for those establishments where a works council exists, 78.2 
percent of all managers asses their work council as being of type A and 21.8 
percent of all managers asses their works council as a type B representative body. 
Clearly this dichotomization aims at distinguishing works councils according to 
how vigorously worker interests are pursued. Some may prefer to call the type A 
works council a strong one and the type B works council a weak one. 
The way the works councils behave will affect their bargaining power and, as 
bargaining power is mainly used for rent-sharing activities, type B works councils 
are expected to be less successful in claiming rents. If this hypothesis is true and 
wages and employment are part of the utility function of works councils, in both 
areas less problems are expected to be stated compared to the situation when a 
type A works council is present.  
We consider several additional covariates. First we control for expected changes 
in sales in 2006. If sales are expected to increase in the near future, the 
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management will probably less frequently state that overemployment is a 
problem. In contrast, if the sales forecast is pessimistic, problems will be more 
likely because fewer employees are necessary.  
In order to control for expected changes in sales and also for different effects of 
decreasing or increasing sales, we generate two different dummy variables. The 
variable increasing sales has unit value if sales in 2006 are expected to increase 
and equals zero if sales stagnate or decrease. In contrast, the variable decreasing 
sales has unit value if sales are expected to decrease in 2006 and equals zero 
otherwise. 
Furthermore, it is possible that flexibility in employment and working time may 
also affect the existence of personnel problems. In order to control for 
employment flexibility we add the variable temporary work into our model. This 
variable is defined as the ratio of temporary workers to all employees. A higher 
share of temporary work increases the flexibility of the management to react to 
personnel problems, especially to overemployment.  
Such flexibility can also be reached through fixed-term contracts. Hence, we 
generate the variable share of fixed term contracts, i.e. the number of employees 
with a fixed term contract divided by total employment. A high share of fixed 
term contracts enables a fairly smooth adjustment of employment in the short 
run simply by not extending such contracts. Hence problems with 
overemployment should be less frequently reported.  
As an alternative to adjusting the number of workers, the number of hours may 
be altered if necessary. This hypothesis is considered by the variable Saturday, 
which is a dummy variable that has unit value if the employees of an 
establishment work Saturdays on demand.  
Part-time employment might also affect adjustment behavior by increasing the 
possibilities of the management to deploy the employees. If this were true, 
overemployment should pose less of a problem. We measure the influence of 
working time flexibility by share of part-time contracts. Share of part-time 
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contracts is the share of employees with part-time contracts divided by total 
employment.  
We also control for the influence of collective bargaining agreements. In 
Germany, two different kinds of collective bargaining agreements exist. Usually, 
unions and employer’s associations negotiate wages at industry level. Hence, we 
add the dummy collect. agreement (industry level) to our model and this dummy 
has unit value if the establishment is covered by such a collective bargaining 
agreement. As an alternative to industry-wide agreements, however, a company 
and a union can agree to a collective bargaining agreement at company level. We 
also control for the effect of such agreements by the dummy collect. agreement 
(firm level).   
Furthermore, we control for the influence of the use of a more or less advanced 
technology by the establishment. In the IAB Establishment Panel the management 
has to  rate its technology compared to other establishments of the same 
industry, on a five-level Likert scale where 1 means “state-of-the-art” and 5 
“obsolete”. We generate a dummy technology that has unit value if the 
management rates its technology with 1 or 2. The effect of technological advance 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, advanced technology could reduce production 
costs so the firm would achieve a competitive advantage in comparison to its 
rivals. This would positively affect growth and employment prospects.  If this were 
true, less personnel problems should be expected. On the other hand, advanced 
technology could also be applied to substitute labor. Hence, overemployment in 
particular would arise, at least temporarily.  
If an establishment has to implement strong structural adjustments, the 
probability of personnel problems might be affected. Insourcing and outsourcing 
in particular are likely to influence the expectation of problems with respect to 
overemployment if the labor force cannot be adjusted smoothly. To take account 
of possible influences of this kind we add two dummy variables, insource and 
outsource. Insource has unit value if other establishments or establishment units 
have been integrated into the observed establishment. In this case personnel 
problems could arise if the integrated units are suboptimally adapted. Outsource 
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has unit value if parts of the observed establishment are outsourced. Outsourcing 
is a method of reducing recent problems in an establishment. Hence, there may 
be less likelihood of problems in the future.  
Additionally, we add the dummy single establishment in order to distinguish 
between single establishments and establishments that are part of a multi-site 
company. Multi-site companies have the option of relocating capacities between 
different establishments, implying that problems regarding labor costs and 
employment can be reduced more easily. Hence, it can be expected that single 
establishments are more likely to suffer from personnel problems.   
Furthermore, we also take the qualification level of employees into account. For 
this purpose, we add two variables to our regression. The variable share of low-
educated workers is defined as the number of less skilled employees divided by 
total employment. In contrast, share of highly educated workers is defined as the 
share of employees with a university degree.  
In addition, active involvement of the capital owners in decision making could 
influence the probability of assessing the recent employment level and wage level 
as overemployment and overpayment. In many cases companies are nowadays 
led by managers who do not hold any capital shares. Their decisions on wage and 
employment levels only indirectly affect their personal income. This is obviously 
different for capital owners and therefore the assessment as to whether a 
problem exists or not may be determined by capital ownership.  
An active owner might state such problems because overemployment and 
overpayment reduce profits. Hence, it is the owner’s business income that is 
directly involved. In contrast, the remuneration of an employed manager does not 
depend, or at most only partially depends, on the establishment’s profits so that 
his or her perception of personnel problems might be less sensitive. We control 
for the influence of active ownership through the dummy active owner that has 
unit value if at least one owner or a family member of the owner works in the 
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establishment38. In order to take size effects into account, we add several size 
dummies to our regression. Finally, we also add industry dummies and state 
(German Bundesländer) dummies to our model to control for state specific effects 
and industry specific effects.   
 
4.4 Method and results 
The aim of this study is to analyze the influence of works councils on two binary 
variables. As OLS ignores the discreteness of our dependent variables and also 
leads to predictions above zero and below one, we estimate a Probit model. 
Clearly, we could estimate two univariate Probit models. This, however, would 
ignore a potential correlation between the error terms of both equations. Hence, 
we estimate a bivariate Probit model that accounts for correlated disturbances. 
This model can be deduced from a generalized index function model with two 
latent variables y1* and y2* that may be correlated39. These variables are defined 
as: 
 
𝑦1
∗ = 𝑥1𝑇𝛽1 + 𝑢1,   𝑦1 = 1 𝑖𝑓  𝑦1∗ > 0, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,                      (4.1) 
 
𝑦2
∗ = 𝑥2𝑇𝛽2 + 𝑢2,   𝑦2 = 1 𝑖𝑓  𝑦1∗ > 0, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,                      (4.2) 
 
where u1 and u2 are joint normal with zero means, variances one, and correlation 
𝜌. If 𝜌 = 0 two separate Probit models could be estimated because both error 
terms are independent. However, if 𝜌 ≠ 0 two independently estimated Probit 
                                                          
38 The wave 2006 of the IAB Establishment Panel does not contain detailed information 
about the position of the owner in the establishment. We only know how many working 
proprietors and unpaid family members are employed in the establishment. Although this 
information does not ensure that the proprietor manages the establishment, we use this 
variable as a proxy for active management by the owner because it is unlikely that the 
owner of an establishment does not have the last word in the decision-making at his or 
her establishment.  
39 For a detailed discussion about bivariate Probit models, see Greene (2008). 
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equations would be inefficient. The bivariate Probit model relaxes the assumption 
of independence. Here, the bivariate normal cdf is 
 
Φ(𝑥1𝑇𝛽1,𝑥2𝑇𝛽2,𝜌) = � � 𝜙(𝑧1, 𝑧2,𝜌)𝑑𝑧1𝑥2𝑇𝛽2
−∞
𝑑𝑧2                  (4.3)𝑥1𝑇𝛽1
−∞
 
where 
 
𝜙(𝑧1, 𝑧2,𝜌) = 𝑒−(𝑥1𝑇𝛽1)2+(𝑥2𝑇𝛽2)2−2𝜌𝑥1𝑇𝛽1𝑥2𝑇𝛽22(1−𝜌2)2𝜋(1 − 𝜌2)12 .                                 (4.4) 
              
Therefore, the log likelihood function is 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = �𝑙𝑛𝑁
𝑖=1
 Φ�𝑞𝑖1𝑥𝑖1𝑇 𝛽1,𝑞𝑖2 𝑥𝑖2𝑇 𝛽2,𝜌𝑖∗�                                           (4.5) 
 
with 𝑞𝑖1 = 2𝑦𝑖1 − 1, 𝑞𝑖2 = 2𝑦𝑖2 − 1 and 𝜌𝑖∗ = 𝑞𝑖1𝑞𝑖2𝜌. 
 
Within this framework, we estimate two different models. The model is based on 
the following equations  
 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑖
= 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑥𝑖𝑇 + 𝑢𝑖1                                       (4.6) 
 
and 
 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑖
= 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑥𝑖𝑇 + 𝑢𝑖2                                           (4.7) 
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In the first model, Wi is substituted by the works council dummy. Hence, this 
model treats works councils in accordance with almost all literature as a unitary 
variable. The second model contains the variables works council (type A) and 
works council (type B) instead of the variable works council. So it additionally 
controls for potential heterogeneity in works councils behavior.  
Table 4.2 shows the results of our estimates and the first two columns contain our 
estimates without controlling for heterogeneity of works councils. The last two 
columns show the estimated effects of different kinds of works councils. A Wald 
test always rejects independence of overemployment and overpayment so that a 
correlation between both error terms exists40.  
Regarding the results which are based on the simple distinction of whether a 
works council exists or not, we find that establishments with a works council are 
more likely to suffer from overemployment. Overpayment, however, does not 
occur more frequently in codetermined establishments. If we control for 
heterogeneity of works councils, we find different results: type A works councils 
increase the likelihood of overemployment and do not affect the likelihood of 
overpayment. In contrast, type B works councils do not affect the likelihood of 
overemployment and even reduce the likelihood of overpayment. 
Most of the control variables work well in both models. If sales are expected to 
increase, the probability that overemployment problems will be reported is 
reduced. In contrast, if sales are expected to decrease, in the view of the 
managers both overemployment and overpayment become more probable. The 
use of temporary work decreases the likelihood that overemployment will be a 
problem during the next two periods. Advanced technology reduces expected 
problems with respect to employment and payment. Hence, advanced technology 
appears to affect employment prospects positively. Collective bargaining at 
industry level is connected with more complaints by managers concerning 
expected overpayment.  
                                                          
40 The p-values of these tests are in the third from last row of each table. 
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Table 4.2: Regression results (full sample) 
Bivariate Probit 
                            Dep. Var. 
 
Variables 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Works council  0.323*** 
(0.072) 
-0.044 
(0.053)   
Works council (Type A)   0.392*** (0.076) 
0.035 
(0.057) 
Works council (Type B)   0.149 (0.103) 
-0.242*** 
(0.073) 
Increasing sales -0.190*** (0.059) 
0.045 
(0.039) 
-0.187*** 
(0.059) 
0.047 
(0.039) 
Decreasing sales 0.697*** (0.061) 
0.156*** 
(0.051) 
0.696*** 
(0.061) 
0.154*** 
(0.051) 
Saturday 0.030 (0.055) 
0.141*** 
(0.039) 
0.028            
(0.055) 
0.141*** 
(0.039) 
Temporary work -1.932*** (0.624) 
0.248 
(0.300) 
-1.979***            
(0.638) 
0.216 
(0.301) 
Technology -0.115** (0.052) 
-0.103*** 
(0.038) 
-0.112**            
(0.052) 
-0.100*** 
(0.038) 
Collect. agreement  
(firm level) 
-0.033 
(0.091) 
0.040 
(0.067) 
-0.036 
(0.091) 
0.034 
(0.067) 
Collect. agreement  
(industry level) 
0.009 
(0.059) 
0.085** 
(0.042) 
0.004            
(0.059) 
0.079* 
(0.042) 
Outsource 0.143 (0.120) 
0.117 
(0.091) 
0.140            
(0.108) 
0.109 
(0.091) 
Insource 0.254** (0.120) 
0.231** 
(0.094) 
0.238**            
(0.120) 
0.214*** 
(0.094) 
Single establishment -0.019 (0.059) 
0.054 
(0.044) 
-0.012 
(0.059) 
0.062 
(0.044) 
Share of low-educated 
workers 
0.088 
(0.111) 
0.186** 
(0.079) 
0.092            
(0.111) 
0.188** 
(0.079) 
Share of highly educated 
workers 
-0.008 
(0.184) 
-0.350** 
(0.139) 
-0.013 
(0.185) 
-0.360*** 
(0.139) 
Share of part-time 
contracts 
0.042 
(0.135) 
-0.041 
(0.102) 
0.051 
(0.135) 
-0.033 
(0.102) 
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Table 4.2: Regression results (full sample) (cont.) 
Share of fixed term 
contracts 
-0.266 
(0.231) 
-0.086 
(0.146) 
-0.228 
(0.230) 
-0.062 
(0.147) 
Active owner -0.019 (0.057) 
0.269*** 
(0.042) 
-0.013 
(0.057) 
0.275***     
(0.042) 
p-value of Wald test  
[ 0ρ = ] <0.001 <0.001 
McFadden-R2 0.074 0.076 
No. of obs. 5940 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. Size 
dummies, state dummies and industry dummies are included but not reported. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Insourcing always leads to a higher likelihood of problems observed with 
overemployment as well as with overpayment in the near future. In contrast to 
our stated hypothesis, managers from single establishments do not expect 
problems with respect to overpayment and with respect to overemployment. Low 
and high qualification levels have the expected effects with respect to the 
probability that overpayment problems are stated. Active ownership has no effect 
on overemployment. The management from these establishments, however, 
more frequently state overpayment, which could be explained by a more 
aggressive counteraction against higher wages. 
In a Probit model, the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal 
effects. Hence, we calculate the influence of the existence of a works council on 
overemployment and overpayment by calculating the difference between the 
average predicted probabilities of codetermined and non-codetermined 
establishments. These marginal effects are presented in Table 4.3. The standard 
errors of the marginal effects are calculated by the delta method. As we are only 
interested in the marginal effects of works councils, we waive to show the effects 
of the other variables for reasons of clarity. Additionally, we calculate semi-
elasticities in order to control for the relative effect of a works council. Remember 
that only 9.7 percent of all establishments suffer from overemployment, but 36.9 
percent of all establishments suffer from overpayment. Hence, solely interpreting 
the absolute effect (i.e. marginal effect) of the works council dummies might lead 
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to a distorted picture. As with marginal effects, we calculate semi-elasticities by 
calculating the difference between the average logarithm of the predicted 
probability of stating problems of codetermined and non-codetermined 
establishments. That is, the average semi-elasticity of a dependent variable is 
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐸𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  whereas 
 
𝑆𝐸𝑌𝑖 = ln(𝑌𝑖|𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖 = 1) − ln(𝑌𝑖|𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖 = 0)                 (4.8) 
 
and Yi is the probability that the management states that its establishment suffers 
from overemployment and overpayment. The estimated semi-elasticities are also 
shown in Table 4.3.  
Regarding the marginal effect of works council, we find that the likelihood that an 
establishment with a works council will suffer from overemployment is 5.1 
percentage points higher than the likelihood in an establishment without a works 
council. Expressed in relative terms, works councils increase the likelihood of 
overemployment by 60.4 percent. The likelihood of the existence of problems 
with overpayment in codetermined establishments does not significantly differ 
from the likelihood in establishments without a works council. Summarizing, these 
results show that the existence of a works council implies a higher likelihood of 
finding a wage-labor relation that is off the labor demand curve41.  
Regarding the results with works councils differentiated according to their type, 
we find a strong heterogeneity in our results: the likelihood that an establishment 
will suffer from overemployment increases by 6.5 percentage points if its works 
council has been classified as being of type A. Expressed in proportional terms, 
the likelihood that the management of such an establishment will state 
overemployment increases by 72.0 percent. In contrast, we find no significant 
effect on overpayment.  
                                                          
41 Due to our cross-sectional data, we are not able to control whether overemployment is 
permanent or just the result of a delaying of necessary adjustment of employment by 
works councils. 
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Table 4.3: Effects of works councils on overemployment and on overpayment 
(full sample) 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. Standard 
errors are calculated by the delta method.  
 
Works councils that are in line with the management (works council type B), 
however, have quite different effects. Here, the management does not report 
overemployment more frequently than establishments without works councils. 
Surprisingly, we find a strong negative impact on the likelihood of overpayment. 
This likelihood is reduced by 8.3 percentage points for establishments with works 
councils of type B which is, in relative terms, a reduction of 27.2 percent.  
A Wald test also rejects equality of the marginal effects at 5%-level (p-value: 
0.012) and of the semi-elasticities (p-value: 0.008) in the overemployment 
Dep. Var. 
Variables 
Overemployment Overpayment 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Works council       0.051*** (0.012)  
      -0.015 
(0.019)  
Works council (Type A)     0.065*** (0.014) 
 0.013 
(0.020) 
Works council (Type B)  0.024 (0.018) 
   -0.083*** 
(0.024) 
p-value of F-test 
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BME ME=
 
  0.012                        <0.001 
 Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Works council    0.604*** (0.133)  
      -0.046 
(0.056)  
Works council  
Type A  
   0.720*** 
(0.135)  
0.037 
(0.059) 
Works council  
Type B  
0.277 
(0.186)  
  -0.272*** 
(0.088) 
p-value of F-test  
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BSE SE=
 
 0.008       <0.001 
  
No. of obs. 5940 
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equation. In the overpayment equation, equality can also be rejected. The p-
values of the marginal effect and the semi-elasticity are p<0.001. 
The Works Constitution Act grants a works council extended codetermination 
rights if an establishment employs more than 20 workers. Works councils in larger 
establishments have additional codetermination rights regarding hires and the 
transfer of employees. Furthermore, the management must also keep the works 
council informed at least once every quarter about the economic situation of the 
establishment42. Due to the fact that these additional rights especially concerning 
employment increase the bargaining power of a works council, we repeat our 
estimates with a subsample that only contains establishments with more than 20 
employees. Table 4.6 in the Appendix shows the estimated coefficients of all 
covariates based on this subsample. Table 4.4 contains the estimated marginal 
effects and semi-elasticities of our main independent variables. 
Compared to the estimates with the complete sample, we find slightly different 
results regarding the existence of overemployment and overpayment in 
codetermined establishments. Without controlling for heterogeneity of works 
councils, the estimated difference in the likelihood that the establishments suffer 
from overemployment is 5.3 percentage points (i.e. 56.8 percent) higher than in 
establishments without works councils. Hence, in absolute as well as relative 
terms, the effect is similar to the previous results based on the full sample. We 
also find no significant effect on the existence of overpayment.  
 
  
                                                          
42 See Pulte (2009) for a more detailed description of the link between firm size and 
codetermination rights. 
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Table 4.4: Effects of works councils on overemployment and on overpayment 
(N>20) 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. Standard 
errors are calculated by the delta method. 
 
Regarding the estimates that control for different kinds of works councils, we still 
find that the likelihood of overemployment in codetermined establishments is 
higher than the likelihood of overemployment in non-codetermined 
establishments if the works council is characterized as a type A works council.  We 
also find no significant effect of type B works councils on overemployment. 
Additionally, the null hypothesis of equality of these effects can still be rejected at 
5%-level. In the case of overpayment, our results are also similar to the previous 
results. The influence of type A works councils is still insignificant and the marginal 
effect is very close to zero. Type B works councils, however, still have a negative 
Dep. Var. 
Variables 
Overemployment Overpayment 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Works council       0.053*** (0.013)  
       -0.008 
(0.021)  
Works council (Type A)      0.067*** (0.015) 
 0.023 
(0.023) 
Works council (Type B)  0.028 (0.021) 
   -0.083*** 
(0.027) 
p-value of F-test 
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BME ME=
 
  0.033                        <0.001 
 Semielasticities 
(Std. error) 
Semielasticities 
(Std. error) 
Works council    0.568*** (0.145)  
      -0.022 
(0.057)  
Works council  
Type A  
   0.673*** 
(0.145)  
0.062 
(0.061) 
Works council  
Type B  
0.271 
(0.185)  
  -0.242*** 
(0.086) 
p-value of F-test  
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BSE SE=  
 0.013       <0.001 
  
No. of obs. 3662 
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and highly significant coefficient. Both marginal effects are again significantly 
different from each other (p-value: <0.001).    
Summarizing our results, we find strong differences between the two types of 
works councils. Without controlling for heterogeneity, we find that 
establishments with works councils more frequently report problems with 
overemployment, but do not suffer from overpayment more frequently than 
establishments without this form of worker representation. Our findings are not 
easy to interpret on the basis of the property rights and the participation theory. 
The absence of complaints of too high wages supports the view of positive 
productivity effects of such an institution. The higher likelihood that managers will 
complain of overemployment is evidence in favor of the property rights theory43. 
Perhaps works councils have “two faces”.  
One limitation of this approach is a potential lack of causality of the estimated 
effects. Recent studies on reasons for the adoption of a works council argue that 
the existence of a works council is not random so that the use of a work council 
dummy as independent variable may not identify causal effects44. Although we 
cannot be sure that our results are causal, theoretical predictions and the fact 
that codetermination rights more strongly affect employment than wages indicate 
that our results might indeed be causal. 
 
4.5 Inference using objective measures 
Given that our estimations are based on subjective measures of the economic 
situation and that the results concerning overpayment are somewhat surprising, 
we compare the results with objective measures. In doing so, we mainly repeat 
the approach of Pfeifer (2011) to estimate the impact of different types of works 
                                                          
43 This conclusion is not true with respect to type B works councils. 
44 See, e.g., Kraft and Lang (2008), Beckmann, Föhr and Kräkel (2010) and Mohrenweiser, 
Margison and Backes-Gellner (2012). 
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councils on wages45. Table 4.6 in the Appendix contains the results of a regression 
on ln(wage) with both types of works councils as independent variables46.   
Unfortunately, some establishments do not report their labor costs. Therefore the 
number of observations drops to 5281 in the large sample (N>4) and to 3261 in 
the small sample (N>20). The lower number of observations might affect the 
comparability of the estimates on wages and the estimates on our subjective 
variables if some establishments with a specific set of personnel problems do not 
state their labor costs. In order to test for such a possible selectivity bias, we also 
repeat the estimations on the subjective variables using the reduced number of 
observations. These results are presented in Tables 4.7 to 4.10 in the Appendix. 
The results of these regressions are almost identical to our previous results. 
Hence, on this basis, the hypothesis for a selection-induced bias finds no support.  
Regarding the regressions on wages, we find a wage markup in codetermined 
establishments for both types of works council. However the markup is not of the 
same magnitude. Compared with establishments without a works council, wages 
in establishments with type A works councils are approx. 16 percent higher.  
Establishments with type B works councils, however, have a wage markup of 
approx. 13 percent. Both markups are also significantly different from each other 
at 5%-level in both samples. Note that the management of establishments with 
type B works councils less frequently state that they suffer from overpayment. 
Hence, based on the results of the subjective and objective wage variables 
together, the wage markup in these establishments must be overcompensated by 
higher productivity. In establishments with type A works councils, wage markup 
and productivity seem to offset each other.    
 
  
                                                          
45 Due to poor data, we only estimate wage equations and do not estimate production 
functions because the IAB Establishment Panel does not contain information about 
capital, and only contains an inaccurate definition of intermediate inputs. 
46 Note that, in contrast to our previous models, we forego the use of dummies for 
expected sales growth as independent variables in this model because such expectations 
should have no causal effect on recent average wage costs in an establishment. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
In this study, we examine whether, from the manager’s point of view, 
codetermined establishments more frequently report having a high financial 
burden on wage costs and overemployment. Furthermore, we also consider 
heterogeneity in the behavior of works councils and investigate whether different 
types of works councils have different effects on the reported problems regarding 
payment and employment.  
Our results show that in comparison with establishments without works councils 
codetermined establishments more frequently suffer from overemployment but 
do not suffer more frequently from overpayment. Apparently, higher wages in 
codetermined establishments that have been identified in previous studies seem 
not to be perceived as a problem by the management. Probably, higher 
productivity countervails.  
According to our results the main effect of works councils is on employment and 
this impact is in accordance with the Works Constitution Act, which explicitly 
grants codetermination rights in this area. Works councils are (in theory) expected 
to abstain from wage bargaining. If they have an impact on remuneration this 
seems to be compensated by higher productivity. In our view these results also 
show that rent sharing is more than higher wages. Employment or employment 
protection is a highly valued good, which apparently is a determinant of the works 
councils’ utility function. 
As expected, in most cases works council do not lead to pareto improvements, as 
redistribution takes place. However this is not true for works councils of type B. 
Finally, our results raise questions regarding future research. More research, 
especially on overemployment in codetermined establishments, is necessary. Is 
the higher likelihood of overemployment in codetermined establishments a 
temporary phenomenon, i.e. do works councils only delay dismissals, or does 
overemployment exist permanently? If the latter were true, do works councils 
lead to the implementation of efficient contracts because, for example, they are 
able to enforce their stability? 
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4.7 Appendix 
Table 4.5: Effects of works councils on overemployment and overpayment 
(20<N) 
Bivariate Probit 
                            Dep. Var. 
 
Variables 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Works council  
   0.313*** 
(0.079) 
-0.022 
(0.059)   
Works council (Type A)      0.377*** (0.082) 
0.063 
(0.063) 
Works council (Type B)   
0.154 
(0.108) 
  -0.232*** 
(0.078) 
Increasing sales 
  -0.233*** 
(0.069) 
-0.012 
(0.048) 
  -0.230*** 
(0.069) 
-0.009 
(0.048) 
Decreasing sales 
   0.679*** 
(0.076) 
  0.166** 
(0.067) 
   0.680*** 
(0.076) 
   0.165** 
(0.067) 
Saturday 
0.064 
(0.070) 
  0.147*** 
(0.052) 
0.061 
(0.070) 
   0.147*** 
(0.052) 
Temporary work 
   -2.193*** 
(0.713) 
       -0.022 
(0.337) 
   -2.240*** 
(0.729) 
       -0.062 
(0.339) 
Technology 
  -0.158** 
(0.064) 
  -0.119** 
(0.049) 
  -0.154** 
(0.064) 
 -0.114** 
(0.049) 
Collect. agreement  
(firm level) 
       -0.015 
(0.103) 
0.013 
(0.078) 
-0.020 
(0.103) 
0.002 
(0.079) 
Collect. agreement  
(industry level) 
-0.032 
(0.072) 
  0.106** 
(0.054) 
-0.040 
(0.073) 
 0.096* 
(0.054) 
Outsource 
0.199* 
(0.115) 
0.145 
(0.100) 
 0.198* 
(0.115) 
0.138 
(0.100) 
Insource 
 0.232* 
(0.130) 
 0.182* 
(0.104) 
 0.215* 
(0.130) 
0.161 
(0.104) 
Single establishment 
       -0.002 
(0.064) 
0.014 
(0.050) 
0.008 
(0.064) 
0.022 
(0.050) 
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Table 4.5: Effects of works councils on overemployment and overpayment 
(20<N) (cont.) 
Share of low-educated 
workers 
0.083 
(0.134) 
   0.268*** 
(0.099) 
0.087 
(0.133) 
   0.271*** 
(0.100) 
Share of highly educated 
workers 
-0.083 
(0.233) 
   -0.470*** 
(0.177) 
       -0.089 
(0.234) 
   -0.484*** 
(0.177) 
Share of part-time 
contracts 
       -0.010 
(0.184) 
       -0.043 
(0.142) 
-0.021 
(0.184) 
       -0.057 
(0.143) 
Share of fixed term 
contracts 
       -0.065 
(0.301) 
0.112 
(0.203) 
       -0.012 
(0.301) 
0.153 
(0.204) 
Active owner 
       -0.065 
(0.070) 
   0.332*** 
(0.052) 
       -0.056 
(0.070) 
   0.344*** 
(0.052) 
p-value of Wald test 
 [ 0ρ = ] <0.001 <0.001 
McFadden-R2 0.073 0.073 
No. of obs. 3662 
Notes: See Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.6: Effects of heterogeneous works councils on ln(labor costs) 
OLS regression  
Sample 4<N 20<N 
Variables            Coeff.         (Std.error) 
             Coeff. 
          (Std.error) 
Works council (Type A) 
 
             0.171*** 
            (0.015) 
             0.158*** 
            (0.015) 
Works council (Type B) 
 
             0.133*** 
            (0.018) 
             0.124*** 
            (0.018) 
Saturday 
             0.005 
            (0.011) 
            -0.006 
            (0.013) 
Temporary work 
             0.165* 
            (0.055) 
             0.142 
            (0.088) 
Technology 
             0.020*** 
            (0.011) 
             0.012 
            (0.011) 
Collect. agreement (firm level) 
             0.042** 
            (0.017) 
             0.034*** 
            (0.018) 
Collect. agreement (industry level) 
            -0.008 
            (0.011) 
            -0.008 
            (0.013) 
Outsource 
             0.013 
            (0.025) 
             0.029 
            (0.025) 
Insource 
             0.036 
            (0.024) 
             0.051** 
            (0.025) 
Single establishment 
            -0.026** 
            (0.011) 
            -0.018 
            (0.012) 
Share of low-educated workers 
            -0.265*** 
            (0.024) 
            -0.254*** 
            (0.027) 
Share of highly educated workers 
             0.700*** 
            (0.034) 
             0.728*** 
            (0.041) 
Share of part-time contracts 
            -0.830*** 
            (0.038) 
            -0.781*** 
            (0.050) 
Share of fixed term contracts 
            -0.078* 
            (0.046) 
            -0.238*** 
            (0.058) 
Active Owner 
            -0.043*** 
            (0.011) 
            -0.031*** 
            (0.012) 
No. of obs. 5281          3261 
R2 0.552          0.600 
p-value of F-test [
WoCo Type A WoCo Type Bβ = β ] 
0.018          0.033 
Notes: See Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.7: Regression results of the main independent variables without 
establishments that do not state labor costs (full sample) 
Bivariate Probit 
                            Dep. Var. 
 
Variables 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Works council  
    0.296*** 
(0.077) 
-0.058 
 (0.057)   
Works council (Type A)       0.373*** (0.082) 
0.011 
(0.061) 
Works council (Type B)   
0.100 
(0.109) 
  -0.226*** 
(0.077) 
p-value of Wald test  
[ 0ρ = ] <0.001 <0.001 
McFadden-R2 0.073 0.074 
No. of obs. 5281 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. All 
previously used covariates are included but not reported. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.        
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Table 4.8: Effects of works councils on overemployment and on overpayment 
variables without establishments that do not state labor costs (full sample) 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. Standard errors 
are calculated by the delta method. 
 
  
Dep. Var. 
Variables 
Overemployment Overpayment 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Works council       0.047*** (0.013)  
      -0.021 
(0.020)  
Works council (Type A)     0.062*** (0.015) 
 0.004 
(0.022) 
Works council (Type B)  0.016 (0.016) 
   -0.078*** 
(0.026) 
p-value of F-test 
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BME ME=
 
  0.006                   0.000 
 Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Works council    0.552*** (0.143)  
      -0.060 
(0.060)  
Works council  
Type A  
    0.685*** 
(0.145)  
0.011 
(0.063) 
Works council  
Type B  
0.188 
(0.200)  
  -0.246*** 
(0.091) 
p-value of F-test  
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BSE SE=  
 0.005  0.002 
  
No. of obs. 5281 
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Table 4.9: Regression results of the main independent variables without 
establishments that do not state labor costs (N>20) 
Bivariate Probit 
                            Dep. Var. 
 
Variables 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Works council  
   0.293*** 
(0.082) 
-0.061 
(0.062)   
Works council (Type A)      0.360*** (0.086) 
0.009 
(0.066) 
Works council (Type B)   
0.127 
(0.113) 
  -0.231*** 
(0.082) 
p-value of Wald test  
[ 0ρ = ] <0.001 <0.001 
McFadden-R2 0.071 0.073 
No. of obs. 3261 
Notes: See Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.10: Effects of works councils on overemployment and on overpayment 
without establishments that do not state labor costs (N>20) 
Notes: See Table 4.8. 
 
Dep. Var. 
Variables 
Overemployment Overpayment 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Works council       0.051*** (0.014)  
      -0.023 
(0.023)  
Works council (Type A)     0.065*** (0.016) 
 0.003 
(0.025) 
Works council (Type B)  0.023 (0.022) 
   -0.083*** 
(0.029) 
p-value of  of F-test 
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BME ME=
 
  0.029                   0.002 
 Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Works council    0.530*** (0.151)  
      -0.059 
(0.060)  
Works council  
Type A  
   0.640*** 
(0.153)  
0.009 
(0.064) 
Works council  
Type B  
0.224 
(0.195)  
  -0.237*** 
(0.089) 
p-value of F-test  
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BSE SE=  
 0.015  0.003 
  
No. of obs. 3261 
5 Separating introduction effects from 
selectivity effects: The differences in 
employment patterns of codetermined 
establishments 
This chapter is based on the SFB 823 Discussion Paper  No. 43/11. It is co-
authored with Kornelius Kraft. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The German Works Constitution Act defines the German method of co-
determination on establishment level. This Act determines the information, 
consultation and codetermination rights of works councils which represent 
employees. Among other codetermination rights, works councils have the power 
to affect decisions regarding hires and dismissals. It is even possible for them to 
oppose hires as well as dismissals in some cases.   
The effect of works councils on firms’ behavior has been examined several times 
since the mid-1980s (FitzRoy and Kraft 1985, 1987, 1990, Kraft 1986). These and 
subsequent studies analyze to what extent firms with and without works councils 
differ with respect to profitability, R&D, productivity, quits and employment47.  
A common feature of studies on works councils is that they ignore potential 
selectivity effects. Differences between firms have so far been explained by the 
existence of works councils, although it might be the case that some of these 
differences are not in fact caused by works councils. Specific characteristics may 
exist before a works council has been introduced and also favor the introduction 
of works councils. These specific characteristics may also affect some other 
variables. Therefore, the existence or introduction of a works council as well as 
differences in employment, hires and dismissals may be caused by an unobserved 
third variable. If this variable is constant over time, selectivity may seriously affect 
the results of existing studies. Even if the heterogeneity that encourages the 
establishment of a works council disappears over time, the estimated effect of 
introducing a works council will be biased as long as no control for selectivity has 
been carried out. The estimation of adoption effects, given potential 
heterogeneity, is essentially the topic of this paper. 
Not many studies until now have considered the effects of works councils on 
employment growth. However the results have been discussed quite contro-
versially. Although we cannot solve all problems, we argue that the comparison of 
                                                          
47 See, for example, Addison and Teixeira (2006) as well as Jirjahn (2008a, 2008b, 2010) 
regarding employment growth. Frick and Sadowski (1995), Backes-Gellner, Frick and 
Sadowski (1997), Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001) as well as Dilger (2002) examine 
hires and dismissals.  
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firms before and after the adoption of a works council avoids many problems 
associated with a cross-sectional comparison of firms with and without such an 
institution. This ensures that the permanent differences between firms, which at 
some point in time adopt a works council, are not mixed up with the actual effects 
of a works council, and the causal interpretation is much clearer.  
The results of this study are probably of use beyond the German context, since 
works councils have interesting and exceptional codetermination rights on 
employment which are not matched by rights that unions in other countries 
possess. This study tries to document the effects of such codetermination on 
employment. 
To analyze in more detail the ways in which employment adjustment is realized, 
we also look at hiring and dismissal rates. We find that firms which introduce a 
works council have higher employment growth rates before the introduction 
actually takes place. After introduction firms with works councils have lower 
employment growth – which, in turn, is the result of lower hiring rates. However, 
we find that the introduction of works councils has no significant influence on 
dismissals. Instead, firms in which a works council is introduced already have 
lower dismissal rates. 
This chapter is organized as follows: firstly we summarize the theoretical 
background (Section 5.2) and the results of previous empirical studies on the 
impact of works councils (Section 5.3). In Section 5.4 we describe our 
methodology and the dataset. Next, we discuss our results regarding employment 
growth (Section 5.5), hires and dismissals (Section 5.6). Finally, with Section 5.7 
we draw our conclusion. 
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5.2 Theoretical background 
The German Works Constitution Act increases workers’ power by conceding rights 
to codetermination when a company hires and dismisses staff, whereby their 
power depends on the number of employees in an establishment. Irrespective of 
establishment size, works councils have to be informed in advance of a dismissal. 
A works council cannot oppose a dismissal without good reason. Possible reasons 
for intervention are when it appears that social issues have been neglected in the 
selection of employees for dismissal, or when further employment might in fact 
be feasible (perhaps after retraining or relocation within the establishment). If an 
establishment has more than 20 employees, the works council has extended 
codetermination rights. Among other things, works councils have to participate in 
decisions on large-scale redundancies, hires, and the classification of employees 
into particular wage brackets of collective bargaining agreements48. 
In the case of large-scale redundancies, managers negotiate a so-called social plan 
(Sozialplan) with works councils which determines redundancy payments, social 
selection criteria regarding who will be made redundant and the establishing of an 
interim employment company (Transfergesellschaft). If a works council exists, dis-
missed employees usually change from their previous establishment to such a 
company where they obtain a fixed-term contract. For the duration of this 
contract the company pays for and provides additional training to the employees 
in order to decrease the likelihood of their becoming unemployed.    
Even if dismissals cannot be avoided in the end, a delay is more probable and this 
clearly has effects on adjustment costs.  
In the case of hires, works councils are able to refuse a hiring if, for example, it 
endangers the “peaceful atmosphere in an establishment” (Betriebsfrieden), 
threatens the jobs of permanent staff or causes other, unjustified disadvantages. 
For obvious reasons dismissals are much more frequently opposed than hires.  
Theoretical discussion about possible employment effects of works councils is 
very controversial. The theories, which are relevant within the given context, are 
                                                          
48 See Pulte (2009) for a description of the link between codetermination rights and 
establishment size. 
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participation theory, the neoclassical approach (with the variants insider-outsider 
theory and rent-seeking theory) and the employment security view49.  
On the one hand, participation theorists argue that works councils improve the 
relationship between employer and employee due to better communication. This 
is basically an application of the exit-voice theory of Freeman and Medoff (1984). 
Better communication helps to avoid misunderstandings and to solve problems at 
the workplace. This in turn has a positive influence on job satisfaction and 
productivity which also affects dismissals (Backes-Gellner, Frick and Sadowski 
1997). Additionally, works councils improve communication with regard to work 
practices (Backes-Gellner, Jirjahn and Mohrenweiser 2011).  
The basic idea is that information asymmetries between employees and the 
management exist. Employees are able to identify, for example, potential 
technical or organizational improvements. However, inadequate communication 
channels or anxiety about possible job losses following rationalization measures 
prevents workers from disclosing (private) information. The explicit task of works 
councils is (among other aims) the exchange of information with management 
and to protect employees from any negative implications of this information 
disclosure. If the introduction of a works council enhances efficiency and implied 
productivity advantages lead to price reductions, demand for the produced 
output will increase, the number of dismissals will probably fall and hires will 
increase.  
On the other hand, based on a neoclassical point of view, it is maintained that 
bargaining power and codetermination rights of works councils constrain the 
profit-maximizing behavior of the management. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1979), the standard argument goes as follows: if works councils are 
such a good thing, why does the legislator exclude the employer from the  
decision of whether to introduce a works council? Related to that argumentation 
is the observation that in no other country do workers’ representatives have so 
much power as in Germany. If codetermination enhanced efficiency, other 
                                                          
49 For a more detailed theoretical discussion from different perspectives, see inter alia, 
Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001), Dilger (2003) as well as Jirjahn (2010).  
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countries would have adopted such an institution, too. The insider-outsider 
theory (Lindbeck and Snower 1988, 2001) argues that employed insiders have an 
advantage in bargaining compared with unemployed outsiders because of firm-
specific advantages and the possibility of hampering cooperation with newly hired 
workers via harassment. Works councils could be interpreted as institutionalized 
insider representation, as they are surely not responsible for the interests of 
outsiders. Another strand of literature (c.f. for a recent example Beckman, Föhr 
and Kräkel 2010) emphasizes that the introduction of works councils aims at 
increasing bargaining power and therefore this institution is regarded as a rent-
seeking entity. Information, consultation and codetermination rights of works 
councils are assumed to prevent or at least delay necessary decisions if these 
decisions are not in the workers’ interest. One obvious example is the case of 
dismissals. The power of works councils to affect decisions on redundancy 
payments and the selection among the employees to be dismissed according to 
social criteria will increase employment (adjustment) costs. Therefore, profits may 
be negatively affected by the existence of works councils (Frege 2002), at least as 
long as no counteracting efficiency effects are connected with the introduction of 
works councils. If this theory is true, such firms experience lower employment 
growth rates in the long run, as they have cost disadvantages in comparison to 
otherwise identical organizations.  
An alternative explanation for the parallel observation of the introduction of a 
works council and lower employment growth rate is the following: as stated 
above, works councils are of particular help for employees if redundancies take 
place. If - for exogenous reasons - economic conditions become worse, the 
workforce might decide to adopt a works council in order to be better prepared 
for possible negotiations about the conditions and extent of dismissals (Jirjahn 
2009, Kraft and Lang 2008). Thus, works councils may be the result of pessimistic 
expectations about the future. If these concerns become real, we will 
simultaneously observe the adoption of a works council and, in an extreme case, 
an increase in dismissals. However, in this scenario the presence of a works 
council would not cause dismissals. The main motivation to introduce works 
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councils is its expected effect of employment security. This theory is difficult to 
test empirically, since information on expectations is needed. Implications are 
that the adoption of a works council is negatively correlated with performance.  
In contrast, if expected profitability and adoption probability are uncorrelated or 
even show a positive relation, a works council is not introduced in times of 
worsening economic conditions. The reason then is probably rent seeking 
(Beckmann, Föhr and Kräkel 2010).  
 
5.3 Related Literature 
The effects of works councils on firm behavior and performance have been 
examined empirically in several studies. The main focus of this field of research is 
the impact of works councils on factors like productivity, innovations, profitability 
and labor turnover. Frege (2002) as well as Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2004) 
survey previous studies. Furthermore, Jirjahn (2011) surveys studies of German 
codetermination rights on company- and establishment- level. Our study confines 
itself to employment growth, hires and dismissals. In an early work, Gold (1999) 
estimates the effect of works councils on employment using data from the 
production sector of Lower Saxony. He finds that works councils reduce changes 
in employment. He also finds that firms with works councils more frequently 
complain of high dismissal costs and are also grossly overstaffed. Gerlach and 
Jirjahn (1999), however, use the same data and find no significant influence of 
works councils on employment growth. Addison and Teixeira (2006) show that 
works councils reduce employment growth. Relating to these results, Jirjahn 
(2008a) argues that the estimated effects of works councils on employment 
growth strongly depend on the modeling of firm size. He claims that works 
councils do not influence employment growth. He proves his hypothesis by 
showing that the effects of works councils indeed vary if different methods of 
specifying firm size are used. Furthermore, Jirjahn (2010) finds a positive effect of 
the existence of a works council on employment growth for manufacturing 
establishments in Lower Saxony. 
5 Separating introduction effects from selectivity effects: The differences in 
employment patterns of codetermined establishments 
 105 
Compared with employment growth, results on the influence of works councils on 
hires and dismissals are less conflicting. In an early work, Frick and Sadowski 
(1995) show that the existence of a works council reduces dismissals significantly. 
They also find a negative effect on hires, although not a significant one. Addison, 
Schnabel and Wagner (2001) find that works councils significantly reduce hires, 
separations and labor turnover in general, although this result does not apply to 
firms with 21 to 100 employees. Dilger (2002) shows that works councils reduce 
hires and separations. According to his results the extent of reduction depends on 
the characteristics of the works councils. Cooperative works councils induce the 
highest reductions. Works councils which do not intervene in day-to-day business 
do not have a significant effect at all. Backes-Gellner, Frick and Sadowski (1997) 
compare the dismissal rates of firms caused by the existence of works councils. 
They show that the dismissal rate in firms with works councils is 2.9 percentage 
points lower than in firms without such an institution. They also find some 
evidence that works councils neither prevent dismissals in bad economic 
situations nor inhibit hires in growing firms.  
Ellguth (2006) uses a propensity-scores-matching approach to identify differences 
in labor fluctuation. Using cross-sectional data, he finds that works councils 
reduce labor turnover. Although lower turnover is explained by a reduction in 
hires and dismissals, fewer hires dominate his results. However, he does not 
estimate introduction effects. Furthermore, the strong correlation between 
establishment size and the existence of a works council reduces the general 
validity of his results as the majority of large establishments have a works council. 
So it is hardly possible to match these firms with other, similar firms without a 
works council. Using linked employer-employee data, Hirsch, Schank and Schnabel 
(2010) analyze the effects of works councils on separation rates, by considering 
whether an employee becomes unemployed or works in another establishment 
after separation. They find that works councils reduce separation to 
unemployment and to employment whereas magnitude and significance of the 
estimated effects strongly depend on the employee’s characteristics. Guertzgen 
(2007) shows that works councils can be associated with lower accession and 
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separation rates. Her definition of the dependent variables and the estimation 
procedure is quite similar to our study. However, she does not distinguish 
between quits and dismissals and the relation between works councils and 
hires/dismissals is not the main purpose of her study.  
A common feature of the majority of the studies mentioned above is that they 
ignore the potential endogeneity of the introduction of a works council. Jirjahn 
(2009) as well as Kraft and Lang (2008) find that employees prefer to introduce 
works councils to secure their rents. Additionally, Kraft and Lang (2008) show that 
employees prefer to introduce a works council if they are worried about potential 
job losses. The adoption of a works council in turn is associated with less anxiety 
about becoming unemployed. However, Beckmann, Föhr and Kräkel (2010) 
highlight that works councils are mainly adopted in order to seek rents instead of 
sustain jobs. These studies highlight that firms with certain characteristics are 
more likely to adopt a works council than others. The only studies that examine 
adoption effects are Addison et al. (2002) and Schultz (2006). These studies use a 
propensity-score-matching approach and find no significant effects on differences 
in quits, productivity, employment growth, profits (Addison et al. 2002) as well as 
productivity, profitability and qualification (Schultz 2006). However, their results 
might be inconclusive because the introduction of a works council is a rare event 
and therefore usually only a small number of observations is available.  
 
5.4 Data & Method 
Our data is taken from the IAB Establishment Panel which is an annual survey of 
more than 15,000 German establishments with at least one employee covered by 
social insurance. This survey is collected by the Institute for Employment Research 
of the German Federal Employment Agency, Nuremberg. We use survey waves of 
the years 1998 to 2008. The advantage of this data is that it covers a long time 
period. Hence, our results should not be driven by cyclical up- or downturns but 
rather include whole business cycles. At first, we drop all observations with less 
than five employees as the introduction of a works council is only relevant for 
firms with more than four employees. We also drop observations from companies 
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where a works council has been abandoned, and observations from the public 
service, non-profit organizations and households. Overall, our sample contains 
54,515 observations of 16,151 establishments. In this sample, we observe 242 
adoptions of a works council. We also generate a subsample which only includes 
establishments with more than 20 employees in order to control for the 
robustness of our results. As already mentioned above, works councils have 
stronger codetermination rights if an establishment has more than 20 employees. 
This subsample contains 31,918 observations of 9,874 establishments and 187 
adoptions of works councils. 
 
5.4.1 Variables 
Our estimates can be divided into two parts. We start by estimating the effect of 
introducing a works council on employment growth. The growth rate is defined as 
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑚𝑝)𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑚𝑝)𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑚𝑝)𝑖,𝑡. In the second part, we estimate 
the effect of the introduction of works councils on hires and dismissals. The idea 
of this approach is to find an explanation for changes in employment growth by 
identifying potential changes in hires and dismissals50.  
We define our dependent variables as the ratio of hires (dismissals) in t+1 and 
overall employment in t. However, the exact recording of dismissals may be 
complicated. To repeat, the aim of this study is to define the effect of works 
councils on the decision of the management whether it wants to dismiss one or 
more employee(s) or not. This dismissal can be done in several ways. For example, 
aside of a classical firing, the firm can also renounce the extension of a fixed-term 
contract or reject further employment after an apprenticeship has been 
completed. Furthermore, management is also able to reduce employment within 
a firm by establishing interim employment companies. In this case employees 
usually terminate their employment contracts by mutual consent and get a new 
fixed-term contract in the interim employment company. Such a company can be 
                                                          
50 We also tried to estimate equations with quit rates as the dependent variable, but 
unfortunately the computations did not converge.  
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seen as an independent organization within the same firm which has the purpose 
of financing and organizing application training courses or computer training 
courses, etc. to improve an individual’s chances of finding alternative 
employment. 
In order to define adequately what a dismissal is, we decide to specify our 
dismissal rate of firm i in year t+1 as  
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝐽𝑎𝑛−𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒,𝑖,𝑡+1 = 100 × Σ𝐽𝑎𝑛−𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒,𝑖,𝑡+1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒,𝑖,𝑡                (5.1) 
 
where Σ𝐽𝑎𝑛−𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒,𝑖,𝑡+1  is defined as the sum of changes in employment through 
dismissals, termination of employment contracts by mutual consent, leaving the 
firm after apprenticeship or after a fixed-term contract has expired. Similarly, we 
define the share of hires as  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐽𝑎𝑛−𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒,𝑖,𝑡+1 = 100 × ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑛−𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒,𝑖,𝑡+1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒,𝑖,𝑡 .                          (5.2) 
 
We restrict the share of hires and dismissals, respectively, to the first half-year 
because the survey only requests the information for this period. 
 
5.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
An influence of unions on employment change can be expected, i.e. the existence 
of collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, we create a dummy to account for 
this influence. We add also a variable qualification to our model to measure labor 
qualification effects. This variable is defined as the number of employees with a 
vocational degree and the number of employees with a university degree divided 
by total employment. Of course, this is a broad definition of qualification. It covers 
68 % of the employees in our sample. Unfortunately, we are unable to divide 
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employees into more precise qualification groups because the respective question 
in the survey has been changed during our sample period.  
Furthermore, we add variables to consider the effect of part-time working and to 
consider the effect of fixed-term contracts. Both variables may be associated with 
higher labor turnover in firms.  
There is a strong correlation between firm size and the introduction of a works 
council. It may also be possible that large firms have different dismissal and hiring 
rates caused by internal manning procedures. Additionally, large firms might have 
different employment growth patterns. Thus, we include several size dummies to 
avoid a potentially omitted variable bias.  
Clearly, employment and employment changes are determined to a large extent 
by demand for the produced goods. Output is probably an endogenously 
determined variable and therefore we refrain from using it. We could use lagged 
values of output growth. However, this would lead to a substantial reduction in 
the number of observations. Less problematic seems to be the use of two 
innovation dummies (Product improved and New product) as alternative and 
exogenous variables describing growth potential. The variables in question have 
unit values if the firm improved an existing product or introduced a new product. 
Unfortunately, the IAB Establishment Panel does not include the respective 
questions regularly, but only in the years 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2008. 
Therefore, we impute the missing observations. As a proxy for capacity utilization, 
we also insert profits in our model51. Insufficient profits are (in the presence of 
fixed costs) usually the result of unsatisfying capacity utilization. Hence, 
employment reduction is probable.  
  
                                                          
51 It could be argued that profits are the result of economic activity and not the cause. 
However, several studies use profits as a variable explaining employment growth. 
Excluding this variable does not alter our results. See, e.g., Gold (1999) and Dilger (2002) 
for a discussion on the effects of low profits on employment. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable     Mean    Std. Dev. 
Employment growth     -0.018     0.164 
Share of hires      5.138   10.020 
Share of dismissals      2.556     6.484 
Works council (existence)      0.338     0.473 
Works council (adopted)     0.010     0.097 
Works council (treatment group)     0.019     0.136 
Works council (pre-existent)     0.328     0.470 
Product improved     0.459     0.498 
New product     0.113     0.316 
Profit situation          0.299                        0.458 
Technology     0.702     0.457 
Collective agreement     0.536     0.499 
Limited liability     0.655     0.475 
Single establishment     0.743     0.437 
Qualification     0.680     0.258 
Part-time contracts     0.161     0.214 
Fix-term contracts     0.042     0.105 
Age of estab.     0.566     0.496 
Size5-20     0.415     0.493 
Size21-50     0.206     0.404 
Size51-100     0.119     0.324 
Size101-250     0.128     0.334 
Size251-500     0.069     0.253 
Size>500     0.063     0.243 
No. of emp. 130.362 295.915 
No. of estab. 16,151 
No. of obs. 54,515 
 
The IAB Establishment Panel contains assessments of the profit situation by the 
management of an establishment measured according to a Likert scale52.We use 
this information to generate a dummy Profit situation that has unit value if the 
management of the establishment assesses the profit situation as 4 or 5, i.e. if it 
rates the profit situation as bad or very bad. We also consider the influence of 
                                                          
52 The Likert scale contains a subjective rating of profitability beginning 1 (very good) until 
5 (very bad). 
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plant technology by using a dummy which has unit value if the management 
assesses the conditions of technical facilities as 1 or 2 on a scale of 1 (up to date) 
to 5 (obsolete). Moreover, we add a dummy for the age of a firm which has unit 
value if the firm was founded before 199053.  
Older firms may have structures that reduce labor turnover and may also be 
active in more stable markets. We also take account of the legal form of firms by a 
dummy variable, which has unit value if the firm in question is managed with 
limited liability. Limited liability could motivate the management to invest in more 
risky but highly profitable projects so that employment growth might increase. 
Moreover, we add a dummy variable that controls for the effect of being a single-
plant company. We also add industry and time dummies to control for industry- 
and time-specific effects. Clearly differences between East and West Germany 
may exist. We therefore include dummies for the German Bundesländer which 
are comparable to states in other countries. Table 5.1 displays the descriptive 
statistics of our data. 
 
5.4.3 Measuring the effect of works councils 
In order to estimate the effect of works councils, we introduce in the first step a 
dummy variable for their existence. This is the common method that has been 
used in several studies. Of course, this method neither estimates the effect of the 
introduction of a works council nor does it account for potential endogeneity of 
the introduction of works councils. It simply shows the difference between firms 
which have a works council and firms without it. In the next step, in order to 
distinguish between potential heterogeneity among firms and the effect of works 
councils, we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework. This specification 
includes three dummies instead of one compared with the previous version. 
Hence, our estimation equation becomes  
 
                                                          
53 The IAB panel does not contain more detailed information on foundation date if an 
establishment was founded before 1990.  
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𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝+ 𝛽3𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡                                                 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .                                                            (5.3) 
 
The second works council dummy identifies the treatment group and has unit 
value in every year if an establishment introduces a works council during the 
observation period, irrespective of whether it is actually introduced or not. The 
purpose of this dummy is to characterize the heterogeneity between our 
treatment group and firms without works councils. The first works council dummy 
has unit value if the observed establishment is a member of the treatment group 
and a works council actually exists. This dummy variable identifies the effect of 
the introduction of a works council. Finally, a group of firms exists that have a 
works council during the whole observation period. We account for this group by 
inserting the third dummy, which has unit value if the firm has introduced a works 
council at some point in time before the first period that we observe. This variable 
captures the impact of pre-existent works councils and its coefficient can be 
interpreted as the sum of heterogeneity, introduction and long-run effect. Hence, 
ignoring this variable would underestimate the effects of treatment group and 
adoption. Altogether, we have three groups of firms: firms without a works 
council (our control group), firms that introduced a works council (the treatment 
group) and firms that have a works council during all periods that we observe. 
This approach enables us to estimate different employment policies of firms with 
and without works councils and to check whether observed differences are 
caused by the actual introduction of a works council or are due to the 
heterogeneous characteristics of the firm.  
An assumption of the difference in differences estimator is that the timing of 
adoption is approximately random. This might be crucial because, as already 
mentioned above, the introduction of a works council could be a result of a 
change in the employee’s expectation about economic prospects.  
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In the first place we have some doubts with respect to the expectation 
hypothesis. The only study that examines the influence of expectations on the 
introduction of a works council is Kraft and Lang (2008). They, however, do not 
find any influence of expectations regarding, sales growth, short-run employment 
growth, and long-run employment on the adoption of a works council54.        
However, even if changes in expectations are the reason for adoption, our 
approach still provides interesting results for the discussion about codetermined 
establishments. Firstly, we still identify the economic performance of an 
establishment before adoption. Hence, our approach still provides inference 
regarding the heterogeneity in employment growth between establishment which 
adopt a works council and establishments that do not55. Secondly, we are able to 
identify how these establishments perform after adoption compared to other 
establishments, independent of the reason for adoption. 
 
5.5 Works councils and employment growth 
Table 5.2 shows the results of OLS estimates of employment growth. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered at establishment level. The first column contains 
the results of a regression, where we only control for the existence of a works 
council. In line with the results of Addison and Teixeira (2006) the existence of a 
works council reduces employment growth. Compared to establishments without 
works council, codetermined establishments have a 0.9 percentage points lower 
employment growth rate. Jirjahn (2008a) criticized that an inadequate modeling 
of firm size leads to biased estimates of effects of works councils on employment 
growth. Therefore, we use size dummies to measure size effects. Dummies have 
                                                          
54 We also estimated models that include short run expectations of sales growth as 
independent variables. Although this does not change our results, we abstain from 
reporting these results because of the likely endogeneity of employment growth and 
expected sales growth. Instead, we prefer to model changes in sales by our innovation 
variables.  
55 We could also estimate a model, where we include time dummies and firm dummies. 
However, we prefer the DiD approach without firm dummies because our main interest is 
the identification of the group effects. In particular we want to show the effects of an 
adoption of a works council by comparing the firms’ performance before and after that 
event. 
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the advantage that they are able to detect nonlinearities as well as kinks in size 
effects. We also experimented with alternative measures of firm size56. None of 
our results were affected. The coefficients of our size dummies indicate a negative 
relation between size and growth so that a size bias, as mentioned by Jirjahn 
(2008a), can be rejected.  
 
Table 5.2: OLS with employment growth as dep. variable 
 Pooled OLS  DiD OLS  Pooled OLS  DiD OLS  
Estab. size N > 4 N > 20 
Variables      Coeff.    (std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Works council 
(existence)  
-0.009*** 
(0.002)    
-0.010*** 
(0.002)   
Works council 
(adopted)    
-0.028*** 
(0.010)    
-0.025** 
(0.010) 
Works council 
(treatment group)    
 0.020*** 
(0.008)    
 0.020** 
(0.009) 
Works council  
(pre-existent)    
-0.008*** 
(0.002)    
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Other Covariates  yes  yes  yes  yes 
No of obs.  54,515 31,918 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. State, time 
and industry dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Table 5.5 in the Appendix shows full regression results. 
 
The second column shows the results of the DiD approach. In this case firms, 
which introduce a works council, can be described by a specific pattern. These 
firms have a two percentage points higher employment growth rate before 
introduction. However, the introduction reduces employment growth by 2.8 
percentage points, so the initially higher rate disappears.  
As already mentioned above, works councils obtain additional codetermination 
rights if an establishment has more than 20 employees. Hence, we repeat our 
estimates with a subsample that only contains establishments with more than 20 
                                                          
56 We used ln(Employment), Employment and Employment2 as well as solely Employment 
as a measurement of size.  
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employees. The last two columns in table 5.2 show these results. The estimated 
coefficients in these columns are quite similar to the previous results.  
In principle the sum of the effects of adoption and treatment group should be 
equal to the effect of pre-existing works councils, as the latter variable estimates 
both effects. Backes-Gellner, Jirjahn and Mohrenweiser (2011) show that the 
influence of a works council increases over time, which they explain by a “learning 
effect”. In our approach, differences between short-run and long-run influences 
may probably be reflected by a gap between the effect of pre-existing works 
councils and the sum of effects of adoption and treatment group. In principle we 
could expand our DiD model by including lagged variables of adoption in order to 
identify development over time. However, unfortunately, our sample does not 
allow us to estimate meaningful long-run effects due to the relatively short time 
horizon that we observe. On average, we observe an establishment 2.1 years 
before and 2.2 years after a works council has been adopted. In addition, Backes-
Gellner, Jirjahn and Mohrenweiser (2011) show that the aforementioned 
“learning effect” implies a very slow increase in power. For example, in their 
dataset works councils have the strongest impact after 30 years of existence. The 
coefficients of adoption and treatment group on the one hand and pre-existing 
works councils on the other hand are statistically insignificant from zero at 
common levels of significance57. This result leads to two different conclusions. At 
first, we find no learning effect because the sum of adoption effect and treatment 
group effect does not differ from the estimated effect of pre-existing works 
councils. Secondly, our results cast some doubt on the employment security 
hypothesis after a temporal shock. If an expected negative shock in demand leads 
to the introduction of a works council and the sum of the effect of adoption and 
treatment group does not differ from the effect of pre-existent works councils, 
this implies that the firms introducing works councils never recover from the 
initial negative shock. This may be the case for some firms, but that is rather 
unlikely for the average of our sample. Hence, these results are more plausibly 
explained by the neoclassical theory, where the management adjusts 
                                                          
57 The p-values of the H0: 𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡  are p1 = 0.930 in the 
first and p2 = 0.604 in the second sample. 
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employment growth as a reaction to a new situation with higher labor 
(adjustment) costs.      
Nor do the results support the participation theory, as the companies which 
introduce works councils do much worse than before.  
 
5.6 What explains changes in employment growth? 
In a last step, we try to find the link between changes in employment growth and 
the employer’s decisions on hires and dismissals following the introduction of a 
works council. In doing so, we estimate the impact of the introduction of a works 
council within our DiD framework as explained above. Of course, many firms do 
not hire or dismiss any employees at all during a period, i.e. a large share of our 
dependent variables is zero. Therefore, we apply a heteroscedasticity adjusted 
Tobit Model to take account of this censored data structure. For this purpose, we 
replace the variance 2σ  in the log likelihood function by the expression 
2 2 2
i i[exp(w ' )]σ = σ α , where α  denotes estimated parameters of the 
heteroscedasticity term and iw '  is a vector of several size and industry 
dummies58. Table 5.6 in the Appendix shows the estimated results of 
determinants of hires. The last row contains 2χ - and p-values of LR tests on 
heteroscedasticity. These tests always reject the assumption of homoscedasticity 
and therefore the heteroscedasticity model is the relevant one. As the magnitude 
of coefficients of a Tobit Model cannot directly been interpreted, we also 
estimate semi-elasticities in order to identify the proportional effect of works 
councils. These semi-elasticities are shown in Table 5.3.  
The conventional approach leads to the by now well-known result: firms with 
works councils hire fewer employees. We find a semi-elasticity of -0.237 in this 
approach59. Clearly, this effect is dominated by establishments with experienced 
                                                          
58 See, for example, Greene (2008) for a detailed discussion on heteroscedasticity in Tobit 
Models and methods to estimate unbiased coefficients. 
59 Here and throughout we evaluate average semi-elasticities of our works council 
dummies given that the dependent variable is positive. Semi-elasticities are defined as 
E(ln(y)|d=1)- E(ln(y)|d=0). 
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works councils and does not identify introduction effects. The DiD approach, 
however, shows that the actual introduction of a works council reduces hires. The 
semi-elasticity of the adoption effect is -0.189 and is still significant at 5%-level. 
Hence, the introduction of a works council reduces the share of hires by 18.9% in 
the large sample (Employment > 4) and we also find a reduction of 23.0% in the 
small sample (Employment > 20). Using the DiD approach, we also find no 
significant differences in hires between treatment group establishments before 
introduction and establishments which do not adopt a works council. That is, we 
find no heterogeneity in hires between firms that will introduce a works council in 
later periods and firms that never adopt a works council. Additionally, the null 
hypothesis that the summarized effect of adoption and treatment group equals 
the influence of pre-existent works councils cannot be rejected60. Hence, the 
short-run impact of works councils on hires is quite similar to the long run effect. 
 
Table 5.3: Semi-elasticities of share of hires 
 Pooled  Het. Tobit  
DiD 
Het. Tobit  
Pooled  
Het. Tobit  
DiD  
Het. Tobit  
Estab. Size N > 4 N > 20 
Variables Semielasticity (std. err.) 
Semielasticity 
 (std. err.) 
Semielasticity 
 (std. err.) 
Semielasticity 
 (std. err.) 
Works council 
(existence)                
 -0.237*** 
 (0.023) 
 
 
 
  
 -0.293*** 
 (0.029) 
 
 
 
 
Works council  
(adopted)                   
-0.189** 
(0.083)    
 -0.231** 
 (0.107) 
Works council  
(treatment group)      
-0.039 
(0.078)    
 -0.060 
 (0.102) 
Works council  
(pre-existent)             
-0.239*** 
(0.023)    
 -0.296*** 
 (0.030) 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in 
parentheses are calculated by the delta method. Table 5.6 in the Appendix shows full regression 
results. 
 
Table 5.7 in the Appendix illustrates the results of the estimations on dismissals. 
The LR Test again rejects the hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Furthermore, Table 
5.4 contains the corresponding semi-elasticities. The estimates of pooled Tobit 
                                                          
60 The p-values of this test are 0.882 in the large and 0.948 in the small sample. 
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show a reduced share of dismissals in firms with works councils. However, using 
the DiD approach, it turns out that the introduction of a works council does not 
affect dismissals. In this case, firms which introduce a works council during the 
sample period generally have lower dismissal rates before adoption. Now, the 
impact treatment group variable explains the difference between firms with and 
without works councils. The estimated average semi-elasticities of dismissals are -
0.217 in the large and -0.254 in the small sample. That is, shares of dismissals in 
firms which introduce a works council are 21.7% and 25.4% lower than dismissal 
rates in firms without works councils. Both average marginal effects are also 
significantly different from zero at 5%-level. Based on the DiD estimation we 
conclude: before adoption, firms do not differ with regard to the hiring rate but 
have a lower dismissal rate compared with establishments without works 
councils. 
 
Table 5.4: Semi-elasticities of share of dismissals 
 Pooled  Het. Tobit  
DiD 
Het. Tobit  
Pooled  
Het. Tobit  
DiD  
Het. Tobit  
Estab. Size N > 4 N > 20 
Variables Semielasticity (std. err.) 
Semielasticity 
 (std. err.) 
Semielasticity 
 (std. err.) 
Semielasticity 
 (std. err.) 
Works council 
(existence)                
 -0.138*** 
 (0.024) 
 
 
 
  
-0.159*** 
(0.032) 
 
 
 
 
Works council  
(adopted)                   
-0.052 
(0.084)    
-0.092 
(0.111) 
Works council  
(treatment group)      
-0.217*** 
(0.084)    
-0.254** 
(0.114) 
Works council  
(pre-existent)             
-0.142*** 
(0.025)    
 0.165*** 
(0.034) 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in 
parentheses are calculated by the delta method. Table 5.3 in the Appendix shows full regression 
results. 
The introduction itself does not change dismissals, but it has a negative impact on 
hiring behavior61. To sum up, the impact of works councils takes place by affecting 
                                                          
61 It could be argued that a part of the reduction in hires is a result of lower quit rates. If 
works councils were to reduce quits, the management would diminish hires because the 
number of vacancies is reduced. However, our results regarding employment growth point 
5 Separating introduction effects from selectivity effects: The differences in 
employment patterns of codetermined establishments 
 119 
hires and not, as perhaps expected, by reducing dismissals. How can our findings 
be explained? In our view, these results are in accordance with two rival 
explanations, but one of the two is more likely. Of course, a works council has the 
legal power to inhibit hires, but apparently they oppose hires rather rarely in 
practice. More plausible is an intervention if dismissals are planned. Generally, 
works councils are able to increase dismissal costs by claiming high redundancy 
payments or simply by avoiding or at least delaying dismissals. One possible 
explanation for the observed effect on hires is the anticipation of increased 
dismissal costs if a works council exists and the termination of contracts is 
economically necessary. The codetermination rights of works councils might lead 
employers to reduce hiring rates because of the extended dismissal protection 
rights and a shift of bargaining power to the employees. This explanation is also 
consistent with the insider-outsider theory. Insiders raise dismissal costs by 
introducing works councils. Hence, employers react to the existence of works 
councils by not filling vacancies. 
However, we already discussed the alternative possibility that the workforce 
introduces a works council if it is worried about the economic perspectives of the 
firm. If these concerns become true, fewer hires will take place in the next period. 
The similar magnitude of the short- and long-run effect of a works council casts 
doubt on the relevance of this theory. The employment security models would 
only be valid if the shock leading to the introduction of a works council continues 
for all periods we observe.  
The results do not, however, support the hypothesis of participation theory that 
efficiency is improved by the introduction of a works council. We estimate lower 
employment growth after the adoption of a works council, which is inconsistent 
with improvements to efficiency, at least if labor costs do not rise more than 
productivity. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                   
out that the hiring effect has to overcompensate a potential quit effect. Otherwise, a 
reduction in employment growth should not be observed.   
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5.7 Conclusion 
We show that differences between firms with and without works councils 
regarding their employment growth, hiring and dismissal behavior are not only 
caused by the existence of works councils. In general, firms with works councils 
hire and dismiss less and also have a lower employment growth than firms 
without works councils. Taking account of the potential heterogeneity of firms 
and estimating the effect of an introduction of works councils by a difference-in-
differences approach, we show that the adoption of a works council is associated 
with fewer hires. However, works councils do not affect the share of dismissals. 
Consistently, we also find a reduced employment growth after introduction.  
We discuss three possible explanations for the reported empirical results. The 
neoclassical view with its variants insider maximization and rent seeking, 
employment security modeling and participation theory are relevant with respect 
to the analysis of the effects of works councils. In our view, the neoclassical 
approach explains the observed results more convincingly than the other theories. 
Although we use a vast dataset with more than 50,000 observations, the fact is 
that even more information is needed. Consideration of the introduction of works 
councils and the lags of these values would unfortunately greatly reduce the 
number of usable observations with positive values for the introduction of works 
councils in former years. However, such variables are needed to infer the long-run 
effects of newly adopted works councils.  
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5.8 Appendix  
 
Table 5.5: OLS with employment growth as dep. variable 
 Pooled OLS  DiD OLS  Pooled OLS  DiD OLS  
Estab. size N > 4 N > 20 
Variables      Coeff.    (std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Works council 
(existence)  
-0.009*** 
(0.002)    
-0.010*** 
(0.002)   
Works council 
(adopted)    
-0.028*** 
(0.010)    
-0.025** 
(0.010) 
Works council 
(treatment group)    
 0.020*** 
(0.008)    
 0.020** 
(0.009) 
Works council  
(pre-existent)    
-0.008*** 
(0.002)    
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Product improved  
 0.015*** 
(0.002)  
 0.015*** 
(0.002)  
 0.013*** 
(0.002)  
 0.013** 
(0.002) 
New product  
 0.007*** 
(0.002)  
 0.008*** 
(0.002)  
 0.008*** 
(0.002)  
 0.008** 
(0.002) 
Profit situation  
-0.059*** 
(0.002)  
-0.059*** 
(0.002)  
-0.054*** 
(0.002)  
-0.054*** 
(0.002) 
Technology  
 0.010*** 
(0.002)  
 0.010*** 
(0.002)  
 0.010*** 
(0.002)  
 0.010** 
(0.002) 
Collective agreement  
-0.001 
(0.002)  
-0.001 
(0.002)  
-0.003** 
(0.002)  
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Limited liability  
 0.010*** 
(0.002)  
 0.010*** 
(0.002)  
 0.006*** 
(0.002)  
 0.006 
(0.002) 
Single establishment  
 0.004** 
(0.002)  
 0.005*** 
(0.002)  
 0.006*** 
(0.002)  
 0.006 
(0.002) 
Qualification  
 0.009*** 
(0.003)  
 0.009** 
(0.003)  
 0.007 
(0.004)  
 0.007 
(0.004) 
Part-time contracts  
-0.000 
(0.004)  
-0.000 
(0.004)  
 0.000 
(0.006)  
 0.000 
(0.006) 
Fix-term contracts  
-0.004 
(0.010)  
-0.004 
(0.010)  
-0.011 
(0.013)  
-0.011 
(0.013) 
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Table 5.5: OLS with employment growth as dep. variable (cont.) 
Age of estab.  
-0.008*** 
(0.002)  
-0.008*** 
(0.002)  
-0.010*** 
(0.002)  
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Size21-50  
 0.008** 
(0.002)  
 0.008*** 
(0.002)  
  Ref. 
  
  Ref. 
 
Size51-100  
 0.010** 
(0.003)  
 0.010*** 
(0.003)  
 0.003 
(0.002)  
 0.003 
(0.002) 
Size101-250  
 0.003 
(0.003)  
 0.003 
(0.003)  
-0.002 
(0.003)  
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Size251-500  
 0.001 
(0.003)  
 0.001 
(0.003)  
-0.003 
(0.003)  
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Size>500  
-0.008** 
(0.003)  
-0.008*** 
(0.003)  
-0.011*** 
(0.003)  
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
No. of obs. 54,515 31,918 
R-squared       0.06          0.06 0.07 0.07 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  State, time and 
industry dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 5.6: Het. Tobit model with share of hires as dep. variable 
 Pooled  Het. Tobit  
DiD 
Het. Tobit  
Pooled  
Het. Tobit  
DiD  
Het. Tobit  
Estab. Size N > 4 N > 20 
Variables Coeff. (std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Works council 
(existence)  
 -2.180*** 
 (0.211) 
 
 
 
  
 -2.041*** 
 (0.206) 
 
 
 
 
Works council 
(adopted)    
 -1.743** 
 (0.761)    
 -1.605** 
 (0.745) 
Works council 
(treatment group)    
 -0.359 
 (0.720)    
 -0.415 
 (0.708) 
Works council  
(pre-existent)    
 -2.203*** 
 (0.219)    
 -2.060*** 
 (0.213) 
Product improved  
  0.582*** 
 (0.122)  
  0.582*** 
 (0.122)  
  0.451*** 
 (0.121)  
  0.450*** 
 (0.121) 
New product  
  0.578*** 
 (0.121)  
  0.580*** 
 (0.121)  
  0.523*** 
 (0.120)  
  0.523*** 
 (0.120) 
Profit situation  
 -1.277*** 
 (0.104)  
 -1.276*** 
 (0.104)  
 -1.138*** 
 (0.101)  
 -1.136*** 
 (0.101) 
Technology  
  0.098 
 (0.106)  
  0.096 
 (0.106)  
  0.104 
 (0.104)  
  0.102 
 (0.104) 
Collective agreement  
 -1.388*** 
 (0.149)  
 -1.384*** 
 (0.149)  
 -1.411*** 
 (0.151)  
 -1.409*** 
 (0.151) 
Limited liability  
  0.821*** 
 (0.162)  
  0.823*** 
 (0.161)  
  0.613*** 
 (0.162)  
  0.615*** 
 (0.162) 
Single establishment  
  0.130 
 (0.099)  
  0.129 
 (0.099)  
  0.176* 
 (0.097)  
  0.175* 
 (0.097) 
Qualification  
 -0.798*** 
 (0.288)  
 -0.797*** 
 (0.287)  
 -0.711** 
 (0.289)  
 -0.710** 
 (0.289) 
Part-time contracts  
  1.056* 
 (0.616)  
  1.054* 
 (0.615)  
  0.838 
 (0.663)  
  0.835 
 (0.663) 
Fix-term contracts  
23.324*** 
 (1.509)  
23.327*** 
 (1.505)  
21.455*** 
 (1.541)  
21.461*** 
 (1.537) 
Age of estab.  
 -1.457*** 
 (0.149)  
 -1.457*** 
 (0.149)  
 -1.189*** 
 (0.148)  
-1.190*** 
 (0.148) 
No. of obs. 54,515 31,918 
Chi2-Value [LR-Test] 
(p-value) 
18,437.49 
 (0.000) 
18,434.45 
 (0.000) 
 10,136.72 
(0.000) 
10,132.96 
 (0.000) 
 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Time, industry, 
size and state dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 5.7: Het. Tobit model with share of dismissals as dep. variable 
 Pooled  Het. Tobit  
DiD 
Het. Tobit  
Pooled  
Het. Tobit  
DiD  
Het. Tobit  
Estab. Size N > 4 N > 4 N > 20 N > 20 
Variables Coeff. (std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Coeff. 
(std. err.) 
Works council 
(existence)  
 -0.932*** 
 (0.167) 
 
 
 
  
 -0.786*** 
 (0.163)   
Works council 
(adopted)    
 -0.357 
 (0.575)    
 -0.455 
 (0.548) 
Works council 
(treatment group)    
 -1.487*** 
 (0.576)    
 -1.258** 
 (0.568) 
Works council  
(pre-existent)    
 -0.973*** 
 (0.173)    
 -0.817*** 
 (0.169) 
Product improved  
 -0.121 
 (0.100)  
 -0.128 
 (0.100)  
 -0.145 
 (0.098)  
 -0.153 
 (0.099) 
New product  
 -0.027 
 (0.094)  
  0.029 
 (0.094)  
  0.021 
 (0.093)  
  0.023 
 (0.093) 
Profit situation  
  1.447*** 
 (0.101)  
  1.453 
 (0.101)  
  1.296*** 
 (0.094)  
  1.301*** 
 (0.094) 
Technology  
 -0.593*** 
 (0.097)  
 -0.595*** 
 (0.097)  
 -0.544*** 
 (0.094)  
 -0.545*** 
 (0.094) 
Collective agreement  
 -0.298*** 
 (0.112)  
 -0.307*** 
 (0.111)  
 -0.362*** 
 (0.110)  
 -0.374*** 
 (0.110) 
Limited liability  
  0.335*** 
 (0.125)  
  0.340*** 
 (0.125)  
  0.247** 
 (0.122)  
  0.252** 
 (0.121) 
Single establishment  
 -0.093 
 (0.078)  
 -0.098 
 (0.078)  
 -0.098 
 (0.076)  
 -0.102 
 (0.076) 
Qualification  
 -1.407*** 
 (0.219)  
 -1.413*** 
 (0.219)  
 -1.245*** 
 (0.216)  
 -1.254*** 
 (0.216) 
Part-time contracts  
  0.109 
 (0.431)  
  0.080 
 (0.430)  
  0.232 
 (0.429)  
  0.199 
 (0.426) 
Fix-term contracts  
14.352*** 
 (0.431)  
14.433*** 
 (1.311)  
12.958*** 
 (1.246)  
13.046*** 
 (1.232) 
Age of estab.  
 -0.341*** 
 (0.111)  
 -0.350*** 
 (0.111)  
 -0.213** 
 (0.109)  
 -0.222** 
 (0.109) 
No. of obs. 54,515 31,918 
Chi2-Value [LR-Test] 
 (p-value) 
17,741.49 
(0.000) 
17,747.69  
(0.000) 
 8,872.28 
(0.000) 
 8,876.78 
(0.000) 
 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Time, industry, 
size and state dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
 
  
6 The effects of ownership concentration 
and codetermination on productivity 
This chapter is based on the study „Die Wirkung von Eigentümerkonzentration 
und Mitbestimmung auf die Produktivität“ published in Schmollers Jahrbuch, 
2010. It is co-authored with Kornelius Kraft. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The theory of management controlled corporations is based on the assumption 
that the ownership structure of a corporation is widely spread across its owners 
and highly decentralized. Such ownership structure explains the often assumed 
scope of the management to act in its own interest rather than in the interests of 
the owner of a firm. In most countries, however, some corporations also have a 
highly concentrated ownership structure with one, or at most few, dominant 
owners. The effects of the existence of such concentrated ownership are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, concentrated ownership supports the ability to 
control the management by the owner because both incentives and possibility to 
control the management enhances. Furthermore, major ownership reduces 
potential problems of free-riding with respect to control manager’s effort. In 
contrast to small shareholders, the wealth of a major shareholder is strongly 
linked to the performance of his or her corporation. Additionally, the 
management‘s job security is more strongly linked with the major shareholder’s 
goodwill so it has to follow the major shareholder’s instructions. Small 
shareholders however usually do not have such strong influence on 
management’s behavior. Thus, concentrated ownership structures can result in a 
better performance of corporations with a centralized ownership structure.  
On the other hand, also contrary arguments with respect to ownership and firm 
performance exist. One argument is that a dominant owner protects a 
corporation against hostile takeovers so that the ability of the capital market to 
monitor management’s performance is reduced. A major shareholder could also 
use his or her power to act in his or her interest and possibly work against the 
interests of other, minor shareholders. Such behavior could especially be 
expected if the voting rights of an owner diverge from his or her cash-flow rights. 
A major owner, for example, might force the management to sign contracts that 
are very unfortunate to the firm but increase the payoff of the major owner62. 
Such behavior would simply shift rents from minor owners to the major owner. 
Major owners may also use the cash-flow of a firm to finance their hobbies and 
                                                          
62 She or he, for example, might enforce contracts with other firms that are also controlled 
by the owner. 
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private interests, i.e. they use the corporation to increase their utility directly. In 
many cases such situations leads the major owner in a conflict where he or she 
has to decide whether to maximize corporation’s profits or to take advantage of 
his or her control rights and exploit resources from the firm (La Porta et al. 2002, 
Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003).  
The aim of our study is to analyze how ownership concentration and 
codetermination by employees in supervisory boards affect productivity. On the 
one hand, these effects will be estimated separately. On the other hand, we also 
estimate the effects of both factors if they exist in a corporation simultaneously. 
The idea of our study is that the representation of the interests of labor and 
capital might not always be efficient. From the point of view of the capital side, 
for example, an efficient representation of interests can rather be expected if a 
major shareholder exists. From the view of the labor side, codetermination in the 
supervisory board provides the possibility to represent the employees’ interests. 
A high concentration of the one side (e.g. labor) however might be misused at the 
costs of the other side (e.g. capital). Thus, the aim of our study is to analyze if 
mutual control by both labor and capital reduces the possibility of abuse of power 
in the supervisory board and therefore results in a prevention of reduction of 
productivity.  
For this purpose, we use German data that contains 1583 (1670) observations 
from 383 (381) corporations for the years 1996-2008. We estimate a Cobb-
Douglas production function and find that ownership concentration has no effect 
in firms with no employee representatives in the supervisory board. Almost parity 
codetermination reduces productivity. This reduction however diminishes with 
increasing capital concentration. Furthermore, the incidence of an owner in the 
supervisory board affects productivity of codetermined corporations.  
This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the theoretical 
background of the effects of mandatory codetermination rights. In Section 6.3, we 
discuss related literature. Section 6.4 contains a discussion about our data, 
empirical strategy and results. We conclude in Section 6.5.  
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6.2 Theoretical background 
The modern corporation is frequently characterized by the separation of 
ownership and management (Berle and Means 1932).  In the case of widely held 
shares, it might be true that the management is the only institution that controls 
corporate processes. Such broad distribution of ownership can mainly be found in 
the USA and UK. In other countries a higher concentration of capital ownership is 
rather typical (Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003). In this context, Denis and McConnell 
(2003, 11) conclude: “Equity ownership in Germany has historically been more 
concentrated than in the U.S.” A higher capital concentration has two diverging 
effects: on the one hand, it enables the possibility of an efficient control of the 
management. On the other hand, it prevents a hostile takeover by other 
investors. This generates scope for potential misuse of power. Morck, Wolfenzon 
and Yeung (2005) characterize such behavior as „Economic Entrenchment“. The 
dominant owner forces the management to increase his or her utility at the costs 
of minor shareholders and other stakeholders. For example, he or she might force 
the management to sponsor major events in order to improve the owner’s 
reputation. Linked with this issue is also a capital ownership by the managers.  
In the empirical literature, the link between ownership concentration and 
economic performance has frequently been analyzed. For this, an inverted U-
shaped link between performance and ownership concentration is implied. If a 
capital owner controls a small share of a company, an increase in his or her share 
increases firm performance caused by a convergence of the behavior of the 
management towards the aims of all shareholders and stakeholders (“Alignment-
Effect”). A further increase in capital ownership however leads to the domination 
of a protective effect (“Entrenchment-Effect”) which results in an egoistic 
behavior by the dominant owner at the costs of all other shareholder and 
stakeholder. These empirical findings however have been criticized by Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) as well as Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). They argue that capital 
concentration, especially by the management, is not exogenous. It is rather an 
endogenous result that is caused by other market influences that determine an 
efficient level of capital concentration.  
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Another frequently neglected argument that affects performance of firms with a 
dominant owner is the ability of the management. If a firm, for example, is owned 
by a family, members of the management will rather be chosen from a pool of 
family members than on the basis of performance related factors like qualification 
and ability. Bloom and van Reenen (2007) as well as Bloom, Sadun and van 
Reenen (2010) show that firms, in which the eldest son becomes manager of a 
firm through inheritance, realize a decline in firm’s performance compared to 
firms with employed managers.  
How such harmful behavior might be avoided if the capital market is not able to 
control a firm perfectly discusses Stiglitz (1985). He argues that beside the 
shareholder side, stakeholders are also able to control the management. In his 
opinion two institutions might also be able to control firms: banks and employees. 
The possibility of employees to participate and control in the supervisory board in 
German corporations is ensured by German codetermination rights. Jirjahn (2011) 
provides a detailed survey of the effects of codetermination in the supervisory 
board. Studies of this kind of codetermination show conflicting results. On the one 
hand, legally given codetermination rights are seen as an intervention of the 
state. Codetermination by employees restricts the owner’s freedom of choice and 
also separates economic risk from the decision making process in the supervisory 
board. This might result in insufficient profitability, a decline of investments and, 
in the worst case, a migration of firms. At least necessary decision on adjustment 
of production in bad economic situations will be delayed in order to save jobs. A 
main argument against codetermination is that except of Germany no other 
country has such pronounced codetermination rights and in no other country 
codetermination rights are voluntarily adopted.  
In contrast, participation theorists highlight that codetermination reduces 
information asymmetries in a corporation (Freeman and Lazear 1995). The 
management has, compared to other shareholders and stakeholders, the best 
information about the current economic situation of a corporation. Such 
information asymmetry might be used to shift rents from the employees to the 
employer. At this, the management refers the economic situation to the 
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employees worse than reality in order to reduce employee’s claims towards the 
corporation. Since employees know such incentives, they will mistrust the 
management, even if the corporation is indeed in a threatening economic 
situation. Participation in the supervisory board by the employees might reduce 
information asymmetries so that the possibility of cheating by the management 
vanishes. This enables agreements between employees and the management that 
otherwise would not be feasible. In bad economic situations, such behavior might 
secure the existence of the corporation and jobs. Additionally, employees have 
information about potential problems in the daily workflow and also potential 
ideas for improvement. If no possibility to communicate such issues exists, 
inefficiencies in production will persist. Codetermination rights might help to 
improve communication between employees and the management so that 
efficiency gains will occur. Furthermore, codetermination might reduce 
opportunistic behavior by the management. This enhances incentives of 
employees to invest in firm specific human capital so that, in the long run, 
productivity gains emerge.  
Fauver and Fuest (2006) discuss the link between employee representation and 
potential agency problems.  Employees in the supervisory board are well informed 
supervisors of the management. If they are interested in long term success of the 
corporation, they might be an institution that even controls the management 
efficiently. In contrast, if employee representatives are the only dominant 
member in the supervisory board, i.e. if no dominant owner exists, they might use 
their power in order to increase employee’s rents at the costs of the other 
shareholders and stakeholders. For example, they might use their power to 
enforce an employment level above the efficient amount of employees63. 
The hypothesis that we analyze in this study is whether the capital side and the 
labor side mutually control each other so that undue benefits of the one side can 
be restricted or even prevented. In this case, both sides have to be organized 
efficiently. That means, the capital side has to be concentrated and the 
                                                          
63 For a more detailed discussion of the effect of codetermination with respect to the 
employment level see Kraft (1998) and Kraft (2001). 
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corporation has to be codeterminated in order to enable a representation of 
employees’ interests. In such situation capital and labor might be well organized 
and the membership in the supervisory board allows efficient communication of 
both sides’ interests as well as efficient control of the management. This might 
have the unexpected consequence that codetermined corporations with 
dominant owners realize higher productivity than non-codetermined companies. 
At least potential negative effects of dominant ownership and codetermination 
respectively could be prevented. 
In practice, some might argue that in Germany the capital owner also has a seat in 
a supervisory board of a corporation. However, this is only true for a minority of 
German corporations. In our sample, in only 33 percent of all corporations the 
share owner also belongs to the supervisory board of not codetermined firms. In 
codetermined firms, the share of such active owners drops to 22 percent. The 
majority of members of supervisory boards are managers from other firms or 
banks as well as former members of the top-management. In principle, the 
owners’ representatives of German supervisory boards are dominated by agents 
that control the management, i.e. other agents. Hence, the interests of the 
principal might even be badly represented so that efficiency losses may occur.    
 
6.3 Related literature 
With respect to codetermination in supervisory boards, only a few studies exist. 
Gorton and Schmid (2004) use a sample of 250 German corporations and analyze 
the effect of codetermination on Tobin’s Q. In their study, they compare one-third 
codetermination with almost-parity codetermination and find that the latter have 
a lower Tobin’s Q than the first corporations. 
Fauver and Fuest (2006) extend the approach of Gorton and Schmid (2004.) They 
use a larger dataset and estimate different model specifications. They find, 
compared to non-codetermined corporations and corporations with almost-parity 
codetermination, a higher Tobin’s Q in one-third codetermined corporations 
across different industries. Their study is comparable with our approach because 
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they also control for ownership concentration. They find negative effects given a 
low ownership concentration yet a positive effect in medium concentrated and 
codetermined corporations. This positive effect, however, is only caused by one-
third codetermination and not almost-parity codetermination. They conclude that 
codetermination seems to have an inverted u-shaped effect on Tobin’s Q. 
FitzRoy and Kraft (2005) estimate production functions with data from 
codetermined and non-codetermined corporations before and after the 
commencement of the German law on codetermination 1976. They find no 
negative effects of almost-parity codetermination. The same results find Kraft and 
Ugarkovic (2006) with respect to return on equity. Kraft and Stank (2004) as well 
as Kraft, Stank and Dewenter (2011) additionally find no effects on innovations64.  
The effects of capital structure on firm performance have been analyzed by a 
large number of studies. Benson and Davidson III (2009) provide a survey of 
previous studies, especially with respect to the effect of managerial ownership. 
Furthermore, Vishny (1997), Denis (2001) as well as Denis and McConnell (2003) 
provide detailed surveys. In a nutshell, previous studies find an effect of 
concentration of ownership and firm performance. Regarding managerial 
ownership, however, Benson and Davidson III (2009, 3) note that „Empirical 
studies, however, have been unable to reach consensus about the actual relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value“.  
  
                                                          
64 A few studies also mainly focus on the effects of one-third codetermination and omit 
almost-parity codetermination, see, e.g., Boneberg (2009) and Wagner (2011). We focus 
on almost-parity codetermination. Hence, we refrain from discussion the results of these 
studies. 
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6.4 Empirical approach 
The aim of our study is to analyze how capital concentration, almost-parity 
codetermination and their interaction affect productivity65. For this, we estimate 
a Cobb-Douglas production function. Our dependent variable is ln(value added). 
As independent variables, we use lagged values of ln(Capital) and ln(Labor). 
Additionally, we add a concentration ratio and an import ratio into our model. 
Both variables are measured at industry level and are used as a proxy for market 
competition. Our main independent variables are Herfindahl index for ownership 
concentration, the type of dominant owner and the incidence of almost-parity 
codetermination. In our first model, we estimate how the effect of 
codetermination differs given changes in ownership concentration. In a second 
model, we estimate whether the effect depends on the type of dominant owner, 
i.e. if the dominant owner is a person or another corporation. 
 
6.4.1 Dataset 
Our estimates are based on self-collected data of German stock companies. Due 
to some missing data with respect to the capital concentration, we use two 
samples. Both samples contain data for the years 1996 to 2008. The first sample 
contains 1583 observations of 383 corporations. The second sample contains 
1670 observations of 381 corporations. The difference in both samples results 
from missing information about all owners of a firm (first sample) and missing 
information about the types of owner of a firm respectively (second sample). We 
could also generate one sample for both estimations. This however would reduce 
the number of observations and therefore reduce the efficiency of our estimates. 
Hence, we prefer to use two samples. Our data only contains corporations from 
the production sector that do not act as a holding or belong to the steel industry 
and coal industry because both industries have their own codetermination rights, 
the Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz. 74 (70 in the second sample) corporation are 
almost parity codetermined according to the German Codetermination Act. We 
                                                          
65 Our study compares the differences in productivity between almost-parity 
codetermined firms and firms that are not almost-parity codetermined, i.e. firms without 
employees in the supervisory board and firms with one-third codetermination. 
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used data from the Hans Böckler Stiftung to identify these companies. Finally, our 
data contains 404 (406) observations of codetermined corporations. At mean, we 
observe a company 4.1 (4.4) years. These relative low mean observation periods 
have two reasons. At first, we dropped observations of a company after it 
changed its accounting methods, declared bankruptcy or changed the company 
structure, i.e. if it converted to a holding or to a GmbH.  Furthermore, in 2005 our 
data has been enlarged with additional companies. This however reduces the 
mean observation time. 
Our accounting data is from annual reports of the Hoppenstedt-Finanzdatenbank 
and the annual reports of the corporations. We also deflated our financial data by 
annual prices of the production sector. Price data is from the Federal Statistical 
Office of Germany. We obtained the information about the ownership structure 
of a company from Wer gehört zu wem, a dataset of the Commerzbank AG. 
Information about import concentration and market concentration are obtained 
from the reports of the German Monopolies Commission. Unfortunately, these 
reports are only published every two years. Hence, we calculated the mean in the 
year before and the year after a missing year in order to close these gaps.  
Table 6.1 contains the mean values and standard deviations of our variables. 
Value added is defined as sales minus material costs. Capital is the total capital 
used. Value added and capital are measured in 1000 euros. Labor is the number of 
employees in a corporation. CoDet76 is a dummy that has unit value if the 
observed company is codetermined according to the German Codetermination 
Act of 1976. Herfindahl measures capital concentration. It is defined as the 
Herfindahl index of the shares of all owners, where an owner has to keep at least 
5 percent of a firm in order not to be defined as part of the public float. If no 
dominant owner exists, we set the Herfindahl index to 0.00001 so that the 
Herfindahl index is always between 0.00001 and 1. The mean value of HERF in our 
data is 0.600 which is a high value compared to other countries. This however can 
be explained by the large number of stock companies that are not listed at a stock 
exchange. They belong to families and other (foreign) corporations respectively. 
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Furthermore, the ownership of German stock companies is highly concentrated 
compared to other countries (Faccio and Lang 2002). 
Additionally, we add the dummy active owner into our model. This variable has 
unit value if the owner of a firm also belongs to the supervisory board. Such active 
owner might have different effects on firm’s performance. On the one hand, he or 
she might increase performance due to a better control of the management by 
the principal so that waste of resources or insufficient effort might be avoided. On 
the other hand, he or she might force the management to invest into less 
profitable projects that increase the owner’s utility at costs of firm performance. 
As an alternative to the Herfindahl index, we use several ownership dummies to 
control ownership effects. We split the owners into three groups and generate 
three dummies: Person, Corporation, and Bank. Each dummy has unit value if the 
dominant owner, a person or a family, another corporation or a bank, of a 
corporation owns at least 25% of all shares. For the estimates with these three 
variables, we use the second sample. 
The effect of corporation age is measured be invAGE.  This variable is the inverted 
value of the age of a firm measured in years. As an alternative specification, we 
also used Age and Age2 was well as ln(Age). This however does not change our 
results. The variable import ratio measures the proportion of imports expressed 
as percentage share of sales at 2-digit industrial level. The classification of 
industries bases on WZ 2003. We use this variable in order to measure 
international pressure of competition.  
In order to measure national pressure of competition, we add the variable market 
conc. in our model. This variable is defined as the Herfindahl index of market 
shares in each 4-digit industry (WZ 2003) multiplied by 100. Furthermore, we add 
time dummies and industry dummies into our model. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable     Mean    Std. Dev. 
Value Added (in 1000 Euro) 289423.100 865757.800 
Capital (in 1000 Euro) 940783.100 3986895.000 
Labor 2542.152 6748.779 
CoDet76 0.245 0.430 
Herfindahl 0.600 0.353 
Person 0.245 0.485 
Corporation 0.476 0.500 
Bank 0.020 0.140 
active owner 0.304 0.460 
invAge 0.021 0.049 
Import ratio (in percent) 62.785 15.825 
market conc. (x100) 8.922 11.611 
 
Note:  Means and standard deviations of Person, Corporation and Bank are based on 
1670 observations. All other values are based on 1583 observations.  
 
6.4.2 Results 
Table 6.2 shows the results of our estimates. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at firm level. We use lagged values of capital and labor in order to 
prevent potential endogeneity problems. The null hypothesis Ho: ln ln 1K Lβ β+ =  , 
i.e. constant returns to scale, cannot be rejected in all specifications. In both 
specifications of Table 6.2, capital concentration has a positive, although not 
significant effect on productivity. Furthermore, an active owner in non-
codetermined firms seems to have no significant effects. A reason for this result 
might be that the costs of generating private benefits and gains from better 
control of the management offset each other66. 
In this study however, the coefficient of the interaction term Herfindahl x CoDet76 
is of particular interest. This coefficient is positive and highly significant.  
                                                          
66 As a robustness check, we also controlled for nonlinear effects of capital concentration. 
We were no able to refuse that linear functional form is the right one. Additionally, in our 
opinion, no objective categorization of a Herfindahl index is possible so we concentrate on 
this specification.  
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Table 6.2: Production function regression results 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff. (Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
lnCapital (t-1) 0.346*** (0.030) 
0.355*** 
(0.029) 
lnLabor (t-1) 0.662*** (0.036) 
0.659*** 
(0.036) 
CoDet76 -0.313*** (0.091) 
-0.371*** 
(0.097) 
Herfindahl 0.062 (0.058) 
0.066 
(0.059) 
Herfindahl x CoDet76 0.397*** (0.112) 
0.402*** 
(0.401) 
Active owner   0.008 (0.043) 
Active owner x CoDet76   0.208** (0.088) 
invAge -0.300 (0.408) 
-0.245 
(0.400) 
Import ratio 0.008** (0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
market conc.  0.002 (0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Constant 2.305*** (0.350) 
2.257*** 
(0.338) 
Time / Industry dummies Included Included 
No. of obs 1583 
P-Value (H0: ln ln 1K Lβ β+ = )   0.649 0.503 
R2 0.931 0.931 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. P-Value shows the p-
value of an F–test with the null of constant returns to scale. 
 
Furthermore, we also find a significant positive effect of active owner x CoDet76. 
In general, our results show different effects of codetermination in the 
supervisory board. If the shares of a corporation are widely distributed, 
codetermination seems to reduce productivity. These results indicate that in such 
companies without any opposing group the employees use their power to enforce 
their interests. For example, they might use their power to delay a necessary 
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reduction of employment during crisis. With increasing capital concentration 
however this negative effect diminishes.   
We even find weak evidence that in highly concentrated corporations 
codetermination increases productivity: in model 1 the null H0:
76 761 1 0×+ × + × ≤CoDet Herfindahl CoDet Herfindahlβ β β  can be rejected at 5%-level
67. 
Note that this test assumes that one owner holds all shares. In the second model 
we find no significant positive effect. This however might be caused by a potential 
collinearity of active ownership and the concentration of capital. In corporations 
with low capital concentration the negative effect of codetermination on 
productivity dominates. 
Table 6.3 shows the results of our estimates where we use ownership dummies 
instead of the Herfindahl index in order to control for different types of owners. 
The reference group is no dominant owner.  The aim of this approach is to analyze 
whether a person more efficiently controls a firm than a corporation because the 
latter might also be bad controlled68.  In our data, no bank is the dominant owner 
of a codetermined corporation. Hence, our models do not contain an interaction 
term of Bank and CoDet76. The results in Table 6.3 support our previous results. 
All interaction terms have a positive effect on productivity. We also do not find a 
difference in the effects of a person and a corporation.  
  
                                                          
67 The p-value of this one-sided t-test is 0.042. 
68 Unfortunately, our data does not allow identifying the capital structure of corporations 
so we do not have any information about the “owner of the owner”.  
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Table 6.3: Production function regression results with different types of 
dominant owners 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff. (Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
lnCapital (t-1) 0.323*** 
(0.032) 
0.333*** 
(0.031) 
lnLabor (t-1) 0.684*** 
(0.038) 
0.677*** 
(0.038) 
CoDet76 -0.111* 
(0.064) 
-0.281*** 
(0.110) 
Person 0.032 
(0.039) 
0.043 
(0.057) 
Person x CoDet76 0.157* 
(0.084) 
0.315*** 
(0.119) 
Corporation 
 
0.018 
(0.052) 
Corporation x CoDet76 
 
0.226** 
(0.109) 
Bank 
 
-0.114 
(0.099) 
invAge -0.061 
(0.335) 
-0.099 
(0.328) 
Import ratio 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
market conc.  0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Constant 2.748*** 
(0.333) 
2.604*** 
(0.328) 
Time / Industry dummies Included Included 
No. of obs 1670 
P-Value (H0: ln ln 1K Lβ β+ = )   0.649 0.637 
R2 0.931 0.936 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. P-Value shows 
the p-value of an F–test with the null of constant returns to scale. 
 
As already mentioned above, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) as well as Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) argue that capital concentration is not exogenous. In their 
opinion, the capital market determines the degree of capital concentration. 
Hence, the existence of a dominant owner might be endogenous. In principle, one 
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might estimate an iv-model in order to take potential endogeneity into account. 
Unfortunately, especially if the effects of capital concentration on firm’s 
performance are estimated, instruments are generally hard to find (Coles, 
Lemmon and Meschke 2012). Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009) use the variance of cash 
flow as a valid instrument. Regrettably, we are not able to calculate a meaningful 
variance due to the short observation periods of our companies. Additionally, 
Zhou (2001) argues that the use of a fixed effects estimator strongly reduces the 
explanatory power of the capital concentration coefficient due to a low volatility 
of ownership. The ownership effect might “hide” behind the fixed effect. Hence, 
we interpret our results following Laeven and Levine (2008), namely by the 
theoretical foundation and robustness of our results. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Our study analyzes the effects of ownership concentration and codetermination 
in the supervisory board on productivity. We find that the effect of 
codetermination strongly depends on the ownership concentration in a 
corporation. In companies with widely spread distribution of shares, almost-parity 
codetermination reduces productivity. This negative effect however diminishes 
with increasing capital concentration. We also find similar effects if the owner 
belongs to the supervisory board. Furthermore, this positive effect is independent 
from the kind of share owner, i.e. it doesn’t matter if the owner is a person or 
family or another corporation. Our results provide evidence that efficiency losses 
caused by employee representatives may be reduced and also might turn to 
efficiency gains if a major shareholder exists and acts as a kind of strong 
opponent. Especially, our results show that codetermination should not be 
analyzed and assessed as an independent, isolated issue. It rather strongly 
depends on other conditions like the ownership structure and the composition of 
the supervisory board. Hence, future research on codetermination in supervisory 
boards might pay more attention to the “environment” of employee 
representatives in supervisory boards. It appears that the effects of the 
constellation of supervisory boards on efficient control of the management and, 
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in association with this, productivity strongly depends on the ownership 
structures and the presence of employee representatives  
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The aim of this dissertation is to provide a more detailed insight into the effects of 
German codetermination rights. For this, I examine major hypotheses regarding 
codetermination from different perspectives that have not been considered so far 
in order to complement or, if necessary, revise previous conclusions. One finding 
of this thesis is that codetermination cannot be considered as an isolated issue. It 
interacts with its environment so that its effects strongly depend on several 
characteristics that have to be considered. For instance, as for many economic 
issues, the answer to the question if works councils affect overtime work or 
supervisory board codetermination affects productivity is: “it depends”. 
Furthermore, heterogeneity between establishments with and without works 
councils has to be considered, especially with respect to rent-sharing issues. In 
this case, there is a danger that apples and oranges are compared. Accordingly, 
previous studies on the effects of work councils on rent sharing mainly focus on 
wage effects and show that codetermined establishments pay higher wages and 
that they are also less profitable. This leads to the conclusion that works councils 
shift rents from the employer to the employees which results in decreasing 
profits. Chapter 4 of this thesis however questions this conclusion because 
codetermined establishments do not more frequently suffer from too high wages. 
Hence, this wage markup that exists between codetermined and non-
codetermined establishments seems not to be caused by rent shifting or, at least, 
the rent shifting effect is negligible. Establishments with works councils however 
more frequently suffer from overemployment. Hence, there is indeed a rent 
shifting behavior. This leads to a higher wage bill yet this roots in a (probably 
temporarily) too high employment level.  In fact, the wage markup that has been 
identified by other studies must either be caused by other factors that have not 
been identified so far or be compensated by works council induced effects like 
higher productivity.  
Furthermore, heterogeneity is a major aspect with respect to the identification of 
the effect of an adoption of a works council on employment growth. Here, the 
chosen control group causes misleading results. If simply establishments with and 
without works councils are compared, the effect on employment growth will be 
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underestimated. This results from a difference in employment growth between 
establishments that do not adopt a works council and establishments that will 
adopt a works council. As the latter growth faster than the first, a comparison of 
establishments with and without works councils is misleading. Furthermore, 
previous studies find that works councils reduce hires and dismissals, which leads 
to the conclusion that works councils reduce employment fluctuation. Although a 
reduction of fluctuation cannot be contested, a lower share of dismissals in 
codetermined establishments cannot be a source of reduced fluctuation because 
lower shares of dismissals are already observed before adoption. In contrast, hires 
are indeed reduced. Thus, works councils seem to make employers act with 
reserve in the case of hires so that the positive argument of fluctuation reduction 
changes to a rather negative argument, namely a delay or even in the worst case a 
prevention of hires. 
The aim how employers react on codetermination is essential for analyzing how 
(long term) welfare is affected by codetermination. Clearly, employees profit from 
codetermination. Otherwise such an institution would not exist. Although, this 
thesis only discusses effects on overtime work and working time preferences and 
therefore ignores many other areas in which works councils may increase 
employee’s utility, Chapters 2 and 3 show that works councils help to improve 
employee’s life-work balance and also support the reconciliation of family and 
working life. However, the rather negative aspect of codetermination on the 
employer’s side in Chapter 4 and 5 shows that codetermination does not lead to a 
Pareto improvement of welfare. Whether the negative effects of Chapters 4 and 
5, whereas especially Chapter 5 suggests a negative long term effect, are 
compensated by the positive effects of codetermination cannot be answered in 
this thesis and is a question for further research. Here the question arises whether 
it is anyway possible to evaluate if, for example, the negative welfare effect of 
reduced employment growth can be compensated by or even compared with 
such soft factors like utility gains from a better working-life balance as it is caused 
by the reduction of overtime work. 
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This thesis may initiate a rather negative conclusion with respect to German 
codetermination rights. That however is not the intention of it. The reader should 
know that codetermination is not a black-box as it is treated by some studies. It is 
a general term for different instruments that are given to employees and may be 
used in line with their preferences in particular situations and lead to particular 
reactions by managers. If, as it is written in Chapter 5, the adoption of a works 
council reduces employment growth, than no one would pronounce that 
codetermination is harmful per se. It rather means that there are some parts of 
German codetermination rights which, at mean, lead to a lower employment 
growth compared to non-codetermined establishments. Of course, there may be 
other aspects of German codetermination rights that are able to affect welfare 
positively, even in the sense of Pareto. As a final remark I would like to point out 
an argument that has not been stated so far. A main argument against 
codetermination, which appears in several chapters of this dissertation, is that if 
codetermination increases efficiency, managers would introduce it voluntarily. In 
the same sense, some also might argue: if mandatory codetermination is harmful 
in the long run, it would not be a major part of German industrial relations for 
almost 100 years. 
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